Tenth Annual International Academic Conference on European Integration

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:
NEW PROSPECTS

Tenth annual international academic conference on European integration

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: NEW PROSPECTS

Tenth annual international academic conference on European integration
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: NEW PROSPECTS
Skopje, Thursday 21 May 2015

Editors:
Prof. Dr. Ivan Dodovski
Prof. Dr. Robert C. Hudson

Program Committee:
Prof. Dr. Mihail Arandarenko, University of Belgrade
Dr. Desislava Ljubomirova Boshnakova, New Bulgarian University, Sofia
Prof. Dr. Jeremy Cripps, University of Findlay, USA
Prof. Dr. Ivan Dodovski, University American College Skopje
Prof. Dr. Robert C. Hudson, University of Derby, UK
Prof. Dr. Mehmet Zeki Ibrahimgil, Gazi University, Ankara
Prof. Dr. Stevo Pendarovski, University American College Skopje
Prof. Dr. Marjan Petreski, University American College Skopje
Prof. Dr. Nebojša Ranđelović, University of Niš
Prof. Dr. Miodraga Stefanovska, University American College Skopje
Prof. Dr. Charalampos Tsardanidis, Institute of International Economic Relations, Athens
Dr. Jaka Vadnjal, GEA College for Entrepreneurship, Ljubljana
Prof. Dr. Johan G. Wissema, Delft University of Technology

Proof reading:
Prof. Dr. Robert C. Hudson

Design & Layout:
UACS

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: NEW PROSPECTS

Edited by:
Ivan Dodovski
Robert C. Hudson

University American College Skopje

Skopje, 2015

European Integration: New Prospects

Table of Contents

ICT EUROPE: INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

LEGAL EUROPE AND BEYOND: FROM TRANSITION TO INTEGRATION THROUGH LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE

European Integration: New Prospects
Introduction

Robert C. Hudson and Ivan Dodovski

This volume is made up of selection of carefully selected peer-reviewed papers originally presented at the 10th international conference entitled: "European Integration: New Prospects" which was held in Skopje on 21 May 2015.

The papers were written against the background of a number of serious issues confronting Europe at the time; particularly, issues affecting the economy, migration and security. Whilst some EU member states seemed to be slowly emerging from the global economic crisis, which had had such a deep impact on Europe since 2008, concerns remained over how to achieve economic growth and create jobs in order to build social cohesion. There were concerns too over rising unemployment, especially amongst European youth and the rise of extremism throughout the continent which could impact on social cohesion and stability in the face of economic austerity. One particular question remained over whether or not enlargement would provide a solution to many of Europe's problems or if it would engender further problems; whilst aspirant countries from South Eastern Europe needed to be fully aware of the hurdles that they would have to go through if they were to create and sustain true civil societies – prerequisites for EU-membership status. There would also be a need too for greater regional cooperation, especially in South Eastern Europe and the need to settle cross-border disputes in a further bid to usher in greater political stability and economic development and to attract foreign direct investment.

Meanwhile, Europe was confronted with new security concerns: such as the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the simmering conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The situation had been exacerbated by the rise of ISIS or Daesh, which had led not only to an increase in terrorist threats at the heart of Europe, but had also begun to impact on continuing conflicts in countries such as Syria and Iraq. These conflicts would in turn lead to steadily increasing flows of migration into South Eastern and Central Europe throughout the summer of 2015, in what would prove to be the worst refugee crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War. Growing tension arose between concepts of European open societies on the one hand and Fortress Europe on the other. This could impact

on cross border cooperation which would be set against the closing of frontiers and threaten the continued existence of the Schengen agreement of 1995.

These are some of the issues addressed in this book which are of great importance to those western Balkan countries which are aspiring to become EU member states in the not too distant future. As such our book is made up of twelve chapters and divided into three parts. The first part concerns "Current Dilemmas Confronting the Common European Home: Unity and Diversity, Prosperity and Culture". The Second part concentrates on "ICT Europe: Inclusion and Exclusion" and the third part is dedicated to "Legal Europe and Beyond: From Transition to Integration through Legislation and Practice".

Part One: Current Dilemmas Confronting the Common European Home: Unity and Diversity, Prosperity and Culture

European unity and diversity is not a recent innovation and the idea of celebrating European unity has been with us across the centuries, though it has often been brought about by force in the past. In the opening chapter of the first part of this book on Current Dilemmas Confronting the Common European Home, Jeremy Cripps makes it clear from the start that the international university community should play a leading role in the move toward celebrating greater unity and diversity in Europe in a bid to strengthen current and future aspirations for peace and development. He particularly highlights the role that can be played by academics in the humanities and the liberal arts in this process. In this carefully constructed and articulately expressed analysis, Cripps considers four key areas which lie at the heart of developing much more successful integration across Europe; these are: religious tolerance, the roles of culture and education, and the use of language. Recognizing that there are twenty-four working languages in the European Union, the author acknowledges that this might only serve to hinder communication, to say nothing of considering the implications of cost to the EU member states. By contrast, a unified language system might be the best way forward, as indeed the great powers of the past and present have resorted to the use of a single language, starting with the Roman Empire. Indeed, the author takes us back to the Antonine period of the Roman Empire, as his starting point, seeing the Antonines as the early masters of European diversity. In this thoughtful and provoking essay, the author takes his reader through a wide range of different societies and cultures, and a raft of cultural, historical and literary references in arguing his case. Ultimately Cripps refers to the Nobel Economics Laureate Joseph Stiglitz whose belief it was that

"Europeanisation can be reshaped to realize its potential for good", advocating that if we are to move forward, we need to study and be aware of the changes that have been taking place and the reasons why they actually took place, so as to enable us to move on and focus on the changes that will be needed if we are to eventually achieve more effective European integration. Clearly, a solid grounding in European history and culture would have a major role to play in this Europeanization process.

Building on the previous chapter, the theme of language politics is taken up by Zlat Milovanovic in his chapter on multilingualism and monolingualism in the institutions of the European Union. Milovanovic opens with a multi-lingual approach to the European Union and then narrows things down to the potential choice of using a single European language for the EU. Milovanovic recognizes that multilingualism helps to maintain transparency in the work of the European institutions and that it facilitates communication between European citizens as well as improving efficiency. Furthermore, he makes the practical observation that those who want to have a real influence in the EU cannot just stick to their national languages, but must have a working knowledge of others. Nevertheless, he also recognizes that the EU and other European organizations and their institutions will eventually need to resort to a common language in addition to all the languages currently in use, if they are to achieve broader social integration, a sense of European Citizenship, new opportunities for study and work in wider geographical areas, and businesses which are able to reach out to all parts of the single market while being more competitive abroad. Ultimately, if the EU is to develop into a new nation and a global power in its own right, it will need its own language as a *condition sine qua non* of the Union. This monolingual approach can be seen as a more practical development; but, the problem is which language should be chosen as the working language of the EU? This opens up a whole can of worms. Otherwise, Milovanovic offers a cornucopia of detail on European languages and ethnic minorities throughout his chapter. He also provides fascinating insight into the problems confronting translation and simultaneous interpretation. Picking up on the references to the Roman Empire in Cripps' chapter, Milovanovic mischievously posits that Latin could eventually become the official language of the EU and other international bodies, especially in the light that it had served as the language of diplomacy well into the 18th century, and its use as the language of communication in the Catholic Church. Indeed, he argues a very convincing case for the use of Latin as the ideal language for use in the EU, before going onto acknowledge the potential of artificial languages, such as Esperanto as a potential solution to

many language problems and as a means of circumventing many political and cultural problems. Ultimately Milovanovic believes that at some point in the future, one language will have to be selected, and that nations and institutions should be ready for change.

Twenty-five years after the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and in the light of the problems confronting European security in the wake of the Ukrainian conflict, Robert Hudson asks the question, "Are we now at the end of the End of the Cold War?" By returning to the motivation behind the creation of what would eventually become the European Union, he wonders if the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative has proven to be too ambitious in the light of more recent developments, particularly with regard to Europe's current relationship with Russia. Indeed, has the crisis in Ukraine opened Cold War wounds, and what are the regional repercussions of this frozen conflict? Certainly, if Russia had been seen as a non-threat to the West in the Yeltsin years (1991 – 1999) the West would be in for a rude awakening as the first decade of the 21st century progressed and one of Russia's most popular and populist leaders established his power base. This chapter takes into account the role of the Eastern Partnership and asks if this expansion into Eastern Europe, into what Russia perceives as its own region of "privileged interest" has been a step too far, at least from a Russian perspective. Hudson also considers the role played by the United States in the Euro-Atlantic Project, arguing that although the US might well be currently focusing its attention on the Pacific region and the rise of China, and concerns over North Korea, to say nothing of the current threat from ISIS, it would be an over-exaggeration to advocate that the United States has actually abandoned Europe, as some commentators have been doing recently. Ultimately, the return to armed conflict on the continent in 2014 came as a deep shock to the West and this was set against the background of the continuing economic crisis. Yet for all this, Hudson does not see a return to the Cold War, but rather that we are at the end of the End of the Cold War; and, the crucial point is that we are heading into a much more multi-polar world than either the Cold War era or the US dominated post-Cold War decade. If all sides concerned become mutually interdependent, then there is at least some hope for the future.

In the fourth chapter in this book, Ljupcho Stevkovski and Dushko Stojanovski analyze the current situation concerning illegal migration in the Balkans. The authors note that the continuing conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan have stimulated an ever-increasing number of refugees who pose an asymmetric risk to the Balkans as the transit region to their final destination

in EU member states. Their hypothesis is that the lack of any clear and coordinated strategy at the European Union level, in terms of dealing with the problem of illegal migration, will lead to a further deterioration of this crisis and to increased flows of refugees into Europe, impacting not only on EU member states, but also on the transit states of the Balkans. The authors present an overview of the current migration crisis with interesting insights into the methods, processes and routes used by people smugglers across the Balkans, with a focus on activities in the Republic of Macedonia. At the time of writing, the real issue remains the lack of a coordinated and consistent EU-wide policy to the biggest refugee crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War. The growing number of migrants from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan as well as those from Eritrea, Algeria and other African countries remains one of the key problems for both the EU and transit countries that are not EU member states to contend with at the current time. This can impact upon security and is expected to boost the level of crime and corruption in South Eastern Europe, potentially exacerbated by the involvement of local criminal networks; and, in turn, from a security perspective the migration crisis could further impact upon the stability not only in the Balkans but also across the rest of Europe by exacerbating simmering ethnic tensions and frozen conflicts.

Challenges in society can also be reflected in dwellings, as part of the physical expression of living. In their chapter on New Prospects for the European Home, Violeta Bakalchev, Minas Bakalčev and Mitko Hadzi Pulja have divided their research findings into two sections. The first deals with the transformation of a residential area, taking as an example the buildings originating from the 1950s in a housing estate within the city of Skopje. The second section provides a description of two competing models of integration performed in two contemporary films: *The Piano Room* (Igor Ivanov Izi, 2013) and *Soul Kitchen* (Fatih Akin, 2009). The authors demonstrate how for many people, the post-socialist transition that took place in a number of countries in Europe meant the end of modernity, or rather the end of a social system based on social solidarity, resulted in the transformation to a discourse based on personal and individual rights and liberties. Consequently, through a number of individual actions, the occupants of these apartment blocks have transformed their modest buildings into distinctive domestic zones. Extending their presence beyond given boundaries, they have created a new residential atmosphere from the inside to the outside, flat by flat, building by building; and, through personal and social-cultural alterations, the occupants have reacted to this new period. The two films, which the authors describe and analyze in the last part of their chapter

present models of integration as extreme scenarios through which the European reality of exclusivity and inclusiveness can be expressed. Ultimately, from both parts of their work, the reader can see how the entire life of a home may be seen as a dialogue between its physical characteristics and the activities taking place within it.

Part Two: ICT Europe: Inclusion and Exclusion

Digital exclusion and concerns that the elderly are being marginalized and excluded from society has become a serious problem in Europe today. The need for older people to develop skills in the use of the Internet and ICT is essential, especially when one considers that the growing number of people in Europe aged between 65 and 80 years of age is estimated at 40 per cent of the population between 2010 and 2030, and that a quarter of the European population will be over 65 years of age by 2020. In Macedonia itself, the age group from 55 to 74 years of age uses computers and the Internet significantly less than other age groups, whilst across Europe, 120 million European citizens have never used the Internet and older age tends to be the principal factor in explaining this. In our sixth chapter, Ivana Stojanovska, Marjana Vaneva and Biljana Stojcevska address the issue of E-inclusion by focusing upon the digital divide and ICT acceptance among the elderly, by comparing the situation in Macedonia with that of Bulgaria and Romania.

In this sensitive and illuminating chapter the authors draw our attention to the fact that the Digital Agenda for Europe is calling for a halving of the proportion of the European population that has never used the Internet to 15 per cent by 2015. They consider the reasons why only two thirds of Europeans aged between 65 and 74 have never used the Internet and they look at different projects for encouraging the use of the Internet for older people as well. The authors draw upon the experience of Bulgaria and Romania to help Macedonia overcome the digital divide, given that those two countries are both among the top five countries that have the highest rate of non-users in the EU.

ICT is becoming increasingly relevant to political systems these days and clearly continues to pose a challenge to the model of representative democracy as it stands. We continue our theme on ICT and the Internet in Europe by focusing on the promise of E-democracy and the myths about Digital Agoras. In chapter 7, the authors, Stevo Pendarovski, Veno Pachovski and Marko Andonov offer a brief survey of European and United States achievements in the field of E-voting and Internet-voting in order to show how political, technical and

security concerns still prevail, before focusing on the eventual possibility of Internet-voting in the Republic of Macedonia. Based on a student survey the authors draw attention to the fact that 44 per cent of respondents emphasized the importance of easier access to the network and the convenience that this would provide for elderly, disabled people and for members of the Macedonian diaspora. Reflecting on the concerns about the digital divide and ICT acceptance among the elderly raised in the previous article, one would presume that these elderly voters are actually ICT-literate in the first place, or that initiatives will be put in place to help them reach that goal. Another interesting finding was that Internet-voting might provide a means of avoiding potentially tense situations and violence in polling stations as well as providing a faster and cheaper means of counting the vote. But, at the end of the day, the reality is that traditional voting systems are not going to disappear for some time yet. Indeed, a quick and radical shift from a representative to an Internet-based democracy is not likely in the foreseeable future, whilst 'blended-democracy' or a mixed model of democracy is nevertheless developing steadily, but surely.

Although Macedonian society is still regarded as a society in democratic transition, serious efforts have been made to develop and enhance the information society in that country. The next chapter by Ganka Cvetanova, Veno Pachovski and Irena Bojadzievska evaluates the digital platform for the engagement of citizens in the process of open policy making in the Republic, in comparison with digital platforms in Finland and the United Kingdom. These countries were selected because of their strong commitment to the open policy-making process, set against the background of the EU initiative for citizens' engagement. As such the open policy-making process is analyzed in all three countries from the following aspects: the legal basis, reforms in the public sector, and tools that enable citizens' engagement with the reflections of civil society in the whole process. In all three cases, legitimacy is given to civil society organizations and the feedback provided has had a strong impact on open policy-making. Furthermore, the authors' findings provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between digital platforms for citizens' engagement, and the importance of Civil Service reform, as key elements in the open policy-making process.

The European Union is built upon peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and a respect for human rights, which above all else requires social solidarity, anti-discrimination and transparency. So, it is not surprising that EU membership criteria are notoriously difficult to fulfill. After all, it took Croatia ten years to achieve full membership status. Furthermore, if we take Romania

as an example, it was the first post-communist country in Europe to have official relations with the EU in 1993, whilst Romania had already had preferential status with the EC since 1974, yet it would not be until 1 January 2007 and that Romania would become a fully-fledged member state of the European Union. This is interesting for aspirant countries from South Eastern Europe which need to be fully aware of the hurdles that they will have to go through if they are to create and sustain true civil societies, and ensure a crackdown on corruption and organized crime. They also need to ensure human rights protection and the protection of minorities, as well as fully engaging in sustainable development and good governance, so that they may become more attractive to outside investment. Nikola Radunović picks up on one aspect of the accession process for joining the EU, by making a comparative analysis between Montenegro and Croatia (the latest country to gain EU member status on 1 July 2013) in those countries' treatment of the Information Society and the media. In his chapter, he places particular emphasis on the role of the Internet, and he asks whether or not the Montenegrin authorities are genuinely trying to enable free access to wireless Internet for all their citizens as part of a bid to enhance a greater democratic environment and put a stop to social exclusion, or whether the Montenegrin government is just going through the motions in its desire to achieve EU member status. In his conclusion, Radunović offers a series of recommendations to accelerate the true development of e-democracy in Montenegro.

Part Three: Legal Europe and Beyond: From Transition to Integration through Legislation and Practice

Regional cooperation is one of the most important elements in creating new relations in South Eastern Europe, strengthening political stability and economic development, which are important preconditions for the countries in this region in their EU accession processes. Krum Efremov, Jasmina Majstoroska and Ilijana Petrovska present a comparison and analysis of one of the pillars of the South East Europe 2020 Strategy on the commitment and determination of all seven governments in South Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia) for achieving a higher level of socio-economic growth that will facilitate integration within the EU. The authors observe that attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), whereby a company based in one country will invest into a company based in another country, is one of the key strategies and pillars

for enabling economic growth. They contribute to the expansion of productive capacity, job creation, income growth, knowledge and the diffusion of technology, among other things, especially as, in general the level of FDI inflow into a country is an indicator that shows the attractiveness of its market. Of course, this is set against global competition for foreign investment which can be fierce, to say nothing of the competition between rival South East European countries. The most attractive sectors for FDI in the region are energy and the transport infrastructure, then agriculture, tourism and the renewable energy sectors. However, the authors acknowledge that there are weaknesses in the region which will have to be overcome if FDI is to be attracted to the Western Balkans. These include issues such as: corruption, poor work ethics, and inadequately educated work forces and inefficient government bureaucracy. Above all, the most important fact is that all countries define and target FDI as a pillar for economic growth, projecting higher FDI inflow in 2020 compared with 2010. Within this context, the lowest projections for attracting FDI have Montenegro projecting 22 per cent growth and the highest expectations were projected by Croatia at 360 per cent growth, with the Republic of Macedonia at 270 per cent growth. The reality is that Montenegro would probably attract much more FDI than the figures that have been projected, whilst Macedonia has been far too ambitious in its projections. There are however two further negatives to overcome if substantial FDI is to be achieved. The first concerns the impact of the EU and world recession and the second concerns political instability in South Eastern Europe.

Mediation represents the values of the EU, especially in the areas of tolerance, the peaceful settlement of disputes and greater access to justice. Indeed, EU policy makes it clear that mediation is a desirable way of resolving cross-border disputes in the interest of a single market and the community building of European citizens. Mediation also has the power to reduce costs, time and resources which would otherwise have to be deployed for the judicial resolution of disputes. In the eleventh chapter on European Standards and Principles in the Law of Macedonia on Cross Border Mediation, Kimo Cavdar, Jasmina Dimitrieva and Zoran Sapurik argue that if Macedonia were eventually to become a member of the European Union it would do well to fully engage with European Law on Mediation and European Directive 2008/52/EC on cross border mediation. To this end, the authors of this chapter have provided an analysis of the applicable standards and principles which have had an impact on mediation legislation within the Macedonian legal system, and they contrast this with mediation legislation from Italy, France, Germany and the UK, in order to

learn from their experience in the transposition of the EU cross-border directive. The authors advocate that the Macedonian government should conduct an awareness raising campaign, not only about the use of mediation in domestic matters, but also regarding cross-border matters in view of the EU Directive mentioned above. They believe that the transposition of the EU Cross-Border Directive into Macedonian legislation would enable the greater prospect of European integration for Macedonia, given that Macedonia is surrounded by EU member countries and by countries with the prospect of European integration.

Cross-border cooperation is a process which helps to overcome socio-political fractures between states and provides a tool for generating integrated regional continuity. In our final chapter the authors Daniele Del Bianco and Marina Andeva argue that cross-border cooperation is one of the key phenomena that both characterizes and influences the current process of European integration. This chapter provides an overview of the current analytical approaches employed in decoding and fostering cross-border cooperation processes in Europe. The authors show how cross-border cooperation is a concerted process of building neighborly relationships between local stakeholders and authorities on both sides of national land and sea frontiers. Then they comment on how the re-centralization of a border area may be understood as being a process by which any given border area may be repositioned from having played a peripheral role to playing a central role in any given system, whether from an economic, cultural or social perspective. They explain the nature and role of EDEN (E-Database Empowering Networks) a database which is used by practitioners to overcome obstacles to cross-border cooperation and demonstrate how analytical tools, such as SWOT analysis and capacity building instruments, and the EDEN platform are essential in shaping robust and sustainable cooperative processes across borders, in a bid to improve the daily life of the inhabitants of border areas.

***

The main aim of this book has been to take an in-depth look into the state of affairs concerning the vital layers of the architecture of the European Union, and to explore new and alternative prospects of European integration from a critical and forward-looking perspective that goes beyond the stalemate in the internal debate and the controversies over future enlargement. At the end of the day the authors and editors believe that this book reflects the intense debate which has arisen across the European Union in recent times over the

need for achieving economic growth, creating jobs and building social cohesion, as well as meeting refugee and migration challenges, enhancing cross border cooperation and addressing some of the challenges facing European security. Crucial to these challenges will be greater transparency, better integration and above all a firm commitment to European stability. We believe that this book will make a significant contribution not only to European Studies and European Integration Studies, but also to a variety of related subjects and academic disciplines as well as helping to understand and shape economic and political cultures in the Western Balkans.

Current Dilemmas Confronting the Common European Home: Unity and Diversity, Peace, Prosperity and Culture

Celebrating European Diversity: Interpretations in Religion, Language, Culture, and Education

Jeremy Cripps

Abstract

This chapter celebrates that "most happy and prosperous" period of European integration which occurred in the first century under the Antonines. What led to the decline and fall of that Roman celebration and where lies the potential for a future "most happy and prosperous" celebration of our diversity in Europe? Four key areas where our diversity may lead to full integration are identified as they were seen to be the foundations of the Antonine period of peace and prosperity throughout the then expanding Roman Empire. The benefits of diversity particularly for the European Union have been identified by many academics over time. The process of European Integration continues to foster the idea that: "we have the ability to achieve, if we master the necessary goodwill, a common global society blessed with a shared culture of peace that is nourished by the ethnic, national and local diversities that enrich our lives" (Mahnaz, 2002). So the achievement of a broad range of diversity has to become an accepted part of the growth outlook for our European community. It is the role of the international university community, particularly those with a liberal arts focus to play a leading role in the move toward diversity. We must become leaders in the recognition of the importance of diversity in strengthening current and future aspirations for peace and development. This paper therefore reflects upon the success of the Antonine period of peace and prosperity and carefully considers the four key areas and the foundation that they may provide as a benchmark for a better and more successful integration across the European continent than is today available.

Keywords: *Diversity, European integration, a single language, liberal arts education, theological rancor, cross-cultural tolerance.*

"If a man were called upon to fix the period in the history of the world during
which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous,
he would, without hesitation, name that which elapsed from the death
of Domitian to the accession of Commodus."
(Gibbon, 2003)

There is little question that European diversity is not a new innovation, the idea of celebrating unity among people has been and is with us in many ways for many years, even though we may have too often preferred to identify differences rather than look for unifying interpretations, for positive recognition of differences and thus the potential for mutual appreciation of the richness of choice. The unification of people, often by force, has been a traditional form of consolidating a nation's military victories for as long as there has been war. For unity to be celebrated history suggests there is a better path.

Probably the early masters of European diversity were the Romans, whose Empire was in their time the largest ever known to mankind. Describing reasons for the initial prosperity of the Roman Empire in the Age of the Antonines (Birley, 1965) Edward Gibbons, noted:

- the lack "of theological rancor;"
- the adoption of a single language;
- cross-cultural tolerance from employment in the "exercitus" (the armed forces),
- and from organized liberal arts education, the "aspiring genius" of adapting to "virtue and merit;" wherever they were found in the Empire.

Once European diversity was celebrated. The "aspiring genius" was to adopt virtue and merit for their own sake wherever they were found "among slaves or strangers, enemies or Barbarians." There was then, in the Age of the Antonines, a time when the human race; asserted the "independent dignity of reason"; was governed "under the guidance of virtue and wisdom;" and "was most happy and prosperous" (Gibbon, 2003).

The decline and fall of Rome, "the long decay" (Durant, 1993) was caused, was authored, by many interrelated events. Among the principal causes explored by Edward Gibbon were:

- religious and other quarrels which promoted division and which continued after the Fall of the Roman Empire (Heather, 2011) were to lead eventually, through ignorance and irrational dogma to

genocide by the Inquisition (Lea, 2013), to the prosecution of opponents of antisocial religious bigots and even today to a continuing refusal by religious fanatics to adhere to the tolerance required by the founders of the religion they claim to follow;

- the adoption of vernacular corruptions of the Roman language which contributed to misunderstanding and restricted communication. As Oscar Wilde (1887) noted, even when the language is thought to be the same, great countries may be "divided by a common language";

- how the sanctity of service was "degraded by personal vices" and the implications of biological diversity raised barriers not only between races, but even between the sexes;

- and the operation of "prejudice and interest," the "preference for imagination over sense" and the appearance of "profound ignorance." In this way groups asserted modes of individual behavior far beyond the idea espoused by St Ambrose in his advice to St Augustine that: "Si fueris Romae, Romano vivito more; si fueris alibi, vivito sicut ibi" (Titelman, 1996).

A Wider Celebration

The purpose of this paper is to examine ways in which we might learn from the decline and fall from times "most happy and prosperous " and, adjusting our behavior accordingly, might better celebrate European diversity. This requires fundamental change so that we begin, more conscientiously, to focus on being in a world where many more of us can be happy and prosperous than the casualties from war and inhumanity presently allow. The focus will be to review how much better our interpretations of four areas of human behavior ought to be. So the focus will dwell on how European interpretations on religion might be more tolerant: on the power and probabilities of fewer languages: on the prospect of a greater respect for dignity at the expense of hypocrisy: and the opportunities provided by continuous improvement in understanding the benefits to be enjoyed by an educated people. In part the purpose is to better understand the successes and the mistakes in human history; the success that celebrated European diversity and the decay that broke apart the celebration; and, to identify one road that might again lead us to better celebrate European diversity.

Interpretations and Religion

Interpretations of God begin with the need for certainty in our everyday behavior. Avoidance of uncertainty about the future is a basic feature of our everyday. We look to insurance, employ superstition, and adhere to certain beliefs as we confront what Hofstede called "the second dimension of national culture" (Hofstede, 2001) the need for uncertainty avoidance.

An early example of our ability to tolerate religious compromise began, ever so long ago, with our recognition of the Sabbath. The Sabbath, a universal day of ceasing (Living words, 2015) to work, is a day for rest. But the origin of this seventh day activity is uncertain (Richmond, 1956). The interpretation of this date by religious authorities as a day of worship rather than a day for "ceasing to work" is an early manifestation of the power in human relations, of politics, but of a special form of politics which goes under the universal term religion. So, in the Christian world, the days are named after the North European Pagan Gods (Tiw, Wodin, Thor, Freya) or their Roman equivalent (Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus) combined with the visible planets (Sun, Moon and Saturn) and their origins, whether they celebrate days of work and days of ceasing to work are lost to us.

Edward Gibbon writes of religious toleration in early Antonine Rome noting: "The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher, as equally false; and by the magistrate, as equally useful" (Gibbon, op. cit.). And this toleration produced not only mutual indulgence, but even a certain religious concord.

Territorially extensive though the Antonine Roman Empire was, the diverse elements rarely came together except in indirect or direct service to the Empire. Transport was reserved for trade and the military and rarely for tourism and travel. In any case, in the context of service to the Empire, arguments about religion were seen to serve no positive purpose.

Yet, as the Empire grew, the centralized administration gradually gave way to devolution and in turn the devolution allowed religions to come together and the supporters of the religions, like too many modern football hooligans, as victims of "the British disease," were prepared "to bury internal differences to battle it out with foreign fans and police on the pavements of European cities" (Asser, 2000). Then, as too often now, the attention of the armed forces changed from maintaining borders to reducing internal revolt.

And the sequence of religious rancor and religious intoleration grew in contrast to the universal teaching of tolerations espoused by religions. The secular acceptance of other gods was suddenly intolerable. Religious "fundamentalists" asserted doctrinal messages based on second hand derivations of the oral history of Prophets (Slick, 2015; and Kathir, 2015). And how those powerful in religion made us mourn (Burns, 1965); how society too often and wrongly depended on their interpretation of the meaning of their Holy Books. Thus religious diversity was continuously handicapped by the intellectual weakness of religious leaders, their lack of humanity or, as Burns wrote, their inhumanity (Reid, 2010), upon their so often incorrect understanding of the potential benefits to be gained from everyday activity with which they insisted their community collectively might not conform.

The extraordinary growth of the European economy during the last 300 years has also seen an acceleration of the coming together of the world's diverse elements. And yet it seems to be a myth that: "Europe has matured out of its religious past and into a permanent secular future" (Malone, 2005) as so many issues from the recent murders of a secular film maker and cartoonists, the ban on headscarves in France, significant post immigration civil unrest, may be leading the way to a new, albeit political, spiritualism.

Interpretations in Language

Nicholas Wade writing in the *New York Tim*es hypothesized that "in the beginning, there was one people, perhaps no more than 2,000 strong, who had acquired an amazing gift, the faculty for complex language" (Greenberg, 2000). As their descendants adapted to European geographical diversity, their developing languages derived from a single ancient mother tongue until: "speaking 5,000 languages," they reached many stages where they were actually unable to communicate with each other.

European diversity most recently has seen a reduction in the number of languages so that in the process more of the world's peoples can communicate together. "English is the universal language on the Internet" (Korpela, 2013). English has become the major language of the world, "the language of business and government; … the language of maritime communication and international air traffic control" (Kitao, 2000). English is also the language of much international popular culture, particularly, as catalysts, music and the cinema which extend the language throughout the world.

The process has happened as native dialects, like the Leicestershire language (Evan, 2013) in England lost out to the importance of understanding about the dangers threatening people. BBC radio in England over the period of the Second World War saw better use for a standard version of "Queen's English" (Queen's, 2015) which could readily be understood by the majority of the radio and television audience. Richard Dimbleby (MBC, 2015), BBC commentator on the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth in 1953 was, by many, considered to articulate the standard pronunciation and phraseology for "Queen's English." I know for that is the English I was taught.

The process has accelerated with the growth of the Internet as a source for research, as a tool for education, as an important marketing medium, as a generator of international, of European trade, and then as a focus for entertainment, for skills and crafts and hobbies and most recently for crowd sourcing social media.

Language, an example of Hofstede's first dimension of national culture, provides an opportunity to reduce "power distance" (Hofstede, p. 17). Language can help move the elitist society to a more pluralist society. This process has been noted by Thomas Friedman as "one of the ten forces that flattened the world" (p. 57). Friedman quotes one of Bill Gates's early mottoes to give every individual "IAYF" (Friedman, 2005), that is information (in English) at your fingertips. Internet connectivity, workflow software, uploading, outsourcing, are other forces of language which are helping the process of flattening the world, reducing power distance, and providing a wealth of future opportunities to celebrate the Europeanization of communications.

Now in Europe there are "24 official and working" languages (European Commission, 2015). As an unfortunate result European nations do not have to provide national data which is easily translated into other "official and working" languages. We know that "a large number of official languages hinders communication and imposes substantial financial and legal costs" (Fidrmuc et al, 2007).

A unified language system identifies the great powers past, present, and perhaps future. This unifies a legal system when the language can be easily understood and uniformly applied. These features, together with a single currency identify the essential elements on which a strong economy may build. In modern Europe, in contrast to Antonine Rome, only one of these elements have yet been adopted and the others are essential to provide the synergy that European Union integration needs.

Interpretations about Culture

European Diversity was celebrated in literature as in Cicero's descriptions of how the leaders of community groups "'turned in two or more directions" (Cicero, 55 BC). Which direction to take depended on the interpreter. The different religious directions, in their so many forms, were reconciled under the Antonines in the interests of reason and piety; challenged; and compromised. Perhaps no better example of the application of reason and the employment of compromise may be found than at the Council of Nicea (Davis, 1988).

This "religious harmony of the ancient world" (Gibbon, p. 238) declined as "the sullen obstinacy" and the "peculiar rites and unsocial manners" of so-called "religious" sects demonstrated the third dimension of Hofstede's national culture, the unfortunate clash as individualism is opposed to collectivism (Hofstede, p. 209 et seq.). Since then we have seen, almost universally from religions, an inability to accept what some call the "golden rule" and others the "ethic of reciprocity" (Religious Tolerance, 2015).

Briefly, as Socrates is said to have observed we should: "not do to others that which would anger us if others did it to you" (Virtue Science, 2015). As wolves are gregarious and tigers are solitary (Hofstede, p. 205), so human societies display different degrees of acceptable collectivism and acceptable individualism. Over a broad range of issues we seem unable to avoid those who insist on collective action interacting often brutally with those who insist on individualism.

The range of issues is large and frequently associated with other than the basic features of "sullen obstinacy," "peculiar rites" and "unsocial manners." Cloaked under interpretations by social, political, and religious leaders, the fundamental rules of tolerance found in the New Testament (Matthew, 7.1), the Hadith (Nawawi, 2015), and the Talmud (Talmud, Shabbat 3id), are cast aside in favor of the Papal Bull, the Fatwa, and the threat of excommunication which, at least for rational man, demonstrate the inability of too many collectivists to accept the rights of the individual.

The hypocrisy of the failing leaders, inevitably provides examples for their followers which identify (for those who wish to celebrate Europeanization) the need for European leaders to be transparent and accountable. This is an issue today not half a mile from here in Skopje. Transparency here refers to the provision of information that is "accessible, visible and understandable" (Van

Gruening, 2003). Accountability means the justification of actions and the taking of responsibility for those actions.

The problems between the competing interests of those who believe in individual choice, and those who support a collective choice seem to cause most of our social friction and the political actions of both sides seem keen on avoiding either justification for their proposals or accountability for the actions they take.

Those who believe in collectivism continue to offer challenges to those who prefer individualism. This was beautifully illustrated by Wilfred Thesiger in *Arabian Sands*. He noted that: "All that is best in the Arabs has come to them from the desert: their deep religious instinct, which has found expression in Islam; their sense of fellowship, which binds them as members of one faith; their pride of race; their generosity and sense of hospitality; their dignity and the regard which they have for the dignity of others as fellow human beings; their humor, their courage, their patience, the language which they speak and their passionate love of poetry. But the Arabs are a race which produces it's best only under conditions of extreme hardship and deteriorate progressively as living conditions become easier" (Thesiger, 1959).

And we watch this clash between the collectivism from those who have come in from the desert and the individualism from the traders in the souk, play out in a rich naturally endowed environment no more unusually than in so many other societies where the division of wealth depends on historical interpretations of rights to the fatally non-specific yet inalienable rights to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" (Declaration of Independence, 1776) which we find so difficult to share. As we are seeing in the coming 2016 United States Presidential contest even the notion of basic healthcare is considered by the collectivist as a "right", by the individualist as a privilege which is as yet, in the richest Society in the World, unavailable to millions.

In Europe 50 civil society organizations have urged European leaders to keep a promise made: "to define a position on mutual accountability and transparency" (Publishwhatyoufind, 2015). In 1997, the EU enacted the Convention against corruption involving officials (Europa, 2015). However only a year ago we heard from the BBC that "corruption across the EU is 'breathtaking' and it costs the EU economy at least 120 billion euros annually" (Malmstrom, 2014) and this was confirmed by the European Commission itself (Santa, 2014).

Education

The fourth dimension along which Hofstede found nations differed systematically is the way we educate our children about gender and gender roles (Hofstede, p. 297 et seq.). Here we note the role that liberal arts education has played in our understanding of ways in which we can celebrate European diversity. What began with Plato at the "akademeia" (Dillon, 2005) was more specifically written down by Cicero as the Trivium and the Quadrivium as the skills necessary for the children of freemen to gain success in their future career, that is the liberal arts (Cicero, op. cit.). This education format has as its purpose famously: "to open the mind, correct it, to refine it, to establish it to know, and to digest, to rule, to use knowledge, and to give the mind power over its own faculties" (Newman, 1966).

So the liberal arts tradition in education has focused on blending the male desirables, advancement, earnings, training, and keeping up-to-date with the female desirables of friendliness, security, health and welfare, and cooperation (Hofstede, p. 281). The combination of these ideas for civilization requires that young people, regardless of gender, strive after the same societal deliverables. This target, and the potential for liberal arts education, is demonstrated most particularly in government where polls from the societies which are "most happy and prosperous" identify the provision of health, education, and welfare benefits, are most generous and the standard of living recognized by the world organizations as highest (UNDP, 2014).

Where the genders in government most nearly reflect the gender diversity of a country's population, we find the best current provision of nations "most happy and prosperous" (UNDP, 2015). For there still is a glass ceiling (Sargent, 1981) and increasingly visible barriers to young women or minorities in our world and fortunately we are learning that when we can celebrate their diversity we are on our way to celebrating an eventual European diversity.

In our world we can still stand in the water with Heraclitus and watch the water change (Graham, 211), and we need to prepare our children for the coming changes. Our minds have seen the telephone move from the land line to the IPod; calculation from comptometers to programmable hand held calculators; recordings from 78 rpm shellac discs to MP3; and global internet streaming. How we must prepare our children for the changes we will not see. We should always remember the advice of Imam Ali to: "bring up your children other than the way you were brought up yourselves, for they were born for

times other than yours" (Al-Amily, 2005). For yes, "the times are changing" (Dylan, 1964).

Here is a philosophy that can transcend genders and the other divisions caused by race, sex, religion, national origin, physical disability, and even age. We have the tutors for our education, we just fail too often to follow their lead. Ibn Khaldun wrote beautifully that: "God distinguished man from all other animals by an ability to think which He made the beginning of human perfection and the end of man's noble superiority over existing things" (Ibn Khaldun, 1377). Then this tutorial, from what we too often refer to as the "Dark Ages" (Ameer and Thompson, 1999), ought to help us to be more conscious of how we "see through a glass darkly" and remain too often unwilling to come "face to face" (Corinthians, 13.12) with reality.

Khaldun writes about our perceptions, about our ability to be sensitive to situations and to have a second sense "which provides us with the ideas and the behavior needed in dealing" with our neighbors. This he called our "experimental intellect" (Ibn Khaldun, p. 334).This is an element of our intellect we fail to use too often. So we resolve too many issues like men, instead of being educated and working on situations without preconditions. And this is because the very preconditions upon which we might insist, demonstrate our unwillingness to approach situations with experimental intellect. There is a fear of change, and therefore "all existing institutions have to make special efforts to be receptive to change and be able to change" (Drucker, 1999).

The Europeanization of business, the development of the internet, e-business, blogs and social networking sites, recognize the changing streams of activity in business. They are transforming the concept of European diversity into something that is achievable. There is a force taking the world forward into an environment of a common language, a tolerance and understanding of diversity, and making partnerships in change. This is, as Drucker wrote: "the basis for continuing relationships."

The catalysts for this change are education and travel. Education, because the change leader is a knowledge worker who seeks familiarity with the diversity he will encounter in business. Travel, because the change leader tests theoretical knowledge against the market within which the change leaders must operate. "Long distance information does not replace face-to-face relationships" (Drucker, op. cit.) in business or in social life. Long distance information exposes people to the culture and values of others. Once having been exposed to these differences, return to our former state becomes

impossible. Because good education requires critical thought, the facts teach us that there are other views and they may have as much credence as our own.

While changed business conditions, the widening arc of European travel and education in general has assisted this growth to European diversity, the liberal arts format of education has the potential to take the movement into new more inhabitable dimensions. Why? Because liberal arts education encourages the development of the complete person and challenges students to take a broader view of life (Zakaria, 2015).

Conclusion

Writing in 2003, Nobel Economics Laureate Joseph Stiglitz concluded that: "Globalization today is not working for many of the world's poor … for much of the environment … for the Global economy" (Stiglitz, 2003). Since then we have witnessed poverty crises in Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and countries "on the periphery of the capitalist system" (World Bank, 1990). Since then we have discovered "compelling evidence of a rapid deterioration in the European environment" (McCarthy, 2008). Since then, particularly as this paper is written, we have been witness to a European economy "sinking in a maelstrom of financial turmoil" (IMF, 2008).

Like Stiglitz, the author believes that: "Europeanization can be reshaped to realize its potential for good" (Stiglitz, p. 215). International Institutions can most certainly be reshaped. Current failures need to be analyzed so that we better understand why the current strategic directions employed by government have failed, and failed so far so badly.

One change of strategy is to learn from the successful operations of non-governmental organizations who, in spite of operating in a period of failing Europeanization, have managed to initiate progress in the attainment of Europeanization's potential for good. Here the emphasis is on civil society on integration and the remarkable achievements that have been achieved this century. We should be studying "the remarkable declines in global poverty" (World Bank, 1990) and how to overcome the many challenges that remain. At the university level our students are remarkably unaware of the last c e n t u r y of societal achievements that have been made. "Global poverty is on the decline, but almost no-one believes it" (Barna, 2014). Somehow this kind of knowledge and the contribution it may make to integration is not included in the knowledge we consider every day.

We need to study the changes that are taking place and the reasons why they are taking place. In this way we have the ability to focus our attention on the changes that are needed to take place if we are to achieve the idea of European Integration. We can again achieve "the peace and harmony" of the Antonines. That was accomplished long ago and if we can take advantage of the knowledge we have gained since then, we might see such integration accomplished even in our lifetime.

> "The good of other times let people state;
> I think it lucky I was born so late."
> *(Mozley, 1985)*

References

Al-Amily. (2005). *The Book of Arabic Wisdom*. Northampton, Mass: Interlink Books, page 35 Imam Ali bin Ali Talib, Fourth Caliph of Islam, rom Hussain Mohammed.

Ameer, A. and Thompson, H. (1999). The Schumpeterian Gap and Muslim Economic Thought, *Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics*, 10, 31-49.

Asser, M. (2000). Analysis: Soccer violence an international problem. *BBC News*. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/797601.stm

Barna Group. (2014). Global poverty is on the decline, but almost no one believes. *Barna website*. Retrieved from https://www.barna.org/barna-update/culture/668-global-poverty-is-on- the-decline-but-almost-no-one-believes-it#.VQYMWo54qxU

Birley, A. (1965). The happy period between AD 98 and AD 180 when public administration was conducted by the virtue and abilities of Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, and the two Antonines. The Age of *Antonines.*

Burns, R. (1965). The Poems of Robert Burns. Heritage press. [Reprint edition recollecting how "Man's inhumanity to man, makes countless thousands mourn!" from his poem "Man was Made to Mourn."]

Cicero, M. T. (55 BC). De Oratore, Artes Liberales.

Davis, L. (1988). First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325-787).

Dillon, J. (2005). *The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347-274 BC).* Oxford University Press.

Drucker, P. F. (1999). *Management Challenges for the 21st Century*. New York: Harper Business.

Durant, W. (1993). *The Story of Civilization*. MJF Books.

European Commission. (2015). Official languages of the EU. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/linguistic-diversity/official-languages-eu_en.htm

Europa, Summaries of EU Legislation. (2015). Council Act of 26 May 1997 drawing up the Convention made on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (C) of the treaty of European Union.

Evan, A. (2013). *Leicestershire Words, Phrases, and Proverbs*. Nabu Press.

Fidrmuc, J., Ginsburgh, V., Shlomo, W. (2007). Ever Closer Union or Babylonian Discord? The Official-language Problem in the European Union. Jan Fidrmuc website. Retrieved from http://www.fidrmuc.net/research/FGW2.pdf

Friedman, T. (2005). *The World is Flat*. New York: Penguin Books.

Gibbon, E. (2003). *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. New York: Modern Library.

Gibbon, E. (2003). *General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire*. New York: Modern Library.

Graham, D. W. (2011). Heraclitus. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/heraclitus/

Greenberg, J. H. (2000). What We All Spoke When the World Was Young. *New York Times Science*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/science/020100sci-archaeo- language.html

Heather, P. (2011). The Fall of Rome History. *BBC News*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ancient/romans/fallofrome_article_01.shtml

Hall, E. T. (1981). *Beyond Culture*. New York: Anchor Books Doubleday.

Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's Consequences*. 2nd Edition. New York: Sage Publications.

Ibn Khaldun. (1377). *The Maqaddimah: An Introduction to History* (translated by Franz Rosenthal). Oxford, England: Princeton University Press.

IMF (International Monetary Fund). (2008). Biannual World Economic Outlook. WEO Report. Washington DC.

Kathir, A. (2015). Did Muhammed write the Quran? Islam Newsroom. Retrieved from http://islamnewsroom.com/news-we-need/112-did-muhammad-write-the-quran

Kitao, K. (2000). Why do we teach English? Doshisha University website. Retrieved from http://www.englishfirst.org/eff/kitao-wh.htm

Korpela, J. (2013). English – the universal language on the Internet? Human Languages website. Retrieved from http://www.cs.tut.fi/~jkorpela/lingua-franca.html

Lea, H. C. (2013). *A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*. Amazon Digital Services.

Living words. (2015). Dictionary explanation of the Hebrew verb shavat (transliterated as Sabbath) which literally means actively "to cease or stop," with the implication of "ceasing from work." Retrieved from http://thelivingwords.ancient-hebrew.org/sabbath.pdf

Mahnaz, A. (2002). Reflections on working towards peace. Retrieved from http://www.mahnazafkhami.net/?s=we+have+the+ability&x=0&y=0

Malone, R. (2005). *The Truth about Religion in Europe*. Trumpet print edition.

Malmstrom, C. (2014). The extent of corruption in Europe is "breathtaking". *BBC News*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26014387

Matthew 7: 1 (1611). King James Version.

MBC (Museum of Broadcast Communications). (2015). Retrieved from http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/D/htmlD/dimblebyric/dimblebyric.htm

McCarthy, M. (2008, September 23). Plunging bird populations environmental danger sign. New Zealand Herald.

Mozley, J. H. (1985). Ovid, in Ars Amatoria Loeb Classical Library. Harvard University Press.

Nawawi. (2015). 40 Hadith Nawawi. Retrieved from http://40hadithnawawi.com/

Newman, J. H. (1966). *The Idea of a University*. Boston: Yale University Press.

Paveo, P. (2014). *Decoding Nicea*. Amazon Digital Services.

Publish what you find. (2010). 50 CSOs urge European leaders to keep transparency promise. Retrieved from http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/updates/news/50-csos-urge- European-leaders-keep-transparency-promise/

Reid, M. (2010). In the name of Heaven: 3,000 Years of Religious Persecution. *Liberty Magazine.* Retrieved from http://www.libertymagazine.org/article/in-the-name-of-heaven- 3000-years-of-religious-persecution

Richmond, B. (1956). *Time Measurement and Calendar Construction*. E J Brill, Netherlands.

Religious Tolerance website. (2015). Passages from 21 World religions which require their true followers to show tolerance. Retrieved from http://www.religioustolerance.org/reciproc.htm

Santa, M., O'Donnell, J. (2014). Corruption costs European economy 120 billion euros a year. *Reuters*. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/03/us-eu-corruption- idUSBREA120KN20140203

Sargent, A. (1981). *The Androgynous Manager*. New York: Amacom.

Slick, M. (2015). When were the Gospels written and by whom? Christian Apologetics & research ministry website. Retrieved from https://carm.org/when-were-gospels-written-and-by- whom

Stiglitz, J. E. (2003). *Europeanization and Its Discontents*. New York: Norton.

Talmud, Shabbat 3id.

Thesiger, W. (1959). *Arabian Sands*. Penguin.

Titelman, G. Y. (1996). *Random House Dictionary of Popular Proverbs and Sayings*. New York: Random House.

UNDP (United Nations Development Program). (2014). Annual Human Development Reports and the HDI (Human Development Index).

UNDP. (2015). Human Development Index. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi

US Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, paragraph 2.

Van Greuning, H. (2003). *International Financial Reporting Standards*. Washington DC: World Bank.

Virtue Science website. (2015). The Golden Rule – the ethic of reciprocity. Retrieved from http://www.virtuescience.com/golden-rule.html

Wilde, O. (1887). *The Canterville Ghost* (1986 ed.). London: North South Books.

World Bank. (1990). World Development Report.

World Bank. (2013). Remarkable Declines in Global Poverty, But Major Challenges Remain. World Bank Press Release. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/03/us-eu-corruption-idUSBREA120KN20140203

Zakaria, F. (2015). *In Defense of a Liberal Education*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Multilingualism and Monolingualism in the Institutions of the European Union

Zlat R. Milovanovic

Abstract

The European Union (EU) policy on languages is based on multilingualism, that is with respect to the equality and parity of all 24 official and working languages (of the 28 member states). The EU functions in all these languages thanks to translation and interpretation, with a few exceptions. Three so called "procedural languages" (English, French and German) are used in the Commission for its internal work. French is also given working preference in the Court of Justice of the EU. Multilingualism helps to maintain transparency in the work of the institutions, facilitates communication with European citizens and heightens efficiency. The 47-state Council of Europe, by comparison, while recognizing the equality of all its languages, has opted for two working languages in its institutions and five in its Parliamentary Assembly. There is no common language in Europe and monolingualism is not under consideration for the time being. Among Europeans, English is the first language of mutual communication, French being the second. Europe, however, has a long history of functioning monolingualism and single language use in diplomacy, international relations, and intellectual life. In real life, the equality and parity of languages cannot be maintained for an extended time as the international community tends to function in one or a few languages, mainly for practical purposes but also to diminish the advantages enjoyed by native speakers of working or official languages. Languages in general convey the cultures of their native speakers, as well as their concepts, qualities, relations and terms (called "universals" in philosophy). The United States, for instance, does not have an official language by law, yet de facto, English has grown into that role. This paper is dedicated to the search for an ideal solution for EU institutions, which would make not only states but also their citizens more equal. The EU and other European organizations and their institutions will eventually need a common language in addition to all languages currently in use, if they are to achieve a broader social integration, a sense of European citizenship, new opportunities for study and work in wider geographic areas, and businesses able to reach out to all parts of the Single market while being more competitive abroad. This chapter is divided into four parts: Multilingualism in the EU; Legal aspects; Monolingualism;

The future. European and other languages can definitely serve peace, development and the general progress of the global world as we know it.

Introduction

The European Day of Language was first organized by the Council of Europe on September 26, 2001, in order to raise awareness of the languages used in Europe, promote language diversity and encourage the life-long learning of languages. The European Commission and the European Center for Modern Languages have supported and taken part in this and similar events. The Commission and the Council of Europe signed a partnership agreement in 2013 to cooperate in this effort and make it a joint venture.

The EU institutions have adopted a policy of multilingualism, that is a policy of respect for the equality and parity of all of the 24 EU official and working languages. EU multilingualism has reached its highest level with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, making the activities of the European institutions more transparent, efficient and legitimate and their communication with European citizens much easier. The EU moved ahead of the Council of Europe's more traditional approach.

As there is no common language in all of Europe, monolingualism has been overlooked and disregarded. The one language present in Europe from Roman times to the end of the 18th century was Latin, the carrier of a common Graeco-Roman culture of ancient times, and the language of diplomacy, government, churches, law, and education. Latin was replaced by French as an international language by the end of the 18th century, and by French and English in the 20th century. Nonetheless, Latin remains a common element of most modern European languages, whether Indo-European or not.

If the EU is to develop into a new nation and a global power in its own right, it will need its own language as a *conditio sine qua non* of the Union. Which language it will be depends fully on the member states and the European citizens. Otherwise, the number of accepted languages could grow easily to 80 or more languages within the next 30 years (Pan, Pfell, 2002). The official use of all those languages could become prohibitively costly and highly impractical.

Multilingualism

Multilingualism can be defined as the existence of many languages in a given area, or the mastery of many languages by a single person. The distinction between languages and dialects which was formerly made is no longer applied, with some exceptions. As almost every person contributes to the creation of his or her own language, individuals can also design and create new languages. The capacity of humans to create new and forget old languages is almost limitless. The capacity of institutions to use any number of languages is not, although it is not easy to say at which point it ends. Today, nobody can possibly speak Phrygian (the language of democracy), Etruscan or Moesian. Some languages are in the process of being reconstructed even if no longer spoken, for instance Cornish, Occitan, and Livonian. Should we also count slang, argot, or Klingon as languages? Ultimately, the issue of identity arises: Is it more important for a people to speak in its own language or to be able to be understood by others?

The European Community started with four official languages: Dutch, French, German and Italian. The Coal and Steel Treaty had originally started with only one official language: French. Today, the 24 languages of the EU, from Bulgarian to Swedish, in alphabetical order, make it possible for 28 states to have their representatives communicate with each other, the principle being one official language per member state (with the exception of Luxemburg, where both German and French count as official languages.) To quote the European Commission, the EU now has some 500 million citizens, 28 member states, three alphabets and 24 languages, some of them with worldwide coverage (EU, *Supporting Language Diversity in Europe*, 2015). According to the same document, some 60 other languages are also part of the EU's heritage and are spoken in specific regions or by specific minority groups. In addition, immigrants (some of whom are already European citizens) have brought in an estimated 175 languages. All these numbers are likely to increase, starting of course with candidate countries, aspirant countries, members of the European Economic Area and some other neighboring countries.

The European Commission (some 33,000 employees) is now backed by 1,750 linguists and 600 supporting staff, who make up one of the largest translation services in the world. The interpretation service employs a staff of 600 and some 3,000 freelance interpreters, with 250 on the supporting staff. The Commission has two Directorates General (DGs) in this area: one for Translation, the other for Interpretation. The General Secretariat of the European Parliament (EP) employs 6,000 employees, the Council of the EU

3,500. The Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have the right to speak in an official language of their country. The political groups of European parties have their own staff. All official documents of the EU and all other publications are produced in the 24 languages, and some of them in the languages of the six candidate countries (including Macedonian). The cost of the use of the 24+6 languages is about EUR 1 billion a year. Within the European Commission, the internal work may be conducted in the "procedural languages" (formerly called working languages): English, French and German. The finalized documents, however, must be published in all 24 languages. Although some of the translations can be prepared faster than others, this is not normally a problem (The European Commission, *Supporting Language Diversity in Europe*, 2015; all figures).

The Committee of Regions, representing the layer of government of member-state countries directly under the national level, provides its members with the right to speak in their own languages, even those that are not official in the EU This is an example of expanded diversity. Catalan or Welsh, for example, can be heard on this Committee (Loughlin, 2004). A step further, following the Treaty of Lisbon, was the acceptance by the EU of communications by citizens in their minority, or Lesser Used Languages (LULs), provided that the expense is covered by member-states. The EU institutions will answer those communications in the same language in which they are written. The first languages included were Welsh, Scottish-Gaelic and Irish (for the U.K.), Catalan, Galician (Gallego) and Basque (for Spain) and Frisian (for The Netherlands). The number of these Lesser Used Languages will increase.

Further developments, especially within the Council of Europe, brought minority language rights to the fore. The right to use one's own language, be it in a traditional regional or an ethnic minority language, has received the support of EU institutions as well. We refer to the "historic minorities" of the states party to the Framework Convention for the Protection of Ethnic Minorities (Council of Europe, Framework Convention, 1995). The ratifying states, members of the Council of Europe, adopted this act in order to combat discrimination against minorities, promote equality among citizens, and preserve and develop the cultural identity of the minorities through their access to the media, education and public life.

While this Convention clearly does not represent an obligation for the EU, the EU cannot possibly ignore it. The Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN) has called upon the European Commission to pay more attention to language diversity, emphasizing the fact that 40 million European

citizens use a regional or a minority language. The European Parliament decided in 2003 to have a report prepared on the language policy of the EU. This initiative was supported by the Committee of the Regions. The report of Michel Ebner, MEP, was adopted on July 14, 2003, by 423 as opposed to 27 votes (21 abstentions). The "Ebner Report" mentioned some 150 regional and minority languages (the lesser used languages), with various recommendations, having in mind the enlargement of the Union and its increased cultural diversity. Among the recommendations, a European Agency for Linguistic Diversity and Language Learning was proposed, including its funding which has not yet materialized (Ebner Report, 2003). The EU Program for 2014-2020 does include funding for a Language Diversity Center, as well as an Action plan for a legal framework, which is to be developed.

Legal Aspects

The European Union has moved from its original inattention to language issues to increasing its interest and support. The European Day of Language is symbolic in this respect. The EU today can be considered a champion of multilingualism in the international community. The EU Barcelona Summit in 2002 already provided inspiration for the European Social Model. The President's Conclusions called for the promotion of skills, competences and qualifications for greater mobility in education, research and innovation. The need to teach at least two foreign languages in addition to one's own from an early age was emphasized, as were including a European dimension in education and digital literacy (Barcelona Summit, 2002).

The Lisbon Treaty of 2007 in its Art. 1:2, states that the EU: "shall respect its rich cultural, religious and linguistic diversity" (*Treaty of the EU*, 2007). This provision formalizes the policy of multilingualism within the EU and, at the same time, recognizes the equal standing of all EU languages. The EU *Charter of Fundamental Human Rights*, in its Art. 21: 1 and 2, states the following: "Any discrimination, based on any ground such as sex, race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, *language,* religion or belief, political or any other opinion, *membership of a national minority*, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation, shall be prohibited." And also: "any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited." Art. 22 states that: "the Union shall respect cultural, religious and *linguistic diversity*." (*EU Charter on Fundamental Human Rights*, 2007 / emphasis added by author of this article).

The Preamble of the Charter also draws attention to the international obligations of member states, including those contained in The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Community and the European Court of Human Rights. The EU Charter has been in force since 2009.

The Linguistic rights of minorities were not forgotten by the Council of Europe, which adopted a European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, originally signed on Nov. 5. 1992 in Strasbourg, and in force since March 1, 1998. This Charter has been signed by 33 and ratified by 25 countries (19 of of which were EU member states) (*European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages*, 1992). The main goal of this Treaty is to protect and promote historical regional and minority languages (not including those of the new immigrant communities). There are several levels of protection in this Charter. Countries ratifying this Charter indicate the regional and minority groups on their territories and the corresponding level of protection. Each state decides which of it minorities' languages should be protected under the Charter, which gives them full freedom of choice.

There is also the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), signed in Strasbourg on Feb. 1, 1995, containing more precise aspects of minorities' rights. By 2009, this Convention had been ratified by 39 member-states of the Council of Europe (*The Framework Convention*, 1995). It is worth mentioning that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in its Art 27, established rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, namely not to be denied the right to "enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language" (*The UN Covenant*, 1966). The Covenant has been in force since March 26, 1976. Several CSCE/OSCE documents deal with the rights of minorities, starting with the Final Act of the Conference, 1975.

The European Union has certainly gone farthest, not only among international organizations but also most nation-states, in the implementation of multilingualism. Adopting one language per member-state of the EU as an official and working language, is a great example. By comparison, the United Nations, with 192 member states uses only six languages, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with 57 members uses six, the African Union, with 51 members also uses six. Full diversity in the EU, according to Theodor Schilling, is a source of cultural enrichment but also a source of tensions (Schilling, 2009). Schilling finds that despite all efforts so far, there is no principle

of the protection of languages in Community Law. Many member-states do not respect the equality of languages in selecting one only as their official language. Many states, which in principle have a number of official languages, also have a "lingua franca" to be used in everyday practice. For instance, there are 11 official languages in South Africa, while only two are used in the work of the Government. The right of the members of the European Parliament to speak in their languages is not a human right *per se*, it is an institutional right of the institution.

Be that as it may, it can be said that language discrimination is not completely or efficiently prohibited. A member of the EP whose native language is not the official language of his country cannot use his/her language in a parliamentary debate. A Lithuanian resident in Italy, who has the right to run as a candidate in the European elections, cannot use Lithuanian in his campaigning, especially if he wants to be successful. An Italian residing in Sweden can be elected to the EP if he/she speaks Swedish.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued a reminder of problems of language in interpreting European Law (in its *CILFIT v. Ministro della Sanita*, 1982 decision). The ECJ said that each working language can be consulted on issues of the interpretation of the law. Prior to 1973, English was not an official language of the EU, thus even in interpreting the Treaty of Rome, the French, German, Italian or Dutch versions would be more authoritative. (The Treaty of Rome was originally drafted in French.) Attorneys practicing European law routinely consult different language versions of regulations, directives, decisions and treaties (Folsom, 2008).

The Court has been trying to reconcile different official texts through "linguistic interpretation", without giving preference to any language. In the CILFIT case, the Court warned against the transferability of legal concepts (from national to European Law). The legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in EU Law and the law of various member-states (Folsom, 2008). The French Administrative Law doctrine of "acte claire" has received support in many countries as reasonable, the same applies to the "détournement de pouvoir" (misuse of power). The ECJ also said that cases involving a reasonably obvious interpretation of the law do not need to be referred by national courts to the ECJ.

Neither discrimination nor the bases of discrimination are clearly defined in the major texts mentioned above. Consequently, in many situations, we find cases of discrimination only by looking at the relevant statistics. It can be shown statistically for instance that women are not equal with men in holding

certain political offices, either within the EU or within their own nations. There is no parity in the use of languages, as members of various bodies prefer the use of those languages which can be understood by most participants. On the other hand, some of the highest positions in the EU are performed by members of ethnic minorities: Donald Tusk (Kashubian)of Poland, Klaus Iohannis (German Lutheran) of Romania, Manuel Vals (Catalan) of France and Mariano Rahoy (Galician) of Spain, to name just a few. The European Parliament is the most multilingual parliamentary institution in the world!

Today's politicians, and civil administrators in national governments and international organizations, do not spend much time studying languages. In many cases, they fully rely on translators and interpreters, unless they speak procedural languages in some institutions, in other words English, French or German. Those who want to have a real influence in the EU cannot just stick to their national languages.

Monolingualism

People in power tend to concentrate on one of the major languages, which could, *ipso facto*, evolve into an informal *lingua franca*. English has become a dominant language of international communication. Preferred in business, trade, education, international politics, it has moved into many other areas.

Within EU member states, some 54% of the population can communicate in another EU language, most of them in English and French (Eurobarometer, 2012). The figure is probably higher in the EU institutions. Those European citizens who work in EU institutions are most likely to communicate in English, the only exception being the judicial branch in which French prevails. Within the Court of Justice of the EU, the preliminary proceedings and the public hearings may be held in any EU language. The members of the "Curia" are all francophone, and all documents and reports are translated for them into French. Their internal debate is in French, and the decision is formulated in French and then translated into the language or the languages of the case. There have even been proposals to make French the language of reference in legal matters, although this has not happened yet.

In the European civil service, a large number of English speakers speak French and vice versa. Eastern and Northern Europeans show a preference for English, whilst Western or Southern Europeans may prefer French (especially the countries of the Francophonie). Central Europe has more German speakers.

New members are more likely to rely on translation and interpretation into their own languages.

We have already mentioned differences between continental and common law legal systems. Some differences are due to philosophy. The "universals", such as general and abstract objects, concepts, qualities, relations, and numbers may not have an independent existence outside the languages we speak, and all languages are not the same. The theory of nominalism places emphasis on the name, as we perceive those things which exist in name and not those things for which there is no name or whose name we do not know. This theory goes back to William of Ockham (13th-14th centuries). The theory of realism maintains that universals exist independently of both the human mind and particular things. They exist independently of our perception. William of Champeaux (12th century) was one of the creators of this theory (*Columbia Encyclopedia*, 1963).

Thus, technically, no translation can be perfect. Different languages are also linked to different epistemologies. Italians have a saying: "Traduttore – traditore" (the translator is a traitor). Here is an example: Averoes, translating Aristotle from Greek to Arabic, had great difficulty in figuring out the meaning of the words "tragedy" and "comedy", despite his excellent knowledge of both languages. For Dante, a monarchy could have been a republic, for Kant a republic also meant a monarchy of a certain type! In Swedish, the word "allemansratt" means all men's right, which designates the right to collect comestibles from publicly owned areas or occupy those areas temporarily for personal use (Moore, 2009).

In modern times, we have simultaneous interpreters, who are specialists in languages trained to interpret speeches, sentence by sentence as they are spoken. Interpreters occasionally specialize in some substantive areas, like law, agriculture, pharmacology, medicine, foreign policy – but not all of them at the same time. Another problem is that there are no interpreters for unusual pairs of languages (such as: Irish to Maltese, Estonian to Croatian, or Hungarian to Icelandic). The principle is to interpret from a foreign to one's own language. What that means in practice is that some interpretations include going to a third language, which increases the possibility of making mistakes. The European Parliament's interpreters are advised to include the gist of what is being said – especially those in unusual combinations of languages. The best interpreters translate for the "Consilium". If one adds the regional or minority languages, those will have to be interpreted through the official languages of their states.

Conscious of all those difficulties, peoples decided early in their history that monolingualism was a better solution. Monolingualism gave strength to the human race allowing it to reach for the sky! Multilingualism was a punishment, many languages were created from the original one to render humans confused and inefficient (11Gen. King James Version). Ever since then, the search for a common language of mutual communication has been ongoing:

Not far from Babel, Darius the emperor of the Persians made Babylonian Aramaic the official language of his empire.

Alexander the Macedonian coined a Greek *koine* as the language of his empire.

The Romans introduced Latin into their empire. When in 212 emperor Caracala enacted the *Constitutio Antoniana de Civitate*, making all free men of the empire Roman citizens, Latin was already a *lingua franca* from Ireland to Persia and from Mauritania to Northern Germany (Milovanovic, 2012).

After the break-up and fall of the Roman Empire, the new Europeans adopted Latin as their common language. It became one of the languages of the Christian Church, and Charlemagne made it the language of his empire. The Treaty of Westphalia was written in Latin, the European common diplomatic language at that time. Whether Bologna, Sorbonne or Oxford, all European universities used Latin for centuries.

Latin has survived to our day and could become one of the official languages of the EU and other international bodies, at first as an auxiliary international language, later a language of common reference and, possibly, a common language of a united Europe. It was Jean Capelle, the Rector of the University of Nancy, France, who, in 1952, proposed the use of Latin as an international language (Capelle, 1952). In 1956, the first international congress for living Latin was organized in Avignon, to be followed by other congresses and events. There are several Academies of Latin Language today (some Latin and Greek); there is a Foundation "Melissa", Latin societies (*sodalidates / circuli latini*), there are *Ludi Romani*, radio programs, and magazines in Latin. According to Gaius Licoppe, a Belgian promoter of modern Latin, the Greek-Roman culture and the Latin language are the only common heritage of all European nations! (Stroh, 2009). During its presidencies of the EU, the Government of Finland publishes newsletters in the official EU languages and in Latin!

It was French that replaced Latin as a diplomatic language in the 18th century. Close to Latin, French became an international language, national in origin and independent of other social institutions. It became the language of the elites in Europe and on other continents, including the US and Latin America,

a language of intellectuals, of international education, and of world trade. The first international organizations used French as their language, for instance the Universal Telegraphic Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Interparliamentary Union.

English, with its high percentage of Latin-origin vocabulary, became an international language at the turn of the 20th century, in part due to the increasing power of the British Empire and the United States of America and to their role in international business and trade and in international organizations. English joined French as an international language in its own right and has become increasingly popular since the Second World War. It is also the language of the British Commonwealth and various regional and sub-regional organizations.

German, Italian, Russian, Spanish, Chinese and Arabic, have all achieved the status of languages used in international communications, within the United Nations and elsewhere.

Artificial languages: Early on, the idea of an international language created especially in order to help international communication was born. The Greek *Koine* was a semi-artificial language. Swahili in Africa was born of the need for a common language, as a combination of Arabic and Eastern African languages.

Esperanto was invented by Dr. Ludwig Zamenhof of Poland, in 1887, as an auxiliary language to be used in international communication, while preserving fully all national languages. The ideal of the first Esperantists was: Your national language + Esperanto = the solution of all language problems. Esperanto has a simple grammar of 16 rules, no exceptions. It is written in the Latin alphabet and its vocabulary comes from a combination of Romance languages, English, German, Russian, Polish and some other languages. It can be learnt easily and rapidly, it is politically neutral and practical (Lapenna, 1952). There is original literature by Esperanto writers as well as many translations of world literature.

Other artificial languages include Volapuk, created in 1880 by Johan Schleyer, based on English, Danish, German, French and Latin. A Dalmatian priest Juraj Krizanic, designed a first Panslavic language in 1665, based on Old Slavonic, Russian, the Serbo-Croatian Chakavian dialect and Polish. There is also a new Interslavic language, designed in 2011 by Ondrej Rechnik, based on easily recognizable words.

Esperanto is the only artificial language which has managed to achieve some status in the international community. The UNESCO General Conference

held in 1954 in Montevideo, authorized the Director General to: "follow current developments in the use of Esperanto in education, science and culture". The Universal Esperanto Association (UEA) has consultative status with UNESCO. In 1966, a petition on making Esperanto an official UN language was handed by the UEA to U-Thant, the then Secretary General of the UN. The petition had been signed by 1 million people worldwide and by 3843 NGOs representing 70 million members. The UEA has consultative status with the ECOSOC. In 2015 a petition to make Esperanto the 25th official language of the EU is being circulated by the UEA in the EU countries. Despite the proclaimed equality of EU languages, says the petition, all languages are not equal, English is being favored, concludes the petition (*Esperanto, an official language of the EU*, 2015).

The Future

Our ability to predict the future is still relatively limited. There are too many unknowns. What is the future of the European Union? The future of the world? The future of human intelligence?

Under present conditions, the EU could maintain its position as an organism between a sovereign state and a regional international organization. Or, it could become a unified federation, the United States of Europe, a world power or a superpower in which European citizens would become full compatriots. In the first case, the EU could have some 55 member-states by 2050 and use some 18 new languages in addition to the present 24. The number of states would increase through the accession of new members, as well as through the secession of some parts of today's states. In the second case, the EU could grow to incorporate all of Europe and part of Asia, with a total of some 80 member states and some 65 languages. In that case, multilingualism will become impractical and too costly, especially if some regional and ethnic minority languages are also added to the official languages, a quite likely prospect. The question of a single language will re-emerge.

If one looks at the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the process resulted in redefining majorities and minorities, as well as in the atomization of existing languages into smaller but more numerous ones. Macedonia was one of the constitutive nations of Yugoslavia, its language official within the whole country. Macedonian was one of the languages of the majority. Today, it is the official language in the Republic of Macedonia only, and a minority language in other republics. Serbian became a minority language in Croatia and Croatian in Serbia. Serbo-Croatian has been subdivided into Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian,

Montenegrin, while some dialects have been overlooked. The Albanian minority was a minority within the whole body of the Yugoslavs, not linked to any particular region – and Albanians could live and work in any part of the country, while now they are restricted to those areas where they originate. Ethnic tensions emerged in the smaller areas over the issue of new identities that were often defined by language.

The example of Yugoslavia should not be repeated within the EU or in other European countries. Similar conflicts could happen in many countries, within and outside the EU In 2014, the Venetian secessionists in Italy claimed the validity of their referendum on independence based on the validity of the Referendum in Montenegro. Once launched, the Republic of Venice could proclaim its own language as well, as proof of its people's identity. The Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, Croatia and Ukraine, could also claim their ethnic identity and the right to use their language if such a right does not exist yet (as in Ukraine, for example).

If and when the question of one language becomes an issue within the EU, English may become first choice. A language referendum could be organized within the EU. If, however, the British electorate decides that the UK should leave the EU (we hope that this will not be the case), English would not be a choice as it would be a language of the EU only in Ireland which has chosen Irish as its EU Language. With no English in competition, French would emerge as the most likely second choice. What if France decided to leave the EU as well? How the EU would chose a single language remains a big question. Financing the use of 80 or more languages could one day prevent the EU from conducting its main activities.

Programs of mechanical translation and interpretation are still only in the initial research phase, for instance at the European Parliament where at this point there are only ten languages in the Statistical Machine Translations Systems. This option, even when further developed, could not possibly be used with the precision needed in legally binding texts.

Transhumanism (h+), a social movement based on nature and technology, could eventually provide some solution to translation and interpretation through the use of increased human capacities (i.e. of the "transhumans"). Nanotechnology would be helpful. Individuals could be able to learn and speak tens of languages at the same time (Clarke, 2000; Bostrom, 2005).

At some point, the author of these lines was a member of the Universal Esperanto Association (UEA) Working Group in New York. The group was

working on a list of proposals to the UN on how to make Esperanto an official language of the UN. This was 12 years after the petition to the UN signed by 1 million people. The group was presided by Humphrey Tonkin, a professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania, later President of UEA. This plan recommended the steps to be taken by the UN and by interested nations. It was proposed that Esperanto be taught in the higher grades of elementary schools, in high schools and in universities. Esperanto literature would be studied as well, the original and the world literature in translation. A number of diplomats would be given classes of International Law and Diplomacy in Esperanto. Many other details were included but no progress could be made due to the Cold War realities of that time. Some of the major principles were agreed by the UN Secretariat, and could serve as guidance for future work, dealing with Esperanto or another language. The UN has the following languages on its list to be considered: 1/ Bengali; 2/ Esperanto; 3/ Hindi; 4/ Portuguese; and, 5/ Turkish. Any of those could be added on to the official languages: English, French, Russian, Chinese, Spanish and Arabic.

What about Latin? It has not been officially proposed yet at the UN although several Popes have spoken in Latin at the General Assembly. It appears that Europeans are not enthusiastic about Esperanto (it remains to be seen how many sign the petition to the EU), while they may be cold to the idea of Latin. They see Esperanto as too artificial and too easy, while Latin may be too difficult. Many deem Latin to be a dead language. In fact, the general public is not aware of how much Latin vocabulary we already use in English, French, German and all the other languages. Indirectly, Latin remains very much alive. Latin is very precise, with a grammar recognizable by most Europeans, and written phonetically in an almost universal alphabet. There are intellectuals all over the world who know all of the above, and who adopt Latin. The steps recommended for Esperanto, would be equally valid for Latin: re-introduce it in schools, starting with elementary schools and high schools, and teach it according to the Cambridge and ASSIMIL methods. Cambridge University has developed wonderful instruction manuals for children, the ASSIMIL method would be for adults. Many recent publications include modern Latin vocabulary. Many universities would be happy to teach Latin, not only in Europe, but in the US and Latin America, even in Africa. President Jefferson once said that if we want to have democracy in our country, we should be speaking ancient Greek (the language of democracy) in the US. *Mutatis mutandis*, we could say Latin for a republic (the language of the republics). In Brussels, the EU buildings are called *Consilium*, *Parlamentum* etc. The U.S. motto is: *E pluribus unum*. Practically all

modern concepts can be expressed in Latin. To quote Gaius Lycoppe of Belgium: *Cultura Graeco-Romana et lingua latina sunt unicum patrimonium commune gentium Europaearum* (Stroh, 2009).

Conclusion

The EU should be saying more about its own visions of the future. The EU Reflection Group Horizon 2020-2030, established by the Commission in 2007 and chaired by Felipe Gonzales, presented its Report in May 2010. The main targets of this report are: employment, education, research and innovation, social inclusion and poverty reduction and climate/energy initiative. The Report left the strategic issues to the member-states, without going into them. The nature of the Union itself and its future are a strategic issue. Yes, it is up to the member-states to clarify their strategic plans, if there are any!

Languages of the future are necessarily related to those, strategic choices. Yes, the EU works in the largest number of equally important languages worldwide. Yes, it has announced its choices concerning minority languages. But it has not said anything about tensions and conflicts which could potentially be threatening EU identity or integrity. At some point, one language will have to be selected, and nations and institutions should be ready for a change. The institutions will certainly have to make their choice and recommendations. The member states, of course. The European citizens should have their say as well!

References

Bostrom, N. (2005). A History of Transhumanist Thought. *Journal of Evolution and Technology.*

Capelle, J. (1952, October 23). Le Latin ou Babel. *Le Bulletin de l'Education Nationalle*.

Clarke, A. C. (2000). *Greetings, Carbon Based Bipeds*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Folsom, R. H. (2008). *European Union Law in a Nutshell*. St.Paul, MN.: Thomson/West.

Lapenna, I. (1952). *Aktuelaj Problemoj de la Nuntempa Internacia Vivo* (Current Problems of Contemporary International Life). Rotterdam: UEA.

Loughlin, J. et al. (2004). *Subnational Democracy in the EU: Challenges and Opportunities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Malloy, T.H. (2005). *National Minority Rights in Europe*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Milovanovic, Z. (2012). European Citizenship at the Time of Crisis. In: I. Dodovski, S. Pendarovski and I. Petrovska (Eds.). *Europe 2020: Towards Innovative and Inclusive Union* (pp. 23-33). Skopje: UACS.

Moore, C. J. (2005). *The Untranslatables*. Edinburgh: Chambers Harrap Publishers.

Ostrower, A. (1965). *Language, Law and Diplomacy*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Pan, C. and Pfell, B. (2002). The Peoples of Europe by Demographic Size, Table 1. *National Minorities in Europe Handbook*. Vienna: Braumullefler.

Pinder, J. and Usherwood, S. (2007). *The European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schilling, T. (2009). Language Rights in the European Union. *German Law Journal*, 9 (10).

Shkaric, S. (2004). *Sporedbeno i makedonko ustavno pravo* (Comparative and Macedonian Constitutional Law). Skopje: Matica makedonska.

Stroh, W. (2008). *Le Latin est Mort, Vive le Latin!* (The Latin is Dead, Long Live Latin!). Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

The Columbia Encyclopedia (1963). New York and London: Columbia University Press.

Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version) C 321 E 1.

The EU Barcelona Summit 2002, the President's Conclusions / SN 100/1/02/REV.1.

Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, signed on November 5, 1992 in Strasbourg, in force since 1998 / CETS 148.

Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, signed on February 1, 1995 in Strasbourg / CETS 157 / Also: conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/HTML/157.htm

The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, A Res. 2200 (XXI) of December 16, 1966, in force since March 26, 1976.

European Commission. (2015). Supporting Language Diversity in Europe. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/linguistic-diversity/official languages-eu_en.htm

Esperanto, an official language of the European Union (2015). Retrieved from https//secure.avaaz.org/en/petition/Esperanto_langue officielle_de IUE

World Transhumanist Association. (2002). The Transhumanist Declaration: Overcoming Human Limitations through Technology, WTA.

United Nations, Declaration of Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, A RES. 47/135 of December 18, 1992.

European Parliament, Michl Ebner Report of July 14, 2003.

Treaty of the EU of the December 13, 2007 with Protocols (The Lisbon Reform Treaty) in force from December 1, 2009. Retrieved from ec.europa.en/archives/lisbon_treaty/glance/Index_en.htm

The EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights, C 363/13 / December 12, 2000 / in force since 2009.

55

Robert C. Hudson: The End of the End of the Cold War:
Current Dilemmas Confronting European Security in the Wake of the Ukrainian Conflict

The End of the End of the Cold War:
Current Dilemmas Confronting European Security
in the Wake of the Ukrainian Conflict

Robert C. Hudson

Abstract

Seventy years after the founders of modern Europe set out to bring stability, union and prosperity to a continent wracked by conflict, Europe and its principal political manifestation, the European Union, is currently confronted with a renewed, and potentially defining struggle against the re-energised forces of internal division and fragmentation, external hostility and encroachment. In the aftermath of Russia's recent dismemberment of a European country by the annexation of Crimea, and its involvement in the currently frozen conflict recently fought out in eastern Ukraine, Europe is facing an increasingly insecure future. Indeed it would seem that, for the first time since the end of the Cold War twenty-five years ago, there are doubts as to whether or not the European Union's borders any longer remain secure. It is against this backdrop that President Putin's apparent attempts to re-establish 'Soviet-era spheres of influence' affect not only Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, but also Central and Eastern European countries which are much closer to the heart of Europe, such as Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia, and EU member states such as Hungary and Slovakia. By reviewing the foundations of Euro-Atlantic Security in the aftermath of the Second World War and appraising the Post-Cold War security structure, this chapter er will consider competing claims in the post-2000 Putin era between Western security institutions and the new Russian security doctrine aimed to control the "near abroad" (former Soviet space). Twenty-five years after the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe are we now at the end of the End of the Cold War? By considering the new security threats to Europe, this chapter will assess today's European security agenda, or the lack of it. With its security focus elsewhere in the world, perhaps the United States, the traditional guarantor of European security might not be able to provide such guarantees today. Perhaps the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative has been proven to be too ambitious in the light of recent developments. Has the crisis in Ukraine opened Cold War wounds, and what are the regional repercussions of

this frozen conflict? Indeed, have any mistakes been made by the Western Alliance in its approach to Russia's legitimate interests. Has the West made an (un) intentional contribution to the current state of affairs and what is the future of the political and security order in Europe?

Keywords: European Security, Eastern Partnership, Russia, NATO, Euro-Atlantic Project, sanctions, frozen conflicts, 'the End of the End of the Cold War'.

The Meaning of Europe

Anthony Giddens, in his *Turbulent and Mighty Continent* (2014) – itself a reference to Winston S. Churchill's appraisal of Europe – has built on the by now well-established idea that the origins of the European Union were inspired by the praiseworthy and necessary desire to end war between European states; wars in which many millions had died. It is particularly poignant to recall these founding aspirations of the European Union in a year which has witnessed commemorations to mark the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the end of the Second World War in 1945, and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In the aftermath of the First World War, one of the key ideas underpinning the European project was to bring peace and harmony to the peoples of Europe by bringing closure to the balance of power politics that had dominated the 19th century, with movements towards creating a Pan-Europa, a European Customs Union, a Federal Europe or even a United States of Europe. This theme was taken up in the 1920s by key thinkers and political figures, such as Count Richard Koudenhove-Kalergi, Elemér Hantos, Gustav Stresemann, Aristide Briand and Edouard Herriot. Such integrationist idealism would be taken further in the aftermath of the Second World War by the forefathers of the European Union – Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gaspari, and Paul-Henri Spark among others.

If the European Union of today is about openness, peace and cooperation between European states, this was well-demonstrated by its founding organisations such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), proposed by French Planning Commissioner Jean Monnet and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, and established in 1950. The ECSC marked the first major step toward Franco-German reconciliation. This was followed by the debate over the European Defence Community initially introduced by the French Prime Minister René Pleven in October 1950, which although never ratified, following its rejection by the French National Assembly in 1954 was

nevertheless subsumed by the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed in July 1949. At the same time, the creation of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was an important step in the evolution of the policy of the Western containment of the Soviet Union (Weigall and Stirk, 1992), whilst Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty provided the security umbrella for Europe which has lasted until this day. It was Article 5 which stipulated that:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area…. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security (Weigall and Stirk, 1992, p.75).

Membership of NATO and the European integrationist project which would eventually become the European Union, in 1992, meant that European member states would never fight against each other again, and in the aftermath of the Second World War and during the Cold War, the idea of a peaceful Europe was imbricated upon American military strength and the belief that the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) has always been at hand as a major security resource (Giddens, 2014, p. 200). Put another way, the understanding has been that, with an acknowledgement to Joseph. S. Nye (2004), European 'power', is based upon 'soft power' if one accepts that the European Union: "Rather than threatening to conquer… exerts a magnetic power of attraction" and that, "…the influence of the EU goes well beyond those countries which might one day be accepted as full members of the European Neighbourhood Initiative" (Giddens 2014). This view is backed up by Ian Manners in his article "Normative Power Europe, A Contradiction in Terms?" (2002) in which he demonstrates how Normative Power in Europe (NPE) is based on five core values: Peace; Liberty; Democracy; Rule of Law; and, Respect for Human Rights, to which he adds four subsidiary values: Social Solidarity; Anti-discrimination; Sustainable Development and Good Governance. José Manuel Barroso, referred to NPE as: "a force for good." In other words our understanding of the role of Europe is based on Soft Power (Nye) and 'the magnetic power of attraction' (Giddens) to which we may add Robert Cooper's view of the transparency of the Union, so that once again we have the idea that no European Union member state will ever, ever go to war

against another European Union member state again. For Cooper, the European Union provided the classic example of what he termed the post-modern state (Cooper, 2003 and 2007) whereby the political, economic and military affairs of EU member states are so transparent and so closely intertwined that the idea of conflict between them is rendered unthinkable. With reference to the New World Order of the 1990s, Cooper argues that: "…there is a zone of safety in Europe and outside is a zone of danger and chaos" (Cooper, 2003, p. 55). In a nutshell, Cooper encapsulates his argument clearly and concisely in the following passage:

> The postmodern, European answer to threats is to extend the system of co-operative empire ever wider. 'I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them,' said Catherine the Great – and the European Union sometimes seems to be saying the same. This is, in fact, an exact description of the most natural security policy for a postmodern community of states. The wider the postmodern network can be extended the less risk there will be from neighbours and the more resources to defend the community without having to become excessively militarized. (Cooper, 2003, p.78)

Meanwhile, Robert Kagan (2003), who had described Europe as Venus and America as Mars – "full of mistrust and misunderstandings", argues in the opening paragraph of his book that: "It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world" (op.cit., p. 3). For Kagan:

> Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant's "perpetual peace". (ibid.)

Yet, how different the scenario painted in 2003 must seem to the situation confronting Europe today. Within a decade, we have witnessed: the European economic crash in 2008 and its continuing repurcussions; the occupation of Crimea by Russian troops in the Spring of 2014; the ongoing frozen conflict (in between ceasefires) in Eastern Ukraine; the sudden rise to prominence of the Islamic State since the summer of 2014; the current climate of fear over potential terrorist threats from political Islam and of course the growing refugee crisis and increased migration which is confronting the European Union today, especially in the wake of the continuing four-year-long conflict in Syria.

Giddens, rather than accepting the differences between the EU and the US pointed out by Kagan, advocates reinforcing John F. Kennedy's transatlantic partnership project of the early 1960s and strengthening EU-US relations. Two key issues are at stake here: The first is the role played by the United States and the second is the role played by a re-invigorated Russia.

But, does the EU have to replace the US in a defence role? Is there not a better reaction to the current dilemmas confronting European security? In particular one should consider the EU's soft power influence and the idea that the EU has a considerable normative power role to play. Can the EU not open up negotiations with Russia and find an alternative role to play?

Without subscribing to Edward Lucas' theory that we have entered into a New Cold War (2008 and 2014) nor indeed General Folgers Rasmusen's view that the "Nuclear issue is back" (2015), it cannot be denied that twenty-five years after the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe we now find ourselves in a new period which can be described as the "End of the End of the Cold War". The current crisis in Ukraine, which has been going on since February 2014, has certainly re-opened some of the old Cold War wounds with the potential for serious repercussions on frozen conflicts. Nevertheless, this does not signify a return to Cold War. Indeed, one take on Putin's current involvement in Syria is that he might well be trying to distract attention away from the frozen conflict in Ukraine by seeking a measure of international rehabilitation and looking towards cooperating with the West over the Syrian conflict, where US-led policy has clearly failed. The only problem is that he is fully backing the Assad regime in Syria, the leader of a former client state of the Soviet Union (Hudson, 2015).

Russia, NATO and the New European Order

The period 1989 to 1991 witnessed the beginning of a New European Security Order. Borders in Europe would be unchallenged (Lucas, 2014, x). There were also organisations in place, such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) - that success story of the 1975 Helsinki Agreement which would come to play such a significant part on the European scene at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, Giddens remarks that:

> …the creation of the EU owes an enormous debt to someone from outside – Mikhail Gorbachev. Without *perestroika* and *glasnost*, without his decision not to intervene militarily to suppress the movements in

> Poland, East Germany and Hungary, there would be no European Union in the form that it takes today. (Giddens, 2014, p.187)

There was a honeymoon period, in which many in Europe believed things could only get better and that there would be peace, harmony and prosperity between one-time former enemies, and this mood of optimism seemed to be buoyed up by Gorbachev's Common European Home speech of 1985:

> Europe is indeed a common home where geography and history have closely interwoven the destinies of dozens of countries and nations. Of course, each of them has its own problem, and each wants to live its own life, to follow its own traditions. Therefore, developing the metaphor, one may say: the home is common, that is true, but each family has its own apartment, and there are different entrances too….
>
> The concept of a 'common European home' suggests above all a degree of integrity, even if its states belong to different social systems and opposing military-political alliances….
>
> One can mention a number of objective circumstances which create the need for a pan-European policy:
>
> Densely populated and highly urbanized, Europe bristles with weapons, both nuclear and conventional. It would not be enough to call it a 'powder keg' today….
>
> Even a conventional war, to say nothing of a nuclear one, would be disastrous for Europe today…. (Weigall and Stirk, 1992, p. 188).

How times have changed. This was the speech that helped to establish the tremendous changes that would take place in the second half of the 1980s that would eventually bring about an end to the Cold War that has lasted for a quarter of a century.

And so, with the exception of one major European crisis, the conflicts in the former – Yugoslavia, for many in Europe, this seemed to be the dawning of a 'golden age'. As for the crisis in the Balkans, Giddens is not the first to admit that the European Community fell at the first hurdle, and that once again, the Americans would have to come in, with NATO airstrikes and the eventual peace settlement for Bosnia, negotiated in November 1995 at the Wright-Patterson Air force base in Dayton Ohio.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, the whole issue of defence and security in Russia and Europe has gone through a tremendous sea-change. Throughout the period of the Cold War, both East and West had based their strategies upon nuclear deterrence in order to maintain the peace. Nuclear

weapons provided the means of organising and implementing western security policy, with the nuclear submarine with ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) capabilities serving as the ultimate strategic weapon of the 1970s and early 1980s. Then the threat of the United States Strategic Defence Initiative, in the mid-1980s, hastened Gorbachev's reform policies of Glasnost and Perestroika, which eventually culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was widely believed that these events marked the demise of what then appeared to be monolithic single party systems, though time would soon show that they had not been quite as monolithic as had been imagined at the time in the West. This was accompanied by an increase in the number of liberal democracies in what had formerly been called 'Eastern Europe', alongside what may be referred to euphemistically as 'multi-party republics', though they often lacked the levels of democracy and civil society that had developed in countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Meanwhile, Cold War organisations and institutions, such as Comecon and the Warsaw Pact had disappeared, whilst existing western organisations, especially NATO, had to reconsider and reassess their role, as new bodies and instruments were created to deal with potential threats to European and international security, as they arose.

In the first half of the 1990s, one of the main security concerns of the international community was the shift from inter-state to intra-state conflict. For example, in 1991, when war broke out in Europe for the first time since 1945, with the bloody wars of secession and post-Yugoslav transition. These wars, in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina brought horrors, hitherto inconceivable to the post Second World War mind-set, in which peace had reigned for forty-five years, thanks to systems created during the Cold War, where the fear of nuclear Armageddon had brought about European and world stability. South-Eastern Europe was confronted with tensions and insecurity, which not only affected the Yugoslav successor states, but also threatened to spill over into Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, even Hungary, Romania, Italy and beyond.

In the meantime, Russia was confronted with new security challenges to its West and South. In the West, states which had hitherto been allies, a 'middle abroad' from the Russian perspective, and had been closely integrated into the Soviet defensive and economic systems, were now furnished with new governments, new constitutions and new ambitions. They were driving towards a new understanding with the West, desiring greater association and even integration within the European Union, and protection, through the auspices of NATO, from perceived threats coming from their eastern neighbour, Russia.

Certainly, the flattening of Grozny, capital of Chechnya, was hardly the best way of calming Polish, Hungarian, Slovak and Baltic fears about any perceived Russian military threat. The CEE states started rushing to the NATO defensive umbrella, first through NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP), and for some states, namely Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic at first, full membership of NATO in March 1999. Furthermore, since Finland had entered the European Union in 1995, the EU now shared a long frontier with Russia for the first time, so that the continued enlargement of Europe brought Russia ever closer as a neighbour. From a European perspective, cooperation with Russia became essential; something that should not be forgotten in the current crisis over eastern Ukraine and also with regard to the establishment of Europe's Eastern Partnership project of 2009.

Russia, meanwhile, was also concerned with its nearest neighbours, the successor republics to the Soviet Union, the so-called 'near abroad', this would form Russia's immediate security problems. In the north, there was tension with the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, over the citizenship rights of Russian minorities. To the immediate west there were tensions with Ukraine, particularly over the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet and the control of the Crimea. To the south there were tensions in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, with outbreaks of violence in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Transdeniester and Moldova. Whilst the Russian Federation's own autonomous regions, such as Tatarstan, then Bashkortostan, began to clamour for independence.

Meanwhile, Russia actively participated in European and International institutions, such as the CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe), established at Helsinki in 1975, and renamed OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) at Budapest in December 1994. Russia also participated in international peace-keeping efforts. From December 1995 Russian troops helped enforce the peace in BiH, alongside their NATO allies, as co-members of IFOR (Implementation Force) and SFOR (Stabilisation Force). From June 1999 they also worked with KFOR (Kosovo Force) in Kosovo, at a time when relations between Russia and the West seemed to have fallen to an all-time low, following the debacle over Priština airport.

The souring of relations between Russia and the West started with the expansion of NATO into Central and Eastern Europe. This would become one of the thorniest issues in international relations during the 1990s. But, Russia had to consider its traditional geopolitical concerns. There was deep-rooted anxiety that invasion could come from the West again. This was deeply embedded in the Russian national psyche. After invasion from the West in 1812, 1914 and

63

Robert C. Hudson: The End of the End of the Cold War:
Current Dilemmas Confronting European Security in the Wake of the Ukrainian Conflict

1941, and the loss of so many Russian lives in two world wars and the Russian Civil War (1918-1921) which had also been a war of allied intervention, Russia had, after the Great Patriotic War, used the newly Communist East European states as a barrier or glacis between Russia and the West. Furthermore, concerned already that former 'East European' allies were clamouring to join NATO, Russian opinion would be extremely concerned if countries in the former Soviet sphere of influence such as Belarus and Ukraine were to join NATO as this would bring what has been described as the world's most powerful military alliance, right onto Russia's borders. Writing in 2015, it is interesting to take note of the fact that the launch of the EU's Eastern Partnership Programme in 2009, in the aftermath of Russia's conflict with Georgia in the summer of 2008 would have a similar impact on Russian foreign policy thinking, which is impacting on the security of an expanded Europe today.

What was NATO without communism? In the aftermath of events in 1989 and 1991 NATO had to completely rethink its position in the world. Whereas it had originally been established to defend the West from Soviet aggression and rearm Germany, it began to look into the role of peace-keeping and peace-enforcement, expansion and even acting out of area. Peace enforcement does not just entail a presence in areas of post-conflict periods of tension, such as the effective NATO-led protectorate that had been established in BiH in December 1995, but also coming to the assistance of minorities under threat, such as the Kosovar Albanians in Serbia, as part of a policy that would be dubbed 'The Responsibility to Protect', that would formally be adopted by the United Nations, ten years later in September 2009, when at the UN summit, all member states formally accepted the responsibility of each state to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (United Nations, September 2015). The problem vis-à-vis NATO's relationship with Russia, was that whereas Russia had made a considerable contribution to IFOR/SFOR activities in BiH, Russia was vehemently opposed to NATO air strikes on its co-religionists and fellow Slavs in Serbia in the Spring of 1999, right on the cusp of the demise of Yeltsin and the rise to power of Vladimir Putin.

Returning to the early 1990s, there were concerns not just about the direction that NATO was taking, but whether or not the organisation would even continue to exist. NATO also came in for criticism for failing to respond effectively to the conflicts in the Yugoslav successor states. Critics argued that there was no longer any substantial threat and that NATO could be replaced by a beefed-up OSCE. But, what they failed to acknowledge was that most of the CEE (Central and East European States) wanted to join NATO and were not

interested in European alternatives such as Eurocorps or the WEU (Western European Union).

Given that the Cold War had ended, many questioned the very purpose of NATO. Its specific aim had been to combat the Soviet threat to the West, but in the 1990s, that threat appeared to have gone away. Formed in April 1949, NATO had kept the peace throughout the Cold War period as the main organisation for the coordination of foreign, security and defence policies in Western Europe and North America. In the last decade of the twentieth century, NATO underwent a tremendous process of transformation, whereby both its role and its sphere of influence had changed considerably. With the collapse of communism, NATO still had to consider Russia's residual military potential. Meanwhile NATO had to consider its policy towards the issue of armed conflict on Europe's periphery and the question of what to do about the crises that would develop in Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and the Kurdish problems in Turkey at the end of the decade and the beginning of the twenty-first century. There still remained the problem of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, which entailed the continued bombing of Iraq throughout 1999, and into the early 2000s which might have also partly motivated the desire to bomb Serbia, Russia's traditional ally in South-Eastern Europe, in the spring of that year, since the Serbs were thought to have provided Iraq with biological weapons, technology and know-how whilst the Iraqis advised them on the use of ground to air defence systems.

Other concerns confronting NATO were the instability to the south of Europe in countries such as Algeria and Cyprus and across much of the Middle East, as well as the fear of Islamic fundamentalism. In the absence of the old Soviet threat it seemed as though western liberal democracies and systems within them, such as military-industrial complexes still needed enemies, either to divert public opinion away from internal problems, or to assist their economies. Indeed, the West's blundering interventions in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq both before and after the Arab Spring and its failure to deal more directly and effectively with the Assad regime and the conflict in Syria contributed directly to the rise of ISIS in 2014 in a new crisis which has taken the focus off Crimea and Ukraine. Likewise, the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have dissipated much of the support there might have been in wider populations in the West for further military engagements as well as fostering a general disengagement towards politics in western countries, if not total cynicism towards western governments.

Meanwhile, returning to Europe, by the end of 1991 it had been realised that NATO's new role could be to facilitate cooperation between those CEE states which wanted to join the alliance, mainly out of fear of Russia, fuelled by the ramblings of Zhirinovsky's middle and near abroad rhetoric, that was central to his nationalistic outlook. Such fears were exacerbated in 1994, when the Russian government argued that it had the right to intervene in the Baltic States, should either Russian installations or the remaining Russian minorities come under threat. The situation was not helped by the Kaliningrad peninsula conundrum, whereby an area of Russian territory had been separated from Russia proper by the secession of Lithuania from the Soviet Union. In 1995, this led Communist Party leader Gennady Zuganov to comment that: "The country has been pushed back to the borders it had in the sixteenth century…dozens of millions of compatriots are now second class citizens, living beyond the frontiers of the Russian Federation." One cannot escape the fact that the Russian psyche is focused on the importance of borders and territories. Meanwhile, Lithuania would go on to join the EU on 1 May 2004.

NATO was confronted with a dilemma. If it did not enlarge, some CEE countries might be left in a security vacuum which would lead to more insecurity in the region. However, if NATO were to enlarge, it might risk a new confrontation with Russia. Whatever the case, it should be recognised that at the time Russia was constrained by its economic and military weakness, its domestic tensions and its need for economic aid from the West. This certainly seemed to be the case during the Kosovo crisis, although Boris Yeltsin was clearly upset about the loss of Russian prestige, hence his sabre rattling in the early summer of 1999. Furthermore, Russia had gained a lot of kudos from its involvement in the IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia, which would benefit its relations with the International Community. Anyway, at the time, Russia had more immediate security problems in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, to say nothing of its concerns over the rise of China.

In January 1994, NATO had launched the PfP on the basis of 'sixteen plus one' in other words relations between the then sixteen NATO member states on a separate basis, with each CEE country, allowing them to determine how far they wanted to go with the relationship. PfP was seen as a temporary means of expanding NATO, based on partnership, without ruffling Russia's feathers too much, since it did not guarantee full membership to partners as allies fully protected by Article 5. Within its first year of operation, twenty-six countries would join.

Membership of NATO, like joining the EU would entail entering, or re-entering into the European mainstream. It would provide further support for developing democracy, civil society and lustration in these states (NPE). It would encourage cooperative relations between neighbouring states as happened with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999. It would increase economic investment and help develop market reforms and it would entail the civilian control over the armed forces. In other words, membership of NATO would add to the feeling of being part of a wider, democratic Europe, a break with the past and an end to the period of transition.

In the meantime, Russia was deeply concerned that this was an all-out attempt to enlarge NATO; that its former enemy would now be on Russia's doorstep, going against Russia's foreign policy for the previous fifty years. By contrast the CEE states felt that this was just a holding operation and that NATO had no serious intention of offering them full membership.

In the 1990s, Russia's response to NATO expansion had been to build new buffer states. Whilst Yeltsin had signed an agreement with Belarus allowing Russian troops to patrol Belarus' so-called three 'external borders' with Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. This led to the comment by Colonel-General Andrei Nikolayev that by this agreement, Russia had pushed its military border 384 miles to the west of the 'administrative border'. This was Russia's way of expanding through military alliances that competed with NATO and underlined Russia's thirst for 'Great Power' status. It was good for Russian prestige and morale. So, Russia's only alternative was to create its own military bloc with the former Soviet republics. Was this not a precursor to the 'hybrid' warfare that we have witnessed more recently in 2014 and 2015 in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, whereby the Russians have employed a strategy based on: deception, denial, undermining the power of a state from within, working with sub-state ethnic nationalisms and above all keeping it all beneath the radar of NATO's Article 5 – the "all for one and one for all" declaration. This is what had happened in eastern Ukraine and Crimea and it could easily by employed by stealth in the Baltics, where Russia could in turn use frozen conflicts to its own advantage.

Ultimately, as the new millennium dawned it remained clear that among other things, the key issues confronting European security and defence would continue to be: the widening and deepening of Europe, the impact of organisations such as NATO on the CEE and Russia, minority groups and human rights and the changing nature of Europe: north-south cleavages, new barriers and frontiers and disparity between states with a rich man and a poor man Europe and the issue of Fortress Europe. Certainly, ten years after the fall of the

Berlin Wall, it seemed that the frontier decided at Yalta in 1945 had shifted a few hundred miles further East.

But, for many in Russia, the lesson of 1991 was quite different. Communism had failed, and the ensuing "collapse of the Soviet Union was seen as a humiliating geopolitical setback." It was all about the loss of Empire. Anybody, who has any real inkling of Russian history, will understand Russia's concerns about its borders, its neighbours and the deeply imbedded fear of invasion. The dates and events of 1812, 1914, 1918 and 1941 as well as the revisionist view of the Cold War (Nye, 1993, p. 99) only serve to underline this simple fact. From a Russian perspective, foreign policy is all about territory and under Stalin the Soviet Union returned to traditional Russian concerns about territory; issues which have become major Russian preoccupations in the face of the "indefinite expansion of NATO" since the late 1990s, and this situation has been exacerbated by the EU's policy towards Ukraine which has largely ignored these concerns. (Giddens, 2014, p. 200).

Admittedly, Robert Cooper might well have described Russia as a 'modern', rather than a 'post-modern' state, though he did not! Nevertheless, a re-reading of his seminal work *The Breaking of Nations* (2003) would put Russia within that 'modern' state bracket, far removed from the 'post-modernist' EU! Furthermore, following the disastrous mid-1990s when Russia was described as being in 'free fall' (Hudson, 2002, p. 52) it was clear that from a Russian perspective, Russia would have to regain its status in the world. Geopolitically, the Yeltsin years had been a disaster for Russia. Yeltsin had proved to be the wrong man at the wrong time. But, there are perhaps many in the West who wish that Yeltsin were in power now! In the aftermath of economic, social and political crisis, to say nothing of disastrous military campaigns of which the first war in Chechnya (1994 – 1996) served as a prime example, Russian self-pride had to be restored. This would come with the rise to power of Vladimir Putin. Putin is Russia. He fits the traditional role of the strong ruler perfectly well. Think of Ivan 'The Terrible', Peter 'The Great', Catherine 'The Great' and, of course Stalin. As Catherine had once allegedly said, 'The Russians love the feel of the knout.'

Many commentators have traced Russia's resurgence back to the Georgian conflict in the summer of 2008, which witnessed Russia's strong backlash against the Georgian invasion of Ossetia, exacerbated by US support for the 'colour revolutions' in Ukraine (Orange, in November 2004 to January 2005) and Georgia (Rose in November 2003), which witnessed the installation of potentially antagonistic regimes to Putin and his aspirations to reinvigorate Russian power (Bacon, 2014, p. 215). But, we can go back even further, to the

period just before Putin's rise to power; back to 1999 and the race to Priština airport. This was the moment when Russia began to retrieve its big-power status after years in the doldrums, as Russia also gained the upper hand in its second war in Chechnya (1999 – 2000). Indeed, the Kosovo conflict would prove to be a disaster for NATO-Russian co-operation. Already exacerbated by the NATO invitation in 1998 to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, as this deepened Russia's fear of NATO's intentions in what was, after all to be NATO's first war. Yeltsin stepped down on New Year's Eve 1999 and Putin took over. If Russia was seen as a non-threat to the West in the Yeltsin years (1991 – 1999) the West would be in for a rude awakening as the first decade of the 21st century progressed and one of Russia's most popular and populist rulers established his power base. One only has to read Putin's millennium speech to realise that under his leadership, Russia was clearly trying to reassert itself in the world. Later in 2004 seven more eastern European states gained NATO membership (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) and the fact that the three Baltic states were among them was particularly galling for Putin.

However, returning to the conflict with Georgia in 2008, Stephen Blank, writing for the *Huffington Post* comments that: "Russia's imperial land and power grabs in Georgia (and now Ukraine), its efforts to undermine security in Moldova and the Caucasus, and its permanent sabre rattling in the Baltics show that Russia remains unreconciled to the 1991 loss of empire." (Stephen Blank, 2015). Blank goes on to argue that: "The quest for empire inevitably and inescapably means war. It means war because Russia, as shown in Ukraine and Georgia, cannot accept the genuine sovereignty or territorial integrity of any of its neighbours, including Eastern Europe." (Ibid.)

This might fit in well with Lucas' 'New Cold War' scenario, or rather with the less aggressively sounding scenario that this writer would more cautiously refer to as: 'The End of the End of the Cold War.' Their argument is that the crisis does not just stop at Ukraine and that any further EU/Western/ American appeasement would only lead to further conflict.

So, from a European perspective, the crisis over Ukraine is about the future of the political and security order in Europe (John Techau, 2015). Indeed: "It is more about who is willing to put military might on the line to defend Western and Central Europe" (Dempsey, 2015). The upshot is that the West and Russia are now facing their worst crisis since the end of the Cold War. Let us now consider the EU's role over the last decade before considering America's changing relationship with Europe.

The Eastern Partnership: Expanding Europe Eastwards A Step too Far?

Europe's approach, as has been demonstrated by Kagan (2003) and Cooper (2003) has been different to that of the United States. It is based on the idea that the Union should extend itself, not by military means, but through the influence of soft power and Normative Power, with the offer of a special relationship with the European Union for prospective partners. Such an approach has also avoided the need for the European Union to defend itself without becoming excessively militarized, whilst: "extending its system of co-operative empire ever wider" (Cooper, 2003, p.78).

Certainly, the integrationist project of European expansion had been the policy of the European Union in the aftermath of the Cold War. But, 25 years on can the EU continue to advocate such a policy, especially in the face of Russian ambitions since 2008, if not since 2000, when Putin came to power.

Recognizing that European integration has been one of the most dynamic processes observed world-wide in the last fifty years, Pétar Balázs the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in Hungary and former member of the European Commission has developed this idea further by considering the expansion of Europe in an ever eastward direction. For Balázs:

The East is very different [to the West]: on the endless plains and mountains of the Eurasian mainland, the neighbouring countries keep being surrounded by new neighbours. In the eastern dimension, the famous question about the interpretation of Article 49 (on European Union) is very relevant: Where are the ends of Europe? (Balázs, 2012, p.173)

The question of European finitude would also be raised two years later by Anthony Giddens (Giddens, 2014, p.187) and this remains a key issue in our understanding of European security issues today, especially in the face of Russian reactions to Europe's eastward push, to states which Russia still considers to be situated within its own sphere of influence. Meanwhile, Jose Manuel Barroso had called an EU summit on the expansion of the European project to the East, in October 2008. The aim was to help the six European Partnership countries to establish strong institutions, the rule of law and NPE with a view to future EU membership within a period of ten to fifteen years.

A year later, in 2009, the European Union's Eastern Partnership initiative was launched in an attempt to boost the EU's earlier fairly ineffectual neighborhood policy by attempting to forge closer ties with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (Lungescu, 2009). This idea, which had originally been proposed by a Polish and Swedish initiative in 2008, was to create

a free trade area between the six countries concerned, somewhat akin to the free trade area that had been established earlier in the Balkans and which appeared to be working well at the time (Pop, 2008). There is little doubt that this process had been accelerated in response to the Georgian conflict over that summer and as had been in the case earlier in the Balkans, the idea had been to get countries that had not worked so well together in the past to pull together on key issues such as transport and energy. Indeed, was this not a reflection of the very processes that had lain at the heart of the European integration project in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the initial six member states, all former enemies had pooled together their resources under the auspices of the European Coal and Steel Community?

The problem was that Russia still saw these countries as part of its own sphere of influence (Lungescu, 2009). They were situated in the post-Soviet zone (Balázs, 2012, p.177), in other words they formed what Russia had considered to be its so-called 'near abroad' – a theme had already been taken up in the early 1990s by the ultra-Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky (Frazer and Lancelle, 1994). It was this that had led Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to accuse the EU of trying to carve out a new sphere of influence in what Moscow defines as its region of "privileged interest" (Lungescu, 2009). Later, in February 2015, Lavrov was quoted as having commented in a speech in Munich that: "The events in the past year have confirmed the validity of our warnings regarding deep, systemic problems in the organization of Europe" (Nougayrede, 2015) and he was quoted as having gone on to say that the West was taking sides and was not taking Russia's concerns seriously (Dempsey, 2015).

While the EU has insisted that the Eastern Partnership project is neither an anti-Russian alliance nor an attempt to create a new sphere of European Union influence (ibid.), for Balázs: The Eastern Partnership project would not be feasible without some form of Russia's inclusion as a partner (Balázs, 2012, p. 178). Furthermore, Lungescu comments:

> One word increasingly mentioned by diplomats when they talk about the EU's eastern neighbours is 'instability'. The war between Russia and Georgia last summer (2008) and the Russia-Ukraine energy row, which led to gas cuts in Europe in the depth of winter, have fuelled EU concerns about events on the bloc's eastern borders (Lungescu, 2009).

Europe cannot exclude Russia in its negotiations and agreements if the Union is to avoid exacerbating the tensions that have been growing, particularly since the start of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, Balázs has also acknowledged that: "frozen conflicts in post-Soviet territories are also a source

of international tensions…. [and that]…the unsolved situations radiate tension to the neighborhood and the outside world" (Balázs, ibid., p. 177). It was the lingering threat of frozen conflicts, such as Transnistria and Nagorno Karabakh as well as the events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia that lay at the heart of the problem. Four years earlier, when the European Partnership initiative was being drawn up, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Chairman of the European Parliament's foreign affairs committee had underlined the need for the EU to "anticipate", rather than "react" to issues in the region, mentioning the need then to assist Ukraine's majority ethnic Russian region of the Crimea with better infrastructure and other "pragmatic" solutions (Pop, 2008). The sad reality is that the EU responded too late, the EU had failed to "anticipate" the situation in the Crimea six years later in February 2014 and was left having to "react" to it. The risk is that Ukraine itself will drift toward frozen conflict status and that Vladimir Putin might succeed in dividing the West ever further (Dempsey, 2015).

Alina Inayeh comments that: "After the developments of 2008 (namely the conflict between Russia and Georgia) and the return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2012, there has been a growing sense of the inevitability of Moscow's aggressive behaviour towards the region" (Inayeh, 2014, p.2). Fears of military invasion, trade wars (especially over Russian oil and gas resources) and political pressure have been exacerbated by frozen conflicts in the region. Indeed, Russian leverage over Russian oil and gas resources has been central to the more bullish stance that Putin has been able to take, especially given the EU's reliance on imported energy sources and its failure to develop a coherent energy policy. Then, in 2011 and 2012, two pipelines bringing gas from Russia into Europe provided Russia with further leverage in EU politics (Giddens, 2014, p. 197). The problem was that the EU remains so dependent on Russia for gas, especially in the case of Germany (Hudson, 2014, pp.34-35). Similarly, the EU-aspirant states in the Western Balkans are also dependent on the potential revenues from Russian pipelines that could be built through their countries. In December 2014, the South Stream pipeline project controlled by Gazprom to transport natural gas from the Russian Federation through the Black Sea to Bulgaria, and through Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia and on to Austria was abandoned. This was in response to objections and sanctions from Bulgaria, an EU member state and the EU as a whole, in response to Russian involvement in the Crimean and eastern Ukraine crises.

Of the six countries which make up the European Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) three (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) have also entered into Association Agreements with the European

Union, thereby accelerating their closer relationship with the EU, so that Russia's aggressiveness would seem to have backfired in the case of these three countries. Nevertheless, it should be noted that all three of the signatories to the EU Association Agreements are confronted with lingering tensions and frozen conflicts. Ukraine is blighted by internal instability brought about by the loss of Crimea and the frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine, where Russia still maintains considerable leverage. Georgia is comparatively more politically stable than Ukraine, in spite of its armed conflict with Russia over Ossetia in 2008. Along with Moldova, Georgia is confronted with lingering tensions and issues concerning the reintegration of the secessionist territories of Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the case of Moldova, the parliamentary elections in November 2014 returned the pro-EU parties as the majority grouping, although the strongly pro-Russian Socialists became the largest single party in the country. All the same, for the time being at least, the Association Agreement with the EU would appear to remain safe. Although, as Inayeh noted the three Association Agreement countries have encountered diminished support from their populations for the European Partnership because of growing fears over Russian intentions. Meanwhile, the other three Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus) have no immediate plans for official relations with the EU to develop (Inayeh, 2014, p. 3) and the events in Ukraine have: "…pushed the issue of national security to the top of the six governments' priority lists'" (Inayeh, 2014, p. 4) which has led Ukraine and Georgia to seek security guarantees with NATO, whilst Armenia and Belarus have turned instead to Russia, and Moldova has sought refuge in its neutrality. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has turned to the United States.

For Inayeh (2014, p. 4): "Western support for, and involvement in the region remains critical from the perspective of all six countries" because "…instability in the region has spillover effects, threatening the security of the EU and NATO's eastern members and heightening concerns for energy supplies and routes" (Inayeh, 2014, p. 3, Hudson 2014, pp. 34-35). In sum, Inayeh makes two key observations from the point of view of the security of the region, noting that the EU and United States should:

1) Focus on the situation in Ukraine, but not forget the rest of the region.

2) Address regional security by addressing the frozen conflicts in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno Karabach (See also, Hudson, 2002).

The real issue at stake is that for the last 23 years, both the EU and the US have largely ignored the frozen conflicts in the region which has enabled

Russia to prolong them (Inayeh, 2014, p. 5) by introducing "peacekeeping forces", which make one think of the role of the so-called "Little Green Men" during the occupation of Crimea in February 2014 (Hudson, 2014, p. 32), and this in turn raises the issue that the OSCE has largely been hamstrung in the region by the presence of Russian 'peacekeeping' forces, as indeed was the case of the OSCE in eastern Ukraine in the summer of 2014 (Hudson, 2014, p. 40).

America and the Euro-Atlantic Project

The current security dilemmas confronting Europe should be seen as the End of the End of the Cold War, rather than as a return to the actual Cold War itself, or as a new form of Cold War. Nevertheless, the situation in Ukraine has inescapably re-opened old Cold War wounds. This was most clearly demonstrated last summer, with the shooting down of MH17 in July, when a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 was shot down by a Buk surface-to-air missile over Hrabove, near Torez in the Donetsk Oblast of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, only forty miles from the Russian border. This was, perhaps, the lowest ebb in the conflict at the time.

As such, the return of war on the European continent, only fifteen years after NATO's first war over Kosovo and twenty years after the Dayton peace accords which had ended the conflicts in Bosnia-Hercegovina, came as a deep shock to the West. Europe, which since 2008 had been struggling with its financial and economic woes, was caught completely off-guard by the situation in Ukraine and Russia's complicit role in conducting that hybrid war. But what seemed worse was that the transatlantic project, the friendship between the EU and the US seemed to be at its lowest ebb too. The US now clearly saw Asia as the region that would define the course of the 21st century. Its interests were in the Pacific, not in Europe, and Washington's eyes were no longer so-keenly focused on Europe, and not for the first time in recent years.

Nathalie Nougayrede, writing in *The Guardian* on 13 February 2015, commented that:

> For years, Europe built its common project with a Kantian view of the world – A Venus syndrome (with the US as Mars), as described by Robert Kagan: a continent incapable of envisaging war because for so long it had lived under the post-war US security umbrella.

The upshot is that without the transatlantic link enshrined in NATO, Europe has no security and defence policy of its own to speak of and never has had one, neither at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, nor

since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Returning to Giddens, as commented above, Europe had fallen at the very first hurdle over Yugoslavia, back in 1991. For in the run-up to signing the Maastricht Treaty that would usher in the European Union amidst the latent euphoria of German re-unification, the then EEC interpreted the events taking place in the former-Yugoslavia as being very much part of its own "back yard", whilst the United States, with the exception of intervention in Macedonia as part of a UN peace-keeping mission, only entered into the wars of Yugoslav Transition relatively late in the day, and then only with airstrikes around on military installations in the *Republika Srpska* (Bosnian Serb Republic). Perhaps lessons could be learned from this. Another commentator, Jan Tachau of the Carnegie Foundation has argued that:

> For the time being, America is back, albeit reluctantly. With renewed US commitment, NATO is reinforcing its eastern flank, marking the boundary at which Western security responsibilities end. Ukraine is left dangling in an in-between position, with part of its territory becoming another frozen conflict that ensures lasting Russian influence over this part of post-Soviet space. The Europeans in the meantime, are trying desperately to keep their economies and their always-fragile political order from disintegrating. Can this form of Western retrenchment, European halfheartedness, and a slightly beefed-up US security presence in Europe be the future of European security? Not for long. The lingering power vacuum invites external probing. Europe seems capable neither of policing nor of integrating its neighbourhood. Germany, Europe's temporary leader, is an incomplete strategic player, while Europe's traditional key players –France and the UK- have, at least for the moment, sidelined themselves because of internal weakness. (Tachau, 2015).

This does make the future of transatlantic relations look rather bleak, especially when one returns to the recurring theme that: "the US has openly identified Asia as a region that will defined the course of the 21st century." (Nougayrede, 2015). Judy Dempsey adds that:

> Europe is far from security self-reliance. In fact, instead of becoming more autonomous, its governments keep increasing their dependence on US security services by steadily reducing their own capabilities. This is partly because of economic stress, partly because of acute strategic dyslexia. Europeans seem to be unaware of their own security dilemma: that the United States must focus elsewhere while Europe's security is

increasingly threatened by its wide, unruly neighbourhood. (Dempsey, 2015).

Yet, although the US might well be focusing its attention on the Pacific region and the rise of China, to say nothing of the current threat from ISIS, would it not be an over-exaggeration to advocate that the United States has abandoned Europe? The United States and several EU member states are currently cooperating directly in the conflicts both in Ukraine and the struggle against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Giddens, 2014, p. 187). Perhaps, as Giddens argues, now is the time for Europe to seek to establish new transatlantic ties which is the key argument in the security chapter in his book.

Conclusion

The return to armed conflict on the European continent in 2014 came as a deep shock to the West and this was set against the background of the continuing economic crisis. Indeed, the economic crisis has meant that there are not the financial resources to strengthen and increase military budgets, resources and commitments in the wider Europe. In addition to this, it would seem that the transatlantic bond, which had been crucial to European peace and stability since the end of the Second World War, has been significantly weakened at the same time as Russia, under the leadership of Putin has been striving to re-establish its great power status (Nougayrede, 2015). The European Union is currently confronted with a renewed and potentially defining struggle against the re-energised forces of internal division and fragmentation, external hostility and encroachment. For the first time since the end of the Cold War twenty-five years ago, there are doubts as to whether or not the European Union's borders will remain secure any longer.

The reality for Europe is that without the transatlantic link enshrined in NATO, Europe has no real defense and security policy of its own. So, in an ever changing world, how can Europe ensure the defense of its own interests? Europe's position is not helped by the obvious absence of either any doctrine or any deployable joint forces capable of ensuring the safety of Russia's neighbors, if the worst-case scenario were to unfold. Possibly for the first time since the end of the Second World War, European governments find themselves in a position where they will have to: "sort the continent out more or less on their own." (Nougayrede, 2015).

Certainly, as mentioned by Tachau and Nougayrede above, NATO has beefed up some of its capabilities in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis. But the fact

that debates continue about NATO's ability to enact Article 5 of its treaty (the all-for-one, one-for-all security guarantee set in place for its members) demonstrates just how uncertain the transatlantic bond has come to be perceived. However, the real fear for Europeans at the beginning of 2015 was that: "US military aid to Ukraine, whether defensive or lethal, can have only one effect: to escalate the standoff further..." between Russia and the West. (Dempsey, 2015). But, this said, perhaps Russia too has recently shifted its main focus away from Ukraine to Syria, especially given the West's abysmal failure to gain any influence on that country's internal conflicts. For Dempsey, the real issue is not the situation in the Ukraine, but something bigger. Who is willing to put military might on the line to defend Western and Central Europe? According to her argument this is set against the background that the US must and wants to shift its geopolitical focus to Asia (Dempsey, 2015).

At the end of the day, forty years after the Helsinki Final Accords (1975) which witnessed the birth of the CSCE (forerunner of the OSCE) and twenty-five years after the Paris Charter in 1990, which laid the foundations of a peaceful post-Cold War order in Europe, all seems to have come adrift. It would seem that the European Union, and the West as a whole has made an unintentional contribution to the current state of security in Europe by impinging on territory which Russia considers to be in its own sphere of influence, both in terms of Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership. This has happened at a time when the United States might not be so willing or ready to guarantee European security and at a time when Russia is committed to reasserting its position in the world.

As for the West, it is facing its worst crisis since the end of the Cold War, when Europeans and Americans need to remain united at a time when Putin would seem to be determined to split the transatlantic alliance. Without the transatlantic relationship enshrined in NATO, the European Union does not have any defense and security policy of its own worth speaking about. The only obvious solutions would seem to be to: Draw NATO and the EU closer together; to develop an integrated European Defense policy under the aegis of NATO in which, in a time of continuing economic crisis, individual European nation states would take full responsibility for specified security and defense initiatives, thereby avoiding duplication by particular nation states, in particular Britain and France. Attention too should be focused on the tendency of European governments to make serious cuts to defense budgets in the light of the imposition of austerity measures following the 2008 economic crash. Ultimately, there needs to be greater solidarity within the European Union and a move away from the European exit strategies and machinations of internal populist political parties.

Future generations of historians will obviously get the opportunity to re-write the story from a position of hindsight. From the current standpoint, the twenty-five year period known as the End of the Cold War appears to have finally come to an end. Europe would seem to be truly standing on the precipice of a new era. What is less clear is whether its leaders and institutions have the capacity or the political vision to chart a new direction for the Continent.

However, on perhaps a more positive note, the situation might not be as bleak as it currently seems. Russia has recently committed ground troops, weaponry and airstrikes to the conflict in Syria. Admittedly, Russia is backing the Assad regime, for which Western governments do not really care for very much. Yet apart, from supporting the Assad regime, Russia is also taking the focus off the situation in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, it might even be that Russia is trying to assuage its involvement in this region. In addition, it might also be that by involving itself in striking out against ISIS forces, Russia has bitten off more than it can chew, and that political Islam might well strike back against the Russian homeland yet again, as it has done so many times over the past twenty-five years. Russia, also suffered as a result of its invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 as have western states more recently. Furthermore, it is not just the US that is concerned about the potential expansion in the Pacific region and the South, so too is Russia. Twenty years ago, in February 1995, Russia signed a common defence agreement with Kazakhstan, which was important to Russian security needs at the time, given that Kazakhstan shared a 625 mile border with China. The significance of this agreement is perhaps best explained within a demographic context, given that east of the Urals there are only 32 million inhabitants in the Russian Federation; with more than a million Chinese in Russia's Siberian territory, this is seen as a potential threat to Russia, should China ever wish to expand in a westerly direction. Here, one is reminded of the events of February 1969, when fighting broke out between Soviet and Chinese troops over Domanski island on the disputed frontier zone between the Armur and Usari rivers.

Given that the United States also sees Asia as the region that will "define the twenty-first century", it might well be that both Russia and the United States will eventually find themselves having to work together. Perhaps, one might see a future in which Russo-US cooperation will reflect the more convivial days of Russian and US cooperation in IFOR and SFOR in the mid-1990s.

Alternatively, co-operation between China and the US is equally possible. The critical point is that we are heading into a much more multi-polar world than either the Cold War era or the US dominated post-Cold War decade.

It is not clear how Europe will co-ordinate its own defence in this new era and undoubtedly the relationship between the US, NATO and the EU may well be complicated further if Britain goes into a reverse gear with the European project. Europe's insularity in terms of its political debates, its lack of vision and its lack of leadership is coinciding with a period when outside issues are beginning to overtake the Continent's agenda. The next few years will either see a transformed EU, in response to these challenges, or an EU that will begin to crumble. Only time will tell.

At the end of the day all sides concerned are mutually interdependent on each other, and Europe and the United States should take more care in consulting with Russia in future. From the point of view of European security, Europe and the United States have to make sure that Russia does not feel isolated, and that they recognise again the potential of Russia's 'great power' status, whilst ensuring that democratic and economic reforms will eventually prove successful in Russia, especially in the area of human rights.

References

Bacon, E. (2014). *Contemporary Russia*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Balázs, P. (2012). The Eastern Partnership. In *The Eastern Partnership and the Europe 2020 Strategy*. Luxemburg: The European Commission.

Blank, S. (2015, May 28). Ukraine and European Security. *Huffington Post*. Retrieved February 12, 2015 from www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-blank/ukraine-and-european-secu_b_5044475.html.

Cooper, R. (2003). *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century*. London: Atlantic Books.Dempsey, J. (2015, February 7). The Dialogue of the Deaf: Between the West and Russia. *Huffington Post.* Retrieved February 12, 2015 from www.carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=59003.Dempsey, J. (2015, February 8). Judy asks: Can the West save Ukraine? Carnegie Europe. Retrieved February 12, 2015 from www.carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=59005.

Dempsey, J. (2015, February 9). 'What Russia and the Islamic State mean for US-European ties. Carnegie Europe. Retrieved February 12, 2015 from http://carnegieurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=59008.

Dempsey, J. (2015, February 10). European Security after Ukraine. Carnegie Europe. Retrieved February 12, 2015 from http://carnegieurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=59025.

Frazer, G. and Lancelle, G. (1994). *Zhirinovsky: the Little Black Book.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Giddens, A. (2014). *Turbulent and Mighty Continent: What future for Europe?* Cambridge: Polity.

Hudson, R. (2002). Apocalypse Now' or a return from the brink? In Nystén-Harala, S. (Ed.) *Transformation and Integration in the Baltic Sea Are and the Barents Area*. Rovaniemi: University of Lapland.

Hudson, R. (2014). The Ukrainian Crisis, the Crimean referendum and security implications for the European Union. In Dodovski, I., Hudson, R., Sefanovska, M. and Pendarovski, S. *The Europe of Tomorrow: Creative, Digital, Integrated* (pp. 25-44). Skopje: University College American Skopje.

Hudson, R. (2015, October 2). Interview on Russia's involvement in the Syrian Conflict. *BBC Radio Derby*.

Inayeh, A. (2014). The regional impact of the Ukraine Crisis: Overview and conclusions. In Inayeh, A., Schwarzer, D. and Forbrig, J. *Regional Repercussions of the Ukraine Crisis*, Europe Policy Paper 3/2014. Washington: The Germany Marshall Fund of the United States.

Kagan, R. (2003). *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order.* London: Atlantic Books.

Longescu, O. (2009). EU reaches out to troubled East. *BBC News*. Retrieved May 7, 2009 from http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/world/europe/8035710.stm.

Lucas, E. (2014). *The New Cold War: Putin's Threat to Russia and the West.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe, a contradiction in terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40, 235 – 258.

Nougayrede, N. (2015). Ukraine has reopened cold war wounds but this time, the US may not guarantee our security. *The Guardian*, February 13, 2013.

Nye, J. (1993). *Understanding International Conflicts*. New York: HarperCollins.

Nye, J. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

Pop, V. (2008, September 18). Balkans model to underpin EU's "Eastern Partnership. Retrieved February 13, 2015 from http://eurobserver.com/enlargement/26766.United Nations (2013 September). Background information on the responsibility to protect. Retrieved October 22, 2015 from http://un.org/en /preventgenocide/....

Weigall, D. and Stirk, P. (Eds). (1992). *The Origins and Development of the European Community*. Leicester and London: Leicester University Press.

The Current Situation Concerning Illegal Migration in the Balkans

Ljupcho Stevkovski and Dushko Stojanovski

Abstract

The research focus of this chapter covers the phenomenon of illegal migration as an asymmetrical threat. It considers the importance of the Balkan region as a transit zone to the countries of the European Union, and presents some of the weakness in the current situation as well as providing indications of possible solutions. The hypothesis is that the lack of a clear and coordinated strategy at the European Union level, in terms of dealing with the problem of illegal migration, affects the situation regarding this phenomenon which has deteriorated and is complicated in every aspect. The increase in the flow of refugees from the Middle East (Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan) and illegal migrants from North Africa will continue to be one of the key problems for the European Union and the transit countries of the Balkans. The Balkans will continue to be affected, primarily as a transit destination for a large number of refugees/migrants who intend to go to Western Europe, but probably some of them will want to stay in some of the countries of the region as asylum seekers. It is expected that this reality will adversely affect the socio-economic and security situation. Because of the involvement of local logistical networks, the increasing number of refugees/migrants will further intensify crime and corruption in the transit countries in the Balkans. The key point of this research is based on the hypothesis that a more significant strategy in dealing with the phenomenon of illegal migration could hardly be carried out without completing the entire geopolitical space of the European continent. Thus, we recommend that the integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union has to be an imperative rather than a long-term strategy of Brussels, as it is at present. The research framework of the phenomenon of illegal migration involves using the method of content analysis and a critical review of the way this issue is tackled on a European level.

Keywords: illegal migration, Balkans, European Union, integrations, security, asymmetric threats.

Introduction

The ongoing dynamics of the armed conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan lie behind the increased number of refugees who pose a risk to the Balkans as the transit region to EU member states that are their final destination. The largest numbers continue to come from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, but there are also significant numbers of so-called economic migrants coming from countries from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa too. The countries most affected are Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece followed by the rest of the Balkan countries, including the Republic of Macedonia as the main transit route into Western Europe (UNHCR, 2015). The majority of refugees continue to arrive from the Near East, but there are also records of increasing numbers of migrants coming from North Africa and Asia. As EU member states, Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria continue to face an increased influx of refugees/migrants, some of whom continue migrating directly to Western Europe, while others transit via the Balkans. As a transit zone on the migrants' way to EU, the Balkans continue to face the increasing trend of the influx of migrants. The increased workload of the security authorities who deal with this problem along with the joint actions taken on a regional level have not made significant progress (Lembovska, 2013). On the other hand, the lack of any clear and coordinated strategy from the EU on illegal migration makes the current state of affairs even more complex and alarming (IOM, 2013, p. 7). The question whether or not a comprehensive strategy for dealing with an asymmetrical threat such as illegal migration is at all possible is a key one, especially without having adopted regulations valid across all states on the territory of Europe (Haselbah, 2015). We believe it is difficult to take any serious steps in combating illegal migration without the previous integration of the entire geopolitical space of continental Europe within the EU. By this, we primarily refer to the western Balkan countries that, for various reasons, still remain outside the EU since, as we shall see, the Balkans is an open door not only to illegal migration, but to other criminal activities within the EU member states (Select Committee on the European Union, 2012, p. 58).

Illegal Migration in the Balkans and Related Problems

Turkey is one of the most affected countries that, from the start of the conflict in Syria to present, has seen approximately 1.5 million refugees for whom the Turkish budget has so far spent approximately $3.5 billion (UNHCR, 2015). These numbers are on the increase as a result of the attack of the so-

called Islamic state in June, 2014, the aerial attacks on Iraq, and the battles in Kobane. The majority refugees of are Kurds from Syria going to EU as their final destination, predominantly to Germany and Italy, due to the presence of Kurdish ethnic communities within these countries.

Bulgaria faces serious problems too, arising from the increased trend of migrants/refugees entering the country from Turkey. At present, there is an increased trend of illegal sea crossings between Turkey and Bulgaria (in the Sozopol region), mainly by Iraqi and Afghan citizens (Novinite, 2014)**.** The influx of migration in Bulgaria increased the level of crime and corruption in that country. The majority of migrants/refugees continue their journey from Bulgaria to Serbia, Macedonia, or via Romania and Ukraine to Western Europe.

Greece remains an open door to illegal migrants going to other EU countries. After taking stricter and more comprehensive measures along the land borders, a growing trend of transferring migrants/refugees from Turkey to the Greek islands (Samos, Lesbos, Rhodes, Karpathos, Agathonisi, Chios and Mykonos) has been recorded (Frontex, p. 28). The main organizers continue to be Pakistani citizens who liaise with Syrians and citizens of the transit countries in order to smuggle migrants via the Balkans to Western Europe.

Migrant smuggling through the territory of the Republic of Macedonia is carried out in an organized manner, in cooperation with Albanian citizens who have Greek residence. The channels include members of the border control units of the transit countries. In Macedonia, migrants usually enter Serbia via Lojane (near Kumanovo) and then transit to Croatia, Hungary, and other EU member states (Frontex, p. 28). Critical entrance points for migrants to Macedonia remain the villages Stojakovo, Bogorodica, Selemli, close to the village Vasilica at the border with Greece, as well as Kriva Palanka and Strumica near the border with Bulgaria. The vast majority are made up of Syrian, Iraqi and Afghanistani refugees, followed by migrants from Pakistan, Somalia, Algeria, Mali, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Cameroon, and Nigeria. In Macedonia, the migrants are transported by Macedonian citizens that have a partial role in the channel for the sum of 50 EUR per person (Frontex, p. 28). Depending on the organization, some of the migrants choose to cross the border with Serbia by train hiding in the freight wagons. At times, as a means of transport, the migrants use the regular international coach lines which operate between Gevgelija-Skopje and EU member state countries. Similarly, an attempt to exit Macedonia has been registered at Alexander the Great airport. The attempt was made by Syrian migrants who had forged Greek identity cards which they procured in Greece for the price of €1000 each. There are records of

transporting migrants from Macedonia and other countries to Albania (via the border crossing at Stenje) and then they move on to Italy and Montenegro, only to continue to EU countries, mostly to Germany (MOI, 2015). According to MOI, on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, just in the period between January and September 2014, 500 migrants from Africa and Asia were detected in the Povardarie region controlled by the Regional border canter "Jug", part of the MOI in Kavadarci. They were found on trains, trucks, or moving on foot or in small groups in taxis from Gevgelija-Veles-Kumanovo, and in the opposite direction from Serbia to Greece. During this period, 19 criminal charges were made for this criminal offence. Among those who transported the migrants there were former police officers (Web Ohrid, 2014). Out of those migrants charged for smuggling, only eight are foreign citizens: two from Bulgaria and Romania, and one from Pakistan, Sudan, Germany, and Kosovo respectively, while the remaining were Macedonian citizens. For the purpose of tracing migrants in the Povardarie region, mobile units from the Customs Administration of the Republic of Macedonia were also included. According to MOI, a police officer employed at the border crossing at Bogorodica, in abuse of his power, provided for the safe smuggling of migrants in an organized manner via illegal crossings for migrants seeking to enter into Macedonia from Greece. For the needs of the criminal group, he also spied out the land and established a 'safe time and place' where in coordination with the rest of the criminal group, they took over and transported the migrants further on (Nova TV, 2014).

For the foreseeable future, one can expect an increased influx of migrants that will seek to enter into the Republic of Macedonia from Greece. This statement stems from the fact that since October 2014, approximately 250,000 Syrian migrants have left Turkey on their way to Greece (Frontex, 2014). Likewise, presently on several locations in Greece, in the vicinity of the border with Macedonia, there have been significant numbers of migrants, including those who have already been caught in Macedonia and deported to Greece, who are awaiting an opportunity for illegal entry. The Greek border authorities that are aware of their location and movement have not intervened with any measures or actions.

Recently, Serbia has been faced with increasing numbers of migrants who mainly enter the country from Bulgaria, but there are some who come from Macedonia too. According to the official data of the Serbian border authorities, 110 immigrants were caught in Serbia during the first quarter. The majority transiting through this country were seen near Nish (Frontex, p. 28). Migrants enter Serbia from Macedonia near the village of Lojane (on the Macedonian

side) and Preshevo (on the Serbian side). One part continues to the north, via Vojvodina to Hungary and Central Europe, and another part to the west, via Croatia to Western Europe. The largest number of migrants in this country comes from Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iran, and Sudan. A variety of vehicles are used as a means of transport to the desired destination: passenger vehicles, vans, trucks, even train freight wagons.

Most of the migrants that enter Albania come from Greece. In other words, the migrants make their way to the EU via Albania, from where one part continues on to Kosovo, then through either Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia, and the other via Montenegro to Italy. The most frequently used exit from Albania to Montenegro is a place called 'the Pomegranate Valley' close to the Hani i Hotit border crossing (Frontex, p. 28). The means of transport usually used by migrants is either in vans, lorries or coaches, but cases have been recorded of migrants being transported by tourist agencies (MOI, 2010). The majority of migrants who wish to travel abroad as 'tourists' come from the northern part of Albania (Kukës, Shkodër, Has, and Puk), and their final destination is Germany. There are also records of Albanian police officers being involved in the transport of immigrants coming from Eritrea, Somalia, and Senegal.

Montenegro is also pressured by migrants seeking to enter the country through Albania and Kosovo (Frontex, p. 28). Recently it has been recorded that the majority of migrants coming into Montenegro are of Kurdish origin and are being smuggled by Turkish citizens. There are three transit routes used by Kurds in Montenegro. The first one is by plane from Istanbul to Podgorica, from where they continue the journey in passenger vehicles to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, with Italy as their final destination. The second route is by plane from Istanbul to Tirana or by coach from Istanbul to Albania via Macedonia, and then in vehicles to Montenegro via Ulcinj, only to continue on to Croatia, Slovenia, and Italy. The third route is by land, from Albania via Montenegro to Serbia (via Belgrade or Subotica-Vojvodina), then on to Hungary and Austria (Frontex, p. 28).

The transport of migrants who did not have any identification documents was recorded in 2014, close to Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina, along the river Neretva.

Croatia continues to serve as a transit destination to migrants who mainly seek to enter the country from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, and carry on to Slovenia so as to reach Hungary, or Italy. The majority come from Afghanistan and Syria, but there are also records of

migrants coming from Ghana, Mali, Bangladesh and Nigeria. In Croatia, migrants are mostly found on freight trains.

The price for migrant smuggling varies depending on the destination. Namely, the journey of one migrant from Turkey to Greece costs between €500 and €1000 EUR; the price for the journey from Turkey via Bulgaria (Sozopol) to Romania by sea, ranges from between €2500 and €6000; the journey from Greece via Italy to Spain and Great Britain costs from between €4000 and €5000, and the transport of Kurds via Turkey to EU countries costs from €3500 and €4000 EUR (Frontex, p. 32).

The legal basis for police cooperation in the Balkans, to combat this asymmetrical threat, is codified in the Police Cooperation Convention in South-East Europe (PCC SEE), signed in 2006 and ratified in 2007, enabling the exchange of information, joint threat analysis, hot pursuits, joint investigation teams, and mixed patrols along the state border. (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, 2007). Article 8 of the Convention gives special attention to regular information exchange to combat illegal migration, envisaging the exchange of information regarding migratory movements, routes, means of transport, forms of organization and smugglers.

In line with the Convention, Macedonia signed protocol agreements for joint patrols with almost all of its neighbours. This included: Bulgaria on 21 February 2011; Albania on 22 February 2008; Serbia on 28 February 2011; and Kosovo on 1 April 2011; as well as protocols and agreements for joint contact centres with the same countries. The European Commission notes that: "border controls have not been effective in detecting irregular migration into the country from Greece and onward transit from the country towards Serbia" (European Commission, 2013). In addition to this, the southern neighbour Greece is excluded from this cooperation. Greece is already an EU member state which applies different procedures in applying for joint projects compared to those where non-EU states apply for EU grants. The different origins of funds for promoting and maintaining agreements on police cooperation can also represent a weakness (Scarabelli, 2012). A feasibility study provided by the International Organization for Migration highlights that an insufficient sharing and exchange of information between countries in the region: "hinders the ability of competent bodies to manage the influx of irregular migration flows in a systematic manner" (IOM, 2013, p. 7). Macedonia has been present in all regional and international initiatives and regularly takes part in ongoing activities. However, most of these activities are meetings at the highest level (ministerial or senior management), which do not allow for substantial

cooperation at the operational and tactical levels. There is a necessity, therefore, for additional initiatives that would enable closer cooperation among police officers at all levels (Lembovska, 2013).

The EU's Treatment of Illegal Migration

The incumbent Greek Presidency of the Council of the EU, which lasted until 1 July 2014 and the successive Italian one, had illegal migration into the EU as the main focus of their political agenda. However, we must immediately point out that, when addressing refugee politics, each country within the EU takes its own course of action. Dimitris Avramopoulos, the EU commissioner for migration and home affairs, in his speech in the European Parliament, called for: 'decisive and coordinated EU-wide actions' to tackle the new ways of smuggling. On the other side, with regards to impeding the movement of refugees coming from the south of the Mediterranean, the European People's Party (EPP) parliamentary group called the EU in the European Parliament to get involved in Libya as a key north-African country. EPP suggested that alongside international partners, Brussels should help establish more functional state structures in this country. As far as Turkey is concerned, the Union has a partner awaiting membership status in the EU, and for this reason Turkey must be ready to cooperate.

It should be emphasized that there is no comprehensive and coordinated European policy concerning refugees, and that the so-called 'Dublin system' has failed, according to which refugees are required to stay in the EU country they have first reached. The aim of the Regulation is to the ensure that one Member State is responsible for the examination of an asylum application, to deter multiple asylum claims and to determine as quickly as possible the responsible Member State to ensure effective access to an asylum procedure. Apart from this, Italy uses its own ways to minimize refugee numbers by simply allowing them to travel north, for example to Germany. The border controls in the countries from the Schengen zone, which make up for most of the EU member states, no longer exist. Although the requests for the EU to redistribute refugees across member states according to population numbers and economic wealth are getting louder, still, there is no consensus on that matter so far (Haselbah, 2015).

According to European Commission data, in 2014, more than 276, 000 people entered the EU illegally, which was an increase of nearly 140% compared to 2013. In other words, it is estimated that in the European Union, home to 500

million residents, there are between 2 to 4 million people residing illegally. Due to the inconsistent approach in the implementation of policies by the institutions, EU member states are facing problems with deflecting the migration wave (Rieger and Trajkovska, 2014).

A network of 560 NGOs from around the world, known under the abbreviation UNITED, is accusing the EU and its institutions of announcing false information regarding the migrants from Africa, Asia and the Near East who have died on their way to the EU (Seiffert, 2104). They have come to this conclusion by comparing official data of the European institutions to information gathered and analysed from print and electronic media. On the other hand, the EU does not acknowledge this, but tries to spin it as a confirmation of the continuity of its policy for the intensified protection of migrants. The EU's activities were directed towards negotiations with countries with the largest number of migrants (especially Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, and Eritrea) in order to disrupt criminal networks in the countries behind the organized transportation of migrants.

The inconsistency of EU policies with regards to tackling the migrant issue is evident, on the one hand, in the constant equipping of Frontex with the latest surveillance systems, and the increasing tendency to create a 'Fortress Europe', and on the other hand, in its intention to help migrants and refugees to find shelter in some of the EU countries (Taube, 2013). In spite of this, the situation in the EU countries that first confront the wave of migrants is especially indicative and disturbing.

For decades, Italy has been facing an increased flow of illegal migrants from North Africa and, since the outburst of the civil war in Syria – an increased migration from this country as well. The number of refugees in Italy has greatly exceeded the capacity of the refugee reception centers and they have been more and more frequently expressing their discontent with the overcrowded situation by organizing protests. At the beginning of 2014, the number of migrants trying to reach Italy by sea was ten times as high as their number in the same period the year before (Utrinski vesnik, 2014). This alarming situation led to an enlarged patrol along Italy's maritime border with Libya and Tunis, which accounts for the major part of the migration to Italy. However, the number of migrants from other countries, such as Syria, Eritrea, Somalia, Egypt, Nigeria, Zambia, Mali, and Pakistan, has also increased. A direct route runs from Ethiopia to Sicily and Calabria. From Egypt there are two routes. The first one runs to Crete where it forks – one way leading to the coast of Italy and the other to Turkey and then to the EU. The second route runs to Malta. The islands of

Lumpedusa and Sicily are still used by migrants as their first stop on Italian territory (Rieger and Nedevski, 2014). For transport they mostly use small boats and rubber rafts. The latest smuggling trend of criminal gangs is to buy old boats and load them with hundreds of refugees after previously charging them several thousands of euros. On the way, the captain would leave the boat setting the autopilot to head for Italy (Rieger and Trajkovska, 2014).

During 2013, many Afghans and Pakistanis interviewed at the asylum registration center (CARA) in Crotone (southern Italy) suggested that they had used the longer land route through the Western Balkan countries when travelling from Greece to Italy instead of a much shorter maritime passage (Frontex, 32).

As mentioned before, Greece serves as a gateway for a great number of migrants from North Africa who travel through the Balkans to reach the countries in the EU. The greater part of these migrants comes by sea from Turkey, mostly from its western region - Dalaman. The growth of illegal migration by sea is due to the enhanced controls along the land border between Greece and Turkey. However, this could also be attributed to the Turkish government's decision for visa liberalization with most Arabian countries (Michaletos, 2014). On their maritime route to Greece, migrants typically use improvised rafts and old fishing boats that often sink, preventing many from reaching their desired destination.

The specific geographic location makes Bulgaria an important destination and a transit smuggling station for many migrants who, due to the still complex political and security situation, come mostly from Syria. During the previous year, 2014, the number of illegal migrants trying to cross the Turkey-Bulgaria border reached 38,500. According to the records of the State Refugee Agency (SAR), tens thousands of these refugees had applied for asylum. Most of the refugees came from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Bulgaria's Vice Prime Minister Meglena Kuneva, who is responsible for this issue, said that compared to 2013 the number of refugees was 200 percent higher. Kuneva also said that she was expecting an even greater refugee wave since the war was still raging in Syria and Iraq and since the crimes of the Islamic states had forced many to go into exile. . Neighboring Turkey is estimated to be the "home" of two million refugees, most of whom are waiting for the spring and for better weather conditions to attempt entering the EU (Papakochev, 2015). In 2013, the European Commission granted Bulgaria 6 million euros to improve the disastrous living standards in their refugee camps. Meanwhile, Sofia is making efforts to protect their southern border against the refugee inflow expected this

spring. After putting up a 33-km fence last year, the Bulgarian government is now investing around 46 million euros for continuing the fencing by an additional 83 kilometers (Bedrov, 2014). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR and many non-governmental organizations condemned Bulgaria's actions. Namely, in order to fully secure its border with Turkey, the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs has posted an additional 1,400 border police officers in the areas with no fencing or border crossings, which has consequently pushed them to their financial limits. As a result, their Minister of Internal Affairs, Veselin Vucko, demanded military units to be deployed along the border (Papakochev, 2015).

The Latvian Presidency of the EU Council is expected to focus on the issue of refugee and migration policy. This new policy is to be aimed at supporting Germany's initiative for revising the Dublin regulation. Contrary to this practice, the EU should introduce quotas in order to justly distribute refugees on its territory and unburden its frontier countries. The German Minister of Internal Affairs Thomas de Maiziere points out that the increased illegal migration has brought profit only to the criminal gangs. In only a year, smugglers across the Mediterranean Sea have made four to five billion euros (Riegert and Trajkovska, 2014). For years now, the EU countries have been debating about what measures need to be taken. The main dilemma remains how to distribute migrants. In the meantime, the Dublin III Regulation is still operational. It makes the EU country in which refugees have first set foot responsible for hosting them and instigating a regular procedure. The countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea, such as Italy and Greece, have reasonably deemed themselves as overburdened. Five other countries, among them Germany, indicate that both in total and estimated per head of citizens, they host the largest refugee population.

The EU divides migrants into two categories: contingent refugees, mostly coming from Syria at the moment, who have been authorized by the UNHCR and sent to the EU, and asylum-seekers, who have reached the EU by legal or illegal means. EU-member countries have accepted to temporarily receive about 30,000 contingent refugees from Syria, which have been unevenly distributed among them. East-European countries receive almost no refugees. Southern countries, such as Portugal and Spain, are also hesitant. By contrast, Turkey has received about a million refugees from neighboring Syria (Riegert and Trajkovska, 2014). This is why the European Commission intends to introduce a system for the fair distribution of refugees, which would take into account the countries' population and their economic strength, announced the

competent EU Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos. Minister de Maiziere indicates that a double or triple growth of the number of refugees in Germany would be unacceptable. As some of his EU colleagues, de Maiziere proposes formation of refugee centers in North Africa, where the reception procedure would start.

At the same time, the countries that are most affected by illegal migration have been taking concrete actions to tackle the illegal inflow. In November 2014, the European Agency for the Management of External Borders (Frontex) launched a new maritime operation called Triton near the Italian coastline, which focused on border surveillance. Effective surveillance is probably the best tool to counter this method as clearly shown by footage from the Albanian border with Montenegro. In one case alone, images of SMARTDEC cameras installed at the green border (railway) with Montenegro enabled Albanian Border Police to detect four migrants who were attempting an illegal border-crossing (Frontex, p. 27). Parallel with Triton, Italy is conducting an independent rescue mission in international waters named Mare Nostrum (Rieger and Nedevski, 2014).

Conclusion

The increased inflow of refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, and illegal migrants from North Africa still remains one of the key problems both for the EU and the transit countries that are not EU members. There are plans to take security measures for blocking the maritime routes used by many migrants from conflict-affected regions, but as a consequence smuggling routes by land passing through the Balkans and Western Europe are expected to intensify. In addition, the increased number of migrants is expected to boost the level of crime and corruption in the region due to the involvement of the local criminal networks. The Balkans is still used as a transit destination by numerous migrants heading towards the EU, but some of them stay and seek asylum in the countries from the region, which could have a negative socioeconomic and security implications. Syria apart, increased refugees could be growing from Iraq and Afghanistan, where the security situation has seriously deteriorated. The number of migrants from Eritrea, Algeria, and other African countries has also grown. In the last three months, much attention has been given to the surge of interest among citizens from the Balkans (Albania, Serbia, Kosovo and the Republic of Macedonia) to illegally reach an EU-member country, primarily Germany. The majority of the immigrants travel through the Western Balkans

and head towards Croatia and Hungary in order to get to Western or Central Europe. A massive inflow of more migrants into Europe will create destabilizing political effects in most countries along with serious economic, social and health concerns. Moreover a chain reaction effect of illegal migration, will lay the foundations of the continuation of a decade's long procedure that will impact on stability in both the Balkans and the rest of Europe and exacerbate simmering ethnic tensions.

To prevent all possible threats that could occur, the following measures should be taken by all European countries: more investment in human and technical resources; an increase in collaboration and joint operations between the neighboring countries affected; diplomatic unity in the face of the issue and vis-à-vis Turkey which stands as the main transit conduit of incoming migration flows; the seeking out of more EU-funded structures relating to the issue; the use of long-range investigations to take out criminal syndicates involved in human smuggling, forged paper production and illegal migration assistance.

To conclude, the fight against illegal migration should not rest solely on the shoulders of the gateway, transit and final destination countries. Instead, it should be driven by a comprehensive strategy because all countries in continental Europe are affected by the problem. As mentioned, the consequences of illegal migration are felt in North Europe as much as they are in the south. For this reason, we believe that an integrated strategy cannot be implemented without the political EU integration of all the countries from continental Europe, primarily speaking of the Western Balkans countries that have been unjustly excluded from the EU integration process.

References

Bedrov, I., Andreev, A. and Trajkovska, A. (2014, 10 August). Бугарија: Ограда против бегалците. [Bulgaria: Fence against refugees] Retrieved from <http://dw.de/p/1CmL2>

European Commission Progress Report on Macedonia. (2013). Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/mk_rapport_2013.pdf>

Frontex. (2014). Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2014. Retrieved from <http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/WB_ARA_2014.pdf>

Haselbah, C. (2015, January 16). ЕУ политика кон бегалците: секој против секого. [EU policy towards refugees: everyone against everyone]. Retrieved from http://dw.de/p/1ELY1

House of Lords. (2012, November). Select Committee on the European Union. EU Enlargement. Written evidence. Retrieved from <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-select/EU%20Enlargement/EU%20enlargement%20-20written%20evidence%20%282%29.pdf>

IOM. (2013). *Feasibility Study for Illegal Migration in Western Balkans*. Final report. International Organization for Migration - migration experts. Retrieved from <http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/IOM-Feasibility-Study-on-irregular-migration-in-the-WB.pdf>

Lembovska, M. (2013). Police cooperation in the field of combating illiegal migration and human smuggling. Retrieved from <http://www.analyticamk.org/images/stories/files/2014/Police_Cooperation_in_the_field_of_illegal_migration_and_human_smuggling.pdf>

Michaletos, I. (2014, June 21). Greek state braces for upcoming massive illegal immigration flow. Retrieved from <http://serbianna.com/analysis/archives/2697>

MOI. (2015, February 28). Реализирани шест случаи на криумчарење мигранти. [Six cases of smuggling brought to light.] Retrieved from <http://www.mvr.gov.mk/ShowAnnouncements.aspx?ItemID=14436&mid=1367&tabId=358&tabindex=0>

MOI. (2010). Заеднички активности за спречување на манипулациите на граѓаните околу стекнување азил.[Joint action to prevent the manipulation of citizens in gaining asylum.] Retrieved from http://mvr.gov.mk/ShowAnnouncements.aspx?ItemID=8532&mid=710&tabId=96&tabindex=0

Nova TV. (2014, November 16). Мигранти: Невидливи на премините, видливи на пругите на кои оставаат живот. [Migrants: Invisible at the border crossings, visible on the railroads where they lose their lives.] Retrieved from <http://novatv.mk/index.php?navig=8&vest=18128&cat=22>

Novinite. (2014, October 18). Number of illegal immigrants in Bulgaria grew significantly in September. *Sofia News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://www.novinite.com/articles/164181/Number+Of+Illegal+Immigrants+In+Bulgaria+Grew+Significantly+In+September#sthash.9qLkNJi4.dpuf>

Official Gazette of Republic of Macedonia No. 74. (2007, June 14).

Papakochev, A., Andreev A. and Fidanoska, E.M. (2015, January 20, 2015) Бегалците не се добредојдени во Бугарија. [Refugees are not welcome in Bulgaria]. Retrieved from <http://dw.de/p/1ENEU>

Riegert, B. and Nedevski, S. (2014, November).Тритон – спас за бегалците? [Triton-lifeline for refugees?]. Retrieved from http://dw.de/p/1DoHh

Riegert, B. and Trajkovska, A. (2014, December 11). Европската порта сè уште е претесна за бегалците. [European port is still too small for refugees]. Retrieved from <http://dw.de/p/1E2aQ>

Scarabelli, D. (2012) Cleaning the Balkan route: Elements of police cooperation in Serbia. *Center for European and North-Atlantic Affairs*. Retrieved from <http://cenaa.org/analysis/cleaning-the-balkan-route-elements-of-police-cooperation-in-serbia/>

Seiffert, J. (2014, April 15). Migrant files: The EU's refugee victims. Retrieved from <http://dw.de/p/1BhsR>

Taube, F. (2013, November 29). Eurosur - surveillance or protection for refugees? Retrieved from <http://dw.de/p/1AQkp>

UNHCR. (2015).UNHCR country operations profile – Turkey. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html>

Utrinski vesnik. (2014, February 5). Навалица на мигранти на италијанскиот брег. [Melee of migrants to Italian coast]. Retrieved from <http://www.utrinski.mk/?ItemID=4C98855ED9B5C642B3FF42BC7C398BB4>

Web Ohrid. (2014, August 8). Криумчареле мигранти во Грција. [Smuggled migrants in Greece]. Retrieved from http://www.webohrid.com/2014/08/08/kriumcarele-migranti-vo-grcija/

95

Violeta Bakalchev, Minas Bakalchev, Mitko Hadzi Pulja:
From Transition to Integration: New Prospects for the European Home

From Transition to Integration: New Prospects for the European Home

Violeta Bakalchev, Minas Bakalchev, Mitko Hadzi Pulja

Abstract

Changes in society can be reflected in dwellings, as part of the process and physical expression of living. In this sense, the long term transition of the political and economic systems of the former socialist countries has affected the design of apartments quite dramatically. Although, in a greater part, houses remained an unchanged heritage from the past, and certain models continued to be repeated, their perception, use and practice were increasingly changed as a reflection of changed socio-cultural models. Former schemes of social housing that were implemented from top to bottom, meaning spatial functional and social unification around a common ideal, essentially changed due to the pluralist and conflicting interests of their residents. While different values, backgrounds and life styles demonstrated decentralised tendencies, there remained the question of the mode of convergence of a variety of diversities, to enable coherence within a community. How could differences be expressed and how could one find the basis for their integration at the same time? Can a community be composed of an aggregation of individual inputs? Is it possible to create an integrated European city out of disparate housing? These questions are not only a metaphor of the long lasting process of the integration of different European heritages and practices, but are also essential to understanding the fundamental condition of living in residential units where the local and global challenges of European citizens meet. This research will be developed on two levels, first, through the transformation of a residential area taking as an example, the buildings originating from the 1950s in a settlement within the city of Skopje, second, by the description of two conflicting models of integration performed in two contemporary films. Thus the process of transition of the residential area and possible points of integration will be demonstrated. Searching for a shared language for the contemporary apartment, this investigation will summarize the new prospects for the apartment arising from both the contradictory processes within a defined spatial frame and contradictory transformations of the existing spatial frame of the apartment.

Keywords: House transition, transformation, integration, process of living, life style.

Introduction, or Background to the Study

It was decided to consider the issue of European integration and new prospects through housing as an essential element of urban and territorial construction as well as a social and cultural model of those who inhabit them. Housing served as the basis of a social experiment and also as one of the primary expressions of modernity. Hence, this research into housing during the period of transition had three goals: first, to contribute to the understanding of the spatial and social processes of transformation and integration in a residential context; second, to contribute to a definition of the models of transformation on a spatial basis; and third, to provide the specific means for the analysis of spatial and social phenomena in this dramatic period.

The apartment is the paradigm of the social project. It is the main topic in the reformation of space, conceived both as a unit and as a system. Although in the beginning of the period of social residential construction it characterized a model of social homogenization through the assumed elementary household (nuclear family), today, demographic and cultural tendencies have changed the nature of households in residential units. Different compositions of households and their individual projections of spatial configuration have given rise to alternative schemes for housing (Ebner, 2007, pp. 11-23).

For many people, the post-socialist transition that took place in a number of countries meant the end of modernity, or rather the endof a social system based on social solidarity and a transformation to a discourse based on personal and individual rights and liberties (Harvey, 2006, p. 27). The shared language of "top to bottom" housing became the subject of a number of dissolving, disintegrating tendencies at the particular level of the home and its occupants.

These transformations in the physical structure of buildings can be seen as a series of retrograde, dissolving processes to the formerly established order. The images of the residential ambience in post-socialistcountries provide examples of the decline of the social model that was based on the principles of modernity in a spatial sense and the projection of solidarity in the social sense. It is exactly in these images of inconsistency, alteration, suppression and displacement that modern stories are intertwined with, and re-utilise the basic structure of the previous period.

Even an initial survey of the former socialist residential structures shows a landscape, a bricolage, in which the initial order displays layers of a number of individual actions. These housing areas seem to be the alternative to the

formerly existing spatial order. Through a number of individual actions, the occupants have transformed these modest buildings into distinctive domestic zones. Extending their presence beyond the given boundaries, they have created a new residential atmosphere from the inside to the outside, flat by flat, building by building. Through personal and social-cultural alterations, the occupants have reacted to the new time. Arousing personal and collective memories, the flats, the balconies and the buildings are places of contrasts, reinstating the complexity and the contradictions of an architecture between memory and innovation, needs and imperatives. These flats are repeatedly used in the practice of transformation and self-expression; but how could a new shared language be created out of the divergent social and spatial tendencies?

Through the transformation of buildings from the 1950s in a residential settlement undergoing transition within Skopje, and consequently seen from the aspect of two opposing approaches to integration; this paper will attempt to derive a transition between different cultures and life styles at the level of habitation. Through these investigations, the process of transition of the residential area, the contradictory tendencies and the epilogue of the possible points of integration will be shown. However, given that transformation in the post-socialistic transitional period is evident in a physical and social sense, the paper will also reconstruct the successive processes of transformation in the life of a residential building. In that way, it should be possible to establish a genealogy of transformations within the frames of previous attitudes to living space and those that are part of the divergent themes of the contemporary transition.

"Prolet" Settlement: From Unity to Individual "Apartments"

The "Prolet" settlement in Skopje is one of the first examples of post-World War II residential reconstruction. The architectonic composition consists of an identical volume that is iterated 13 times according to a particular geometric template (Fig. 1). It is for many reasons that the "Prolet" settlement is representative of the principles of modernity, simplicity and also reductionism, the generation of a compositional collective form but also the negation of context, new relationships between built units and open space, as well as the loss of the traditional spatial syntax. From its very beginning modernity has challenged the traditional experience of space and the traditional means of diversity and integration (Castex, Charles Depaule, Panerai, 1989).

In this chapter we will trace the processes of transformation as the dynamics in the period of transition from modernity to postmodernity enfolded, from the perspective of the apartment. The promoted principle of modernity, the existential minimum (*Existenzminimum)* meant a new programme basis, but at the same time, it meant a new spatial and social organization that can enable it. The extensive residential texture that existed until then had to be replaced by a functional residential model in which all the needs of Man in a new modern society would be met. The existential minimum as the biologically determined elemental minimum of space, air, light and heat in a way that each occupant may thoroughly develop his/her "living functions" meant a program and spatial reformation of the home. However, this concept also provided and projected the desired new social structure as the main program prerequisite for the new residential production (Mumford, 2000, p. 37; Bulok, 2005, pp. 382-394).

The main residential type of the "Prolet" settlement is a three floor linear residential block, a multicore system, composed of three subunits, each containing two apartments per floor. The day and night segments of the apartment are alternately distributed around the staircase space. Within each residential unit, the spaces are distributed according to structural modules, in which: one module contains the staircase, entrances, and bathrooms; a second module is occupied by the kitchen, pantry, kitchen balcony, the living room, the balcony; and a third module - the bedrooms.

In the course of time, through a number of individual actions, the occupants have transformed the repetitive layout into individual domestic spaces. Extending their presence beyond the existing parameters, they have constructed a new residential ambience from the inside to the outside, flat by flat, building by building. It is possible to chronologically define the transformations at the apartment level to determine the time phases and types of transformation. The initial residential units dating back to 1949 experienced their first transformation through the widening of the kitchen, which was carried out by the municipality in 1952. In the period that followed, from 1960 to 1990, there were different individual transformations and interior restructuring. (Fig. 2). From 1990, external transformations as enlargements began that occurred spontaneously. This process was almost complete by 2012. Each flat now has its own extension and some interior transformation (Fig. 3). However, behind these spontaneous processes of transformation a number of spatial patterns that connect the spatial transformations to the specific social-cultural models, as a mix of traditional and contemporary forms, can be observed.

The "Large kitchen": The kitchen was the first place where spatial change occurred, ten years after the occupants moved into their flats (1949-1959). In 1960, the changes were planned and performed simultaneously throughout the entire neighbourhood. These were limited to the apartment itself (the kitchen and the pantry). The partition wall between the kitchen and the pantry was torn down and the kitchen was widened over the entire main module of 4.00m. In the external zone of the balcony, a part of the pantry to be entered from the kitchen was preserved (Fig. 4). During the interior transformations (period 1970-1980): the pantry and the balcony were connected with the kitchen. In that way, an integral space – "a large kitchen" (3.6 x 3.6m) was obtained with the possibility of gaining an additional function as a dining room or living room, thus becoming the centre of the living functions of the household.

The Large room "free plan": This refers to the creation of an integrated multifunctional space. In this procedure, the programme re-definition not only refers to the cooking area, but the entire living area group of spaces - living room, kitchen, and balcony are integrated into a large room or a local "free plan", which undertakes all the living functions (Fig. 4) The interior changes (period 1980-1990) were pragmatic, acupunctural projects, limited interventions, in which individual projects were conceived as an exchange of information and experience among neighbours so that the transformation did not go beyond the limits of their, often modest resources. The small, interior changes very realistically referred to cost, feasibility and aesthetics.

Room+: An additional room was generated by external transformations, involving additional construction. Depending on the orientation of either the kitchen (northwest) or the living room (southeast), two versions of an additional room were possible. First, if the additionally built module was on the side of the living room, then part of the new spatial module, the balcony and part of the living room were partitioned as an additional bedroom. The remaining space of the living room and the kitchen constituted the new integral space with a series of possible interior transformations of the kitchen and the living room. Second, if the additionally built module was on the side of the kitchen, then the additional bedroom occupied the position of the former balcony and the additional module, while the existing space remained as the kitchen and the living room (Fig. 4).

In the alterations undertaken around 2001, the addition to the side of the kitchen was divided, for the first time, across its width, between the balcony or the kitchen and the additional single bedroom. On the side of the living room,

the space was partitioned to obtain another single bedroom. In both cases, the central living area (living room, dining room and kitchen) was reduced and remained insufficiently illuminated by natural light.

Vertical installation: In the "Prolet" settlement, a specific model of enlargement was promoted (Fig. 5). This model was spontaneous in terms of time, but determined from the spatial aspect, with defined geometrical characteristics. The addition forms an extension of the module with the living room, kitchen and balcony. The dimensions follow the width of the main module of the residential building by 4.0m; the depth was the available green area in front of the building (1.8m). Depending on the households participating in the extension, the height was: 2 storeys, 3 storeys or most frequently all 4 storeys.

As to the particular building investigated in detail, the only vertical slot without an extension is at the first entrance. The occupants of these apartments and those in the other blocks where there are no such extensions indicate that they were unable to reach a consensus.

From a structural perspective, two types can be differentiated: additions with two external reinforced-concrete columns on the outer side with a reinforced concrete slab connected to the existing structure of the building on the inner side; and extensions with four reinforced-concrete columns as an independent structural module adjacent to the external wall of the existing building. In this way, a prototype for vertical installation can be established that can be open or closed in different proportions, depending on the needs and the wishes of the individual users.

Local material prototypes. Behind the diversity and spontaneity of the interventions, several models of infilling can be distinguished:

Mimicry enlargements: In this model, the masonry infilling and the reinforced-concrete structure are covered with a uniform external plaster and paint identical to the existing finishing of the buildings. In this model, the enlargements are part of the existing structures and are assimilated into an integral configuration.

Brutalistic enlargements: In this model, two versions are differentiated. The first, where the infilling and the structure are additionally externally finished, but with different treatment. The masonry infilling is plastered, while the reinforced concrete structure, the columns and the beams are painted, most frequently with white paint, different from the colour of the main infilling. Secondly, where the reinforced concrete structure is visible, the infilling consists of bricks. After the casting of the reinforced concrete frame, building is carried out from the inside and no additional external finish or scaffolding is necessary.

This model for extensions is the most common thanks to the low cost of construction processes and materials. In this model the additions exemplify autonomous units from a spatial and artistic viewpoint and are independent of the main body of the existing structures.

Pluralistic enlargements: The main construction of the addition, (the structure and infilling) are designed in different stylistic images, both traditional and modern. In this model, the extensions embody tools for transformation, and the suppression of the existing spatial and formal expression of the structures.

The materials used, and the mode of enclosing the structure can be differentiated into three types:

1) The Open Balcony Type

It refers to the open balconies. The enlarged space is not closed, but represents an external part of the individual apartments (Fig. 6).


Fig. 6. The Open Balcony Type.

2) The Closed Balcony Type

This type follows the minimal construction intervention up to the parapet level and most frequently refers to glazed areas, from column to column, with different types of divisions (Fig. 7).


Fig. 7. The Closed Balcony Type.

3) The Apartment Type

This refers to perforating different types of openings in the closed wall mass of the extensions. The openings result from the utilitarian character of the infillings of the vertical structures and also the stylistic preferences of the occupants (Fig. 8).

Fig. 8. Apartment type.

The additional construction epitomises a kind of open vertical form, almost like a tower, waiting for individual contributions. At the level of accommodation, the extensions are additions to the overall area and enable the redistribution of spaces.

DOM-INO/2 (1914-2015):

Summing up the processes of transformation that chronologically ranged from interior transformations, or "corrections" of the principal system to external extensions, or enlargements, the process goes from being a single building to being multiple additionally built "apartments" along its margins. In that way, the physical reality illustrates the transition from social homogeneity to economic-social diversification. However, if this process is the proof of the

rejection of the common project of the modernity, it seems that the way in which it is conducted is bringing back the essential prototype of modernity.

The enlargements that assume an open structure and a number of individual interpretations are informal copies of the Dom-Ino model of 1914 from many aspects. Le Corbusier proposed this model as a prototype for the post-World War I reconstruction of the devastated areas through which the main principles of modern architecture were anticipated (Le Corbusier, 1978, pp. 211-247). Dom-Ino consists of a principal reinforced concrete structure (six columns and two floor slabs) as a structural frame completely independent of the functional basis and the internal configuration. A structural frame independent of the flat structure allows mass production on the one hand and great diversity of interior distribution on the other (Fig. 9).

The informal extensions consisting of a principal structure with two or four columns and horizontal slabs depending on the need for intervention, metaphorically and concretely represent copies of the Dom-Ino prototype in quite a different local and socio-cultural context. If this proposal anticipated the main assumptions of modernity, its use in the period of postmodernity or postsocialist transition as a crisis and prevalence of the modern legacy, is an interesting turning point in the frames of the conceptual and material basis of modernity. It is in many aspects that modernity was rejected and forgotten in the contemporary post-socialist context, but it is exactly its generative mechanism, pluralistically disseminated, that provides a powerful tool for considering and talking again about the main contributions of the modern architecture (Fig. 10).

Integration Models: Piano Room versus Soul Kitchen

The changed paradigm of society, the pluralism of lifestyles and their expression in physical space is most suggestively expressed in a number of works of popular culture and in various artistic formats, especially the film, which became a place of anticipation and documentation of the changed ways of life. Two films in particular present new patterns of social behavior most intensively (Bakalchev, Hadzi Pulja, 1997). It is in two auteur movies, "The Piano Room" (Igor Ivanov Izi, 2013) and "Soul Kitchen" (Fatih Akın, 2009), that we find models of integration as extreme scenarios through which the European reality of exclusivity and inclusiveness can be expressed. The post-socialist transformation of housing necessarily leads to questions about the ways and possibilities of new forms of integration.

Through these two films different methods of the connection of different social practices in the framework of contemporary forms of housing

will be explored. The reality of the divergent life styles and the different social/cultural backgrounds gives rise to different connections.

* * *

The Piano Room

The film "The Piano Room" (Igor Ivanov Izi, 2013), is set in a single space, through different time sequences, showing episodes with different hotel guests. The room is a spatial fragment in which the entire film action takes place. A series of idiosyncratic stories develop in this room (Fig. 11).

Victor is a gentleman of a good social standing who secretly meets his mistress Eva in the hotel room. Nina and Goga come to the hotel for the first time during the school excursion. During their stay in this room, they reveal their mutual attraction. Nina is shy, while Goga is forward and precocious. They fall in love. During their first meeting, the bed is the place for their love games. Many years later, they meet in the same room where the bathtub is the place for their dramatic dialogue. A gentleman in a costume, a businessman judging from his appearance, often comes to this room and wears women's clothes. Yilmaz and Azis, father and son, are truck drivers that often come for an overnight stay in this hotel and always in the same piano room. Yilmaz has the ambition for his son Aziz to become a musician. Aziz shows extraordinary feeling and talent through his short piano performances, but he always resists his father's ambitions for him. Their dialogues take place between the piano and the bed. Lying on the bed, Aziz repeatedly turns on and off the light by the bed in an interrupted rhythm. Petar and Marta, a young couple, bikers, with a Yamaha motorcycle parked in front of the hotel, with two wedding rings, celebrate their wild love. On the tenth anniversary of their marriage, they are again in the same room depressed by an everyday life, which lacks the passion of the past. Dize, a former pianist and an old vagrant, comes to the hotel room to pick up money that has been hidden in the secret compartment of the piano.

The different stories exemplify fragments of the lives of the different people that intermingle within the frame of a single space, the piano room. The main character, who is in the background of the individual actions, is the maid. She tidies up the room between the different scenes. According to the letters sent to her mother in which she idealizes her everyday life, she is a Ukrainian emigrant. In the end, in a contradictory way, she succeeds in getting the money kept as a secret by Dize. In the last scene, she exits the room and leaves the

hotel and it is for the first time that the audience sees the exterior as the maid is walking with her daughter along the street, among people, in a realistic everyday situation.

Soul Kitchen

In Fatih Akin's films, the life of Turkish immigrants in Germaniy is a frequent theme. The conflict and the confusion between the two cultures is shown in a dramatic and comic way. In the film "Soul Kitchen" (Fatih Akın, 2009), this theme is presented through the life of two brothers, the German Greeks Zinos and Illias.

Zinos Kazantsakis is the owner of a shabby, run-down restaurant, in a former storehouse in the industrial quarter of Hamburg where he prepares fish and chips for the local customers. His business is in a critical financial condition and tax inspectors ask Zinos for payments, which he cannot realize with his income. Occasionally, a punk rock band uses the restaurant as a space for practice, but never pays any rent. An old sailor, Sokrates, continuously works on his boat at the warehouse, but he is also never able to pay rent. Zinos' brother Illias described as the "king of the thieves" is in prison. He is a gambler and a hustler. He is allowed occasional leave from the prison, but must do community work as part of the terms. Therefore, Zinos agrees to hire Illias. Nadine is Zinos' girlfriend, who abandons him and goes to work in Shanghai. There she meets a Chinese man, Mr. Han, who becomes her friend and accompanies her during her temporary return to Hamburg. Anna is a physiotherapist and helps Zinos to recover from the injury to his back after his attempt to move a dishwasher. She advises him to "dance and alleviate his pain". Thomas is his former school mate and a new entrepreneur, who wants to purchase the restaurant from Zinos. Shayn is the fanatical cook who leaves a high class restaurant to work in the Zinos' soul kitchen. The different characters create a dramatic flow of events through a number of twists aimed at the protection of the authenticity of the place.

The film ends with the restaurant closed for a "private party", with only two people present, Zinos and Anna, who is visiting the place for the first time. In that way, through a gallery of diverse characters of different cultural backgrounds and life styles, a common identity of mutual interaction is created. Through their joint actions, the marginal place of a former warehouse is articulated. Their integration of diversity and idiosyncrasy is created by their shared experience and intermingling of their personal weak and strong points (Fig. 13).

These films symbolize opposing approaches to diversity. In the "Piano Room" it is shown through a series of episodes that are time segregated in a single spatial frame, the diversity in the "Soul Kitchen" produces a creative mixture of different characters and life stories. In these films, the opposing models of "Room" versus "Kitchen" represent separation versus merging.

Critical Integration - New Prospects for the European Home

The entire life of an apartment is seen as a dialogue between its physical characteristics and the activities taking place within it. So, in the case of the residential buildings in the settlement of postwar reconstruction "Prolet" (1948), through its entire history, the transformation and reconstruction of the interior of the physical structure within the frames of a single residential unit may be traced. However, the transition period indicates a wave of divergent social and spatial tendencies referring to both the interior and exterior of the main residential frame. Through the interventions of users, the initial identical design is transformed and extended with alterations that are as much pragmatic as they are symbolic with respect to the new social heterogeneity of society. Taking the "Prolet" settlement as an example, the projection of social dispersion is evident in the physical structure.

As to the issue of positioning different life styles and social-cultural backgrounds, these are dramatically expressed in the two contemporary films. In the "Piano Room" (2013), there are different stories as fragments of life in the same spatial fragment, the hotel room, but they are never connected. These are separate episodes in the same space. Describing the work, director Igor Ivanov says: "This is a film free of the traditional film narration and it doesn't need to carry an integral story within. Instead, it is simply a presentation of different intertwined life stories brought to this single location, from the foreshortening of which the most essential aspects of our existence are seen." (Ivanov Izi). In the "Soul Kitchen" (2009), the different figures and their stories are mixed in a permanent dynamic setting. Or, as Fatih Akin says: "It was more than just a restaurant ... It was like a home base for the whole neighborhood, so artists were hanging around there — but, artists who never really created something you know". Experience with that nightly routine inspired Akin to work on a story about the imaginary homes created for young people — homes that are less about geography and more about friends, strong drinks and, of course, the right mix of music (Quershi, 2010). The model that the film proposes is a kind of 'extension of personality' in the common project of a soul kitchen. According to

Akin: "When you're a really good DJ, you see he's able to mix the tracks. You don't realize it as an audience. He's really surfing on the beat, and I was wondering if this is possible with a picture.'" (Quershi, 2010).

In all three examples, the transformation of unity in the case of the "Prolet" settlement, with the layering of different episodes in the same spatial fragment as in the case of the "Piano Room" and the mixing of different personalities in the creation of something new in the case of the "Soul Kitchen", there is a mapping of different possibilities, models of integration of contemporary homes and questions. Is integration to be understood as an isolated spatial unit, a "room", in order to express different particular idiosyncrasies as captivated individual freedoms? Could integration as a way of extending personality in the mix of the "kitchen" as a joint performance indicate a way forward? Is integration to be understood as a marginal decentering, an enlargement of available space?

Pluralism and social heterogeneity cannot suppress reality, but while the cases of "Piano Room" and "Soul Kitchen" show two opposing models of reality, the "Prolet" case provides a view of realism as the integration of space and social need. Realism as a critical view or critical integration is somewhere in-between. It ranges between the common basis and the particular pragmatic and symbolic steps, between the postmodern iconography and the modern dom-ino prototype. To that effect, it is perceived as a decline in the historic, social, spatial, and aesthetically dominant models of a socialist past and the emergence of a heterogeneous practice that can lead to New Prospects of European House practice.

References

Akın, F. (2009). *Soul Kitchen.* [German comedy film]. Retrieved from http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1244668/.

Bulok, N. (2005). "Frankfurt and New Housing Culture." (In Serbian). In Milosh R.Petrovic (Ed.), *History of Modern Architecture, Antology of Texts*. Belgrade: Draslar Partner.

Castex, J., Charles, J.C., Depaule, Panerai, P. (1989). *Urban Forms.* (In Serbian)*.* Belgrade: Gradjevinska knjiga.

Ebner, P., Hollbacher, R., Kuntscher, M. (2007). "Integrated Living". InChristian Schittich (Ed.), *Housing of People in All Ages*. Basel, Boston, Berlin: Birkhauser.

Harvey, D. (2006). *Spaces of Global Capitalisam*. London, New York: Verso.

Ivanov Izi, I. (2013). *The Piano Room*. [Republic of Macedonia film]. Retrieved from http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2710942/

Ivanov Izi, I. *Director's Statement*. Retrieved from http://www.igorivanovizi.mk/projects/films/feature-films/the-piano-room

Le Corbusier. (1978) *Towards a New Architecture*. London: The Architectural Press.

Mumford, E. P. (2000). *The CIAM, Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960*. The MIT Press.

Quershi, B. (2010, September 7). "A German 'Soul Kitchen' that's more than a restaurant". *National Public Radio*. Retrieved November 10, 2010 from http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129706282

The Piano Room. (2013). Retrieved from http://enff.nl/video/?a=i&i=123


Fig. 1. "Prolet" settlement, Skopje (1948).

Initial conditions (1949): a characteristic storey

Interior changes /enlargement of a kitchen (1959).

Interior changes (1960 – 1990)

Fig. 2. Interior transformations.

Initial phase of enlargement /enlargement+ground floor (1995-1998)

Violeta Bakalchev, Minas Bakalchev, Mitko Hadzi Pulja:
From Transition to Integration: New Prospects for the European Home

Final phase of enlargement / enlargement + ground floor   (2011)

Fig. 3. External transformations.

Model of a large kitchen: evolution phases.

Model of a large room: development of a local free plan".

Model of a room +: gradual occupation of the external front and suppression of the living zone.
Fig. 4. Model of transformation.

Fig. 5. Building + enlargement, "Prolet" settlement, 2013.

Violeta Bakalchev, Minas Bakalchev, Mitko Hadzi Pulja:
From Transition to Integration: New Prospects for the European Home

Fig. 9. Le Corbusier, Dom-ino concrete residential system 1914 (Le Corbusier, 1978).

"Prolet" settlement, Skopje (1948): basic conditions.

Model of enlargements.

"Prolet" settlement, Skopje (2011): basic conditions + enlargements.
Fig. 10. "Prolet" settlement, Skopje: proces of transformation.

Violeta Bakalchev, Minas Bakalchev, Mitko Hadzi Pulja:
From Transition to Integration: New Prospects for the European Home

Fig. 11. Piano Room: film scenography.


Fig. 12. The storehouse in the industrial quarter of Hamburg in which a multicultural "soul kitchen" is re-utilized.

Fig. 13. Soul kitchen: joint dinner (Quershi, 2010).

ICT Europe: Inclusion and Exclusion

119

Ivana Stojanovska, Marjana Vaneva, Biljana Stojcevska: E-Inclusion: The Digital Divide and ICT
Acceptance among Elderly People in Macedonia Compared with Bulgaria and Romania

E-Inclusion: The Digital Divide and ICT Acceptance among Elderly People in Macedonia Compared with Bulgaria and Romania

Ivana Stojanovska, Marjana Vaneva, Biljana Stojcevska

Abstract

Despite the rapid growth of digital technologies, a significant proportion of the global population continues to be digitally excluded. According to the National strategy for e-inclusion, in Macedonia the age group from 55 to 74 years uses computers and the Internet significantly less, thus indicating a high disparity compared to other age groups. Based on the fact that the elderly citizens are a strongly growing population group in our society, the use of the Internet and ICT for older people is essential. But, it is doubtful whether the mere provision of computer courses or free Internet access is sufficient in aiming to achieve a more inclusive information society. Around 120 million European citizens have never used the Internet, with age being the principal factor. Bulgaria and Romania are both among the top five countries that have the highest rates of non-users in the EU. According to the Digital Agenda for Europe and Eurostat data statistics on digital literacy, both Bulgaria and Romania have a substantial percentage of the population missing from the picture on Internet usage. But, both of them have experienced reductions in the past, whose practices have to be encountered in the process of reducing the rate of non-users in Macedonia, towards the decreased digital divide. According to AGE, the Digital Agenda for Europe calls for halving the proportion of the population that has never used the Internet (to 15%) by 2015. This chapter reviews a part of the literature regarding the use of digital technologies among older people in the EU, as well as EU directives for overcoming the digital divide. The paper concludes with some suggestions and strategies that are adequate to the specific context.

Keywords: Internet, digital technology, digital divide, e-Inclusion, elderly citizens.

Introduction

We live in a world of communication and information technologies, which are a major force for change. Technology is a dynamic subject that continuously produces new ideas and development, thereby creating multiple digital divides. On the other hand, due to increased life expectancy coupled with a decline in birth rates, elderly citizens form an ever larger population group in our society. The latest census confirms this trend. The total number of people over 55 years of age in Macedonia has amounted to 508,027, of whom 237,868 are men and 270,159 women, which is approximately 24,6% of the total population. Due to the ageing of the population pyramid, long-term projections indicate that the population aged over 55 will represent a larger portion of the total in the years to come. In 2020, about a quarter of Europe's population will be over 65 and the number of people aged between 65 and 80 will grow to nearly 40% of the European population between 2010 and 2030 (Abad, 2014). Therefore, compelled by circumstances, the need for older people to develop skills in the use of the Internet and ICT is essential.

For non-users, age is the principal factor with around two thirds of Europeans aged 65-74 and about half of those aged 55-64 having never used the Internet. When asked about their reasons for not having an Internet connection, lack of interest, motivation and attitudes is the most cited reason. However, research suggests that older people tend to face different barriers and challenges to access, such as cost and economic factors, demographic and social factors, skills and ability, disability, concerns about security and privacy, the lack of time to use it, many people simply do not recognise the relevance of these technologies for themselves. Disabilities, as well, can hinder people from actively engaging in the use information technology. For the usage of online services, the most important disabilities to consider are visual handicaps, cognitive defects and limitations of motor skills.

Despite all this, we believe age itself is not a barrier to using digital technologies, and they can also offer great potential benefits to this section of the population. Therefore, the digital age divide must be prevented, by adapting services and technologies to the needs of the elderly population.

EU Initiatives and Directives

The Digital Agenda for Europe, a 2020 initiative, outlines seven pillars that are central to the delivery of Europe's Digital Agenda, namely: A Digital

Single Market; Interoperability and Standards; Trust and Security; Fast and Ultra-Fast Internet Access; Research and Innovation; Enhancing Digital Literacy, Skills and Inclusion; and, ICT Enabled Benefits for EU Society.

The aim of Pillar 6 - Enhancing Digital Literacy, Skills and Inclusionis to tackle the concern that some 30% of the population in Europe has never used the Internet. Most of these people are either older, unemployed or have a low income and a lack of confidence and skills in using ICT. In 2014, 76% of the EU population had used the Internet at least once. At a global level, the EU is the second largest region behind Asia by number of Internet users, with more than 582 million users (Table 1). Worldwide only 42,33% of the population is estimated to use the Internet. The Digital Agenda has set a target for having 60% regular Internet use (at least once per week) among disadvantaged people by 2015 (the sub-population of socially disadvantaged people includes persons aged between 55 and 74).

The concern about the need to include older people in ICT has been taken up by various public authorities and international organizations leading to a significant number of media literacy initiatives for this sector of the population. One interesting project is the intergenerational project "Grandparents and grandsons" for people over the age of 55, which offers opportunities for young students from colleges as "digital facilitators" who assist older people in the use of the Internet and e-mail. As part of the e-Inclusion policies and specifically the "European i2010 initiative on e-inclusion", the Commission has set up a group of measures to improve e-Accessibility for older people. This proposal complements the initiative taken in 2007, called the "Ageing Well in the Information Society Action Plan". One of the most ambitious studies on the issue is that called the "Social Impact of ICT" conducted under the auspices of the Directorate General for the Information Society of the European Commission, which has involved several European universities (European Commission, 2010). One of the main recommendations arising from this study is precisely that e-Inclusion should not focus on access to ICT, but especially on operational skills and more advanced forms of digital literacy, offering support to those groups at risk of being marginalized in this process, especially the elderly (Abad, 2014).

The Internet offers the potential to advance the quality of life for elderly people in different ways, such as: access to facilities and information that are not otherwise accessible because of mobility or the need for transport or cost (health, banking, shopping, educational opportunities, hobbies, contact with family and friends) and participation in civil society. If older people are to reap

the benefits of the information society, and society is to reap the benefits of the economic and social inclusion of older people, then it is clearly of interest to understand what lies behind their resistance to engage directly with digital technologies and to understand how this resistance might be overcome (Olphert, Damodaran and May, 2005).

Initiatives for e-Inclusion in Macedonia

The digital divide has been addressed by governments all over the world: The European Union recognised that ICT is an important driver of growth and employment and that many Europeans do not use ICT and do not benefit from it. Therefore, the ministers of the member states of the EU called for an inclusive information society and declared to focus on multiple goals to reach this aim (Niehaves and Plattfaut, 2010).

Bridging the digital divide is a part of the policy of the local government. First generation projects to bridge the digital divide in the Republic of Macedonia included: IT courses for all citizens (40,000 citizens, between 2007 and 2008); free Internet access for a limited time period of two months within two years (2008); Internet cafes for free Internet access - within the project "Svetot na dlanka", 22 Internet cafes in different cities around the Republic of Macedonia were opened, allowing all citizens free access to the Internet and use of other services and computer applications for professional or personal needs; free Internet kiosks with wi-fi routers in rural areas - 680 points were installed across Macedonia (2009); an annual conference entitled "e-Society.mk" in order to raise public awareness, organized by the Foundation Metamorphosis and several non-governmental organisations.

One of the priorities in the national strategy for e-inclusion is providing independent living for the aging population, which includes: carrying out training for the elderly to use the computer and the Internet; setting specific time periods dedicated to the elderly in the Internet clubs in the Republic of Macedonia; creating websites with services for the elderly and conducting online training by students for the elderly.

However, research into technology acceptance still suggests that numerous barriers remain in place. Current research lacks an understanding of the potential factors that influence private Internet usage. Moreover, there is the possibility that the group of non-users is fragmented and that different measures should be established for different groups. The National Strategy for E-inclusion 2011-2014 presents disparities in the use of the Internet by socio-

economic groups. Disparity in the age group from 55 to 64 years is 0.68 in terms of the average value of using the Internet, while for the group of users from 65 to 74 years it is 0.33. The index of digital literacy in the age group 55 to 64 years is 0.7, and in the age group 65 to 74 years is 0.38. The index of digital literacy in the age group 55 to 64 years is 0.7, and in the age group 65 to 74 years is 0.38.

According to the analysis of the Metamorphosis foundation, the percentage of citizens who have an elementary knowledge of the use of the computer as a prerequisite for the functioning of the e-services is at the level of 50.3%. However, it must be noted that among the group of people who do not have any basic knowledge are dominant people with lower levels of education, the unemployed, those older than 40 years of age, citizens in rural areas and similar target groups. This addresses a real danger of increasing the digital divide in this population group, numbering over one million inhabitants. A positive fact is that over 60% of them expressed a readiness for learning ICT. Improved usability and accessibility are vital, and we must do more to encourage older people to want to use the Internet.

Initiatives for e-Inclusion in Romania and Bulgaria

Across the EU, AGE and its members rely on Eurostat evidence. This is comprehensive and highlights how some EU countries are making better progress than others. Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, and Portugal are all lagging behind in terms of digital inclusion. These five countries have the highest rates of non-users but together these five countries have just 25 million people (a figure similar only to Italy with 23 million non-users; altogether, the six largest countries (the UK, Italy, Poland, Spain, Germany and France) account for 80 million out of the total 120 million inexperienced citizens that have never used the Internet. Although the gap between Member States in the number of non-users is closing, progress in the last year has slowed down. Situations are uneven across the largest Member States, which influence the EU average, with the UK over-performing (only 11% of its population has never used the internet), while in Italy, Poland and Spain between 30-40% of the population declare that they have never used the Internet (this equates to 49 million people). Germany has reduced its rate by one percentage point to 16%, while in France it appears that no further progress has been made.

According to the Eurostat statistics for Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania, shown in Table 2, in 2014 the largest difference in individual computer use between those under the age of 24 and over 65 is in Macedonia with 77%,

compared with slightly better statistics of 76% in Bulgaria and 75% in Romania. The percentage of people who have never used a computer in Macedonia is 56% (the age group 55-64) and 82% (the age group 65-74). The largest age group differences in individual Internet use can be found in Macedonia with 77%, compared to Bulgaria and Romania with 75%. In Macedonia the age group from 55 to 64 and from 65 to 74 years of age uses the Internet significantly less, with 58% and 83% of them, respectively, who have never used the Internet at all, indicating a high disparity compared to other age groups. The difference in the frequency of Internet use, between age groups under 24 and over 65, is the largest in Macedonia with 79% and 73% in Bulgaria, compared to Romania with significantly less at 61%.

The information on particular Internet use and skills is missing a lot of data for the older age group since they are probably unlikely to undertake such activities, but amongst the skills for which there is data, the statistics for the elderly group in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania are shown in Table 3, indicating an average of 5,6 % Macedonians, 2,9% Bulgarians and 2,8% Romanians who perform certain tasks and have skills for specific Internet use, and belong to the group above 65 years of age. Despite the fact that Macedonia has a similar percentage of individuals who use/do not use the computer and the Internet, as in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, both of them have experienced reductions of (-5) and (-3) percentage points, and those practices have to be encountered in the process of reducing the rate of non-users in Macedonia.

The strategies developed and supported by the Ministry of Communications and Information Society in Romania aim to solve various problems and social challenges either through direct projects or by supporting central government institutions through calls for proposals in e-governance. Funding and direct support are given to public partner institutions from the fields of education, culture, health, and environment, thereby generating a positive impact directly correlated with the Digital Agenda 2020. The most important reason behind the focus on this group is the reality existing in Romania: seniors are people close to retirement age and have financial, social and communication problems, given the fact that their income decreases on retirement, social bonds are not so strong whilst the communication need is much higher than the period when they were in the labour market. In the last few years, Romania has been facing a large population migration to other more developed countries in Europe, with young people moving, leaving older parents often lonely and socially isolated. They have begun to look for funding to develop projects for seniors. Thus, they have joined the E50+ and Carer+

projects so they could reach their target group more easily. The E50+ is a 2-year programme funded through the Grundtvig Lifelong Learning Programme, whose aim was to look at the methodologies used to engage older people in ICT usage in 4 partner countries – England, Iceland, Romania and Spain.

In order to implement the Europe 2020 strategy, Romania realized several solutions, such as: implementing the latest technology projects to buy equipment and software adjusted to the needs of the elderly; using mobile training teams to conduct ICT workshops for the elderly in the Day-care centres or homes; setting up telecentres and employing local public administrators to manage ICT courses for the community, especially for the elderly. In order to initiate their interest in learning and cooperating, as well as overcoming the fear of damaging the equipment, they ensured that the ICT trainer, apart from good ICT skills, also had good inter-personal and psychological skills, enough to convince the seniors that the equipment cannot be damaged easily.

As for Bulgaria, recent data suggests that on some indicators they perform well, but for the others there are concerns. Although ICT is one of the most developed sectors in Bulgaria, 40% of citizens have never used the Internet. What is indicated as a major barrier is the lack or low level of computer or Internet skills. Just over 10% of the population of Bulgaria have high computer skills compared to the EU average of over 25% and less than 10% of the population have high Internet skills, compared to the EU average of over 10%, indicating the regularity of Internet usage. The main strategic planning and programming documents that outline strategic policy framework for the development and usage of ICT in Bulgaria are consistent with the key strategic planning documents of the "Europe 2020" and "Digital Agenda for Europe". They are: the national program "Digital Bulgaria 2015", which defines the parameters (measures, responsible institutions, deadlines, budget) to develop an information society in Bulgaria and aims to support the implementation of European priorities and objectives set out in the Digital Agenda for Europe; the National Strategy for Broadband Development 2012 -2015 and a National Operational Plan, updated and supplemented with an extended time horizon to 2020 and thematically focused most closely to ensure fast and ultra-fast Internet for all citizens; a common strategy for e-government in the Republic of Bulgaria 2011 - 2015, focused on making the administration of fragmented and bureaucratic structures an integrated, efficient single system by providing modern high quality public e-services for citizens and businesses. One of the priorities in Bulgaria is to encourage the widespread use of ICT to address some major economic and social challenges.

Methodological Proposals for e-Inclusion Programs

All the afore-mentioned studies show the difficulty of encouraging the elderly into an active, beneficial and productive use of ICT. Regarding this, the need to bridge the digital divide for this population group which is without the abilities and capabilities for the effective use of ICT is crucial, leading to the concept of e-inclusion, understood as the ability to regularly and easily access the various services and programs both 'online' and 'off-line' and to be able to use their skills linked to the specific needs of each user. As a step towards digital inclusion, digital literacy, defined as: "the ability to understand and use information in multiple formats from a wide range of sources when presented via computers", is essential.

Theoretically, there are three phases in the progress of digital literacy:
- digital competence,
- digital use, and
- digital transformation.

Digital competence involves finding information on the Web, document preparation and processing, electronic communications, the creation and manipulation of digital images, using spreadsheets, creating presentations, web publishing, creating and using databases, digital and interactive games, the production of multimedia objects and the dominion of digital learning environments. Digital use involves the successful use of digital skills in real life situations, the proper application of digital competence in any specific profession or context, giving rise to a corpus of specific digital uses for an individual, group or organization. Digital transformation is the ability to make those digital applications that have been developed to permit and enable innovation and creativity, and encourage significant changes within professional or knowledge-based areas, or in a personal or social context (Abad, 2014).

Most of the projects on the digital divide, aging and e-inclusion have been linked to E-learning and few studies have focused on the needs of older people regarding new technologies, and specifically on the usefulness of the Internet.

Conclusion

A clear conclusion which can be drawn from this study is that many older users are not prevented from access to the Internet by reasons of cost or ability, but that the motive for their exclusion appears to be based on a lack of precise information and awareness about the Internet. The results indicate some specific

gaps that need to be addressed for older people to be able to make well-informed decisions and choices about participating in the digital society. Providing elderly-friendly user interfaces, the development of good learning materials on the use of computers, the creation of public Internet access points and computer literacy training to increase the skills of elderly people, grants to provide more senior citizens with computers, as well as free Internet access at local libraries or comparable centres, are some of the suggestions that can be drawn from the research conducted on Romania and Bulgaria, in order to overcome the digital divide in Macedonia. But, for all this it is necessary to have different pedagogical approaches and teaching strategies that are adequate to the specific context, especially considering the functional transformations that come with age.

Nonetheless, increasing awareness of the benefits of the Internet will not necessarily transform a non-user into a user. The need to continue to improve the accessibility and functionality of hardware and software from the elderly people's point of view, and to continue to develop applications and design materials which are significant and attractive to older people, are some of the things Romania and Bulgaria have been trying to achieve through the past years. In order to provide independent living for the aging Macedonian population, this whole process requires continuous direct forms of influence, free access using specific time periods, training and education, including websites with services for the elderly and online trainings for the elderly, given by students. Undoubtedly, ICT must be reformed to better address the needs and lives of older adults so that they are encouraged to use it.

References

Abad, L. (2014, January). *Media Literacy for Older People facing the Digital Divide: The e-Inclusion Programmes Design.* Paper presented at Comunicar 42: ¿La revolución de la enseñanz. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.3916/C42-2014-17

Perlgut, D. (2011, November). *Digital Inclusion in the Broadband World: Challenges for Australia.* Paper presented at the Communications Policy and Research Forum Sydney. Retrieved from http://www.intelligentcommunity.org/clientuploads/PDFs/Digital-Inclusion-Australia-Nov2011_Perlgut.pdf

Niehaves, B., & Plattfaut, R. (2010, March). *T-Government for the Citizens: Digital Divide and Internet Technology Acceptance among the Elderly.* Paper presented at the tGov Workshop "10 (tGOV10) at Brunel University, West London. Retrieved from http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228430912_T-Government_for_the_Citizens_Digital_Divide_and_Internet_Technology_Acceptance_among_the_Elderly

Olphert, C. W., Damodaran, L., & May, A. J. (August, 2005). *Towards Digital Inclusion – Engaging Older People in the 'Digital World'.* Paper presented at the Accessible Design in the Digital World Conference. Retrieved from http://ewic.bcs.org/content/ConWebDoc/3825

Aula, A. (2004, September). *Learning to Use Computers at a Later Age.* Paper presented at the HCI and the Older Population Workshop at University of Glasgow, UK. Retrieved from http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/utopia/workshop/aula.pdf

Ministry of Information Society and Administration - Government of the Republic of Macedonia. (2011). *National Strategy for E-inclusiveness (2011-2014).* Retrieved from http://www.mio.gov.mk/files/pdf/dokumenti/Strategija_za_e-vklucuvanje.pdf

Ministry of Information Society and Administration - Government of the Republic of Macedonia. (2005). *National Strategy for E-society Development (2011-2014).* Retrieved from http://mioa.gov.mk/files/pdf/dokumenti/Strategija_i_Akcionen_Plan.pdf

Ministry of Information Society and Administration - Government of the Republic of Macedonia. (2010). *Strategy for E-content Development (2010-2015).* Retrieved from http://mioa.gov.mk/files/pdf/dokumenti/akcionen_plan_e-sodrzini_3.pdf

ZELS. (2010). *Strategy for ICT Development 2011-2015*. Retrieved from http://www.zels.org.mk/Upload/Content/Documents/Izdanija/Publikacii/MK/Strategija%20na%20ZELS%20IKT%202011-%202015.pdf

Helsper, E. (March, 2014). *Harnessing ICT for Social Action, a Digital Volunteering Programme.* Peer Review on digital inclusion, Digital Inclusion in Europe: Evaluating Policy and Practice, Discussion paper. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/harnessing-ict-social-action-digital-volunteering-programme-peer-review

Hardill, I. (2013). *E-Government and Older People in Ireland North and South.* CARDI - Centre for Ageing Research and Development in Ireland. Retrieved from http://www.cardi.ie/sites/default/files/attachments/Final%20EGov%20Full%20Report.pdf

Berry, R. (2011). *Older people and the internet, Towards a „System Map" of Digital Exclusion.* Retrieved from www.ilcuk.org.uk

Lewin, D., Adshead, S., Glennon, B., Williamson, B., Moore, T., Damodaran, L., & Hansell, P. (2010, March). *Assisted Living Technologies for Older and Disabled People in 2030.* A final report to Ofcom, Plum 2010. Retrieved from http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/technology-research/Assisted.pdf

Mancinelli, E. (2007). *e-Inclusion in the Information Society.* Retrieved from http://www.ittk.hu/netis/doc/ISCB_eng/10_Mancinelli_final.pdf

Ivana Stojanovska, Marjana Vaneva, Biljana Stojcevska: E-Inclusion: The Digital Divide and ICT Acceptance among Elderly People in Macedonia Compared with Bulgaria and Romania

De Sales, M. B., Silveira, R. A., & Gonçalves, L. H. T. (n.d.). *Designing Learning Material for Digital Inclusion to Elderly People.* Retrieved from http://www.researchgate.net/publication/237469924_Designing_learning_material_for _Digital_Inclusion_to_elderly_People

Clarke, A., & Concejero, P. (n.d.). *The Digital Divide - Services for the Elderly and Disabled in 2010 – The PRISMA project.* Retrieved from http://www.hft.org/HFT01/paper01/PSN/19_01.pdf

Abott, C. (n.d.). *E-inclusion: Learning Difficulties and Digital Technologies.* Retrieved from www.futurelab.org.uk/litreviews

Ethics of e-Inclusion of older people, Senior Discussion Paper. (2008). Retrieved from http://www.cssc.eu/public/Ethics%20of%20e-Inclusion%20of%20older%20people%20- %20Bled%20%20Paper.pdf

Tables

WORLD INTERNET USAGE AND POPULATION STATISTICS					
JUNE 30, 2014 - Mid-Year Update					
World Regions	**Population** (2014 Est.)	**Internet Users** Dec.31, 2000	**Internet Users** Latest Data	**Penetration** (% Population)	**Growth** 2000-2014
Africa	1,125,721,038	4,514,400	297,885,898	26.5 %	6,498.6 %
Asia	3,996,408,007	114,304,000	1,386,188,112	34.7 %	1,112.7 %
Europe	825,824,883	105,096,093	582,441,059	70.5 %	454.2 %
Middle East	231,588,580	3,284,800	111,809,510	48.3 %	3,303.8 %
North America	353,860,227	108,096,800	310,322,257	87.7 %	187.1 %
Latin America / Caribbean	612,279,181	18,068,919	320,312,562	52.3 %	1,672.7 %
Oceania / Australia	36,724,649	7,620,480	26,789,942	72.9 %	251.6 %
WORLD TOTAL	**7,182,406,565**	**360,985,492**	**3,035,749,340**	**42.3 %**	**741.0 %**

Table 1: World Internet Usage and Population Statistics
(Source: Internet World Stats)

INDIVIDUAL COMPUTER AND INTERNET USAGE: 2014						
	16-24	**25-34**	**35-44**	**45-54**	**55-64**	**65-74**
Percentage of Individuals - Computer use (Last 12 months) - 2014						
Bulgaria	87	81	78	60	38	11
Romania	88	81	73	56	34	13
Macedonia	94	94	73	65	42	17
Percentage of Individuals - Computer use (Never) - 2014						
Bulgaria	11	15	19	36	57	83
Romania	10	16	25	41	61	83
Macedonia	6	4	22	29	56	82
Percentage of Individuals - Internet use (Last 12 months) - 2014						
Bulgaria	86	81	78	60	37	11
Romania	87	79	72	55	33	12
Macedonia	94	93	76	68	39	17
Percentage of Individuals - Internet use (never) - 2014						
Bulgaria	12	16	19	36	58	84
Romania	11	18	26	43	63	85
Macedonia	6	5	22	29	58	83
Percentage of Individuals - Frequency of Internet use (Daily) - 2014						
Bulgaria	79	69	59	40	23	6
Romania	65	50	35	24	11	4
Macedonia	89	77	55	39	21	10

Table 2: Individual Computer and Internet Usage for Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania (Source: Eurostat 2014)

Ivana Stojanovska, Marjana Vaneva, Biljana Stojcevska: E-Inclusion: The Digital Divide and ICT Acceptance among Elderly People in Macedonia Compared with Bulgaria and Romania

INTERNET SKILLS: 2014						
	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-74
Playing, downloading games, images, films or music						
Bulgaria	72	54	39	20	9	1
Romania	59	40	25	13	6	1
Macedonia	69	40	29	15	5	1
Internet banking						
Bulgaria	6	6	7	6	2	0
Romania	3	9	5	4	2	0
Macedonia	14	12	9	7	3	1
Interaction with public authorities (last 12 months)						
Bulgaria	27	28	29	25	12	3
Romania	7	16	14	12	5	2
Macedonia	49	35	26	22	14	6
Downloading official forms (last 12 months)						
Bulgaria	16	18	19	18	7	1
Romania	3	8	7	6	2	1
Macedonia	8	11	9	8	3	0
Sending filled forms (last 12 months)						
Bulgaria	9	10	10	11	4	1
Romania	2	6	4	4	2	1
Macedonia	23	18	9	10	5	0
Travel and accommodation services						
Bulgaria	18	21	18	12	5	0
Romania	11	17	14	8	5	2
Macedonia	16	18	11	8	1	0
Telephoning or video calls						
Bulgaria	78	68	58	40	24	8
Romania	40	35	26	18	10	4
Macedonia	75	54	44	46	27	13
Participating in social networks (creating user profile, posting messages or other contributions to facebook, twitter, etc.)						
Bulgaria	77	66	52	29	15	3
Romania	69	57	42	27	12	3
Macedonia	88	79	63	40	17	11

Reading online news sites, newspapers, news, magazines						
Bulgaria	57	58	54	42	26	7
Romania	50	55	49	36	21	7
Macedonia	70	59	46	41	25	15
Sending and receiving e-mails						
Bulgaria	75	65	57	39	22	5
Romania	71	64	50	35	19	7
Macedonia	80	69	41	28	22	7

Table 3: Internet Use/Skills for Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania
(Source: Eurostat 2014)

133

Stevo Pendarovski, Veno Pachovski, Marko Andonov:
The Promise of E–Democracy and the Internet: Myths about Digital Agoras?

The Promise of E–Democracy and the Internet: Myths about Digital Agoras?

Stevo Pendarovski, Veno Pachovski, Marko Andonov

Abstract

The advance of digital technology in the field of politics in the last 20 years has raised expectations about enhancing the potential of the long dominant model of representative democracy. The need to reinvigorate the overall political process has been talked about since the first signs of a decline in civic engagement in the second half of the twentieth century. In the meantime, technological gadgets, and, especially the great versatility of Internet applicability have indeed contributed to better communication between political elites and their people and for sharing information on an unprecedented scale. Yet, the key challenge still seems barely to be touched upon: how to provide the meaningful participation of politically awakened individuals in decision-making processes within states. In this chapter we offer a brief survey of the European and United States achievements in the field of e-voting and Internet-voting in order to show how political, technical and security concerns still prevail in debates thereby undermining trust in the new modes of casting votes. Also, we present the results of the survey carried out with 120 students in the Republic of Macedonia and their considerations about the eventual possibility of Internet voting in the country. By applying descriptive and analytical methods, we would argue that the immense possibilities for using the Internet in politics are far from being fully exploited, so any initial miscalculation or failures should not discourage communities from observing new pathways for improving the unavoidable digital component of democracy.

Keywords: Internet, digital technology, e-democracy, e-voting, citizens.

Introduction

Debates about the inherent limits of democracy (Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki, 1973) and a decline of the West as the prime promotor of this political system have been occasionally circulated by the prominent authors in the past (Spengler, 1926). One of the biggest concerns is the ever decreasing number of citizens who are part of the political processes which directly correlates with a decline in the membership of civic networks (Putnam, 1995). Despite the fact that in the meantime no other type of political system has been elevated to the level of a systemic challenger, the future shape of democracy is uncertain. According to some scholars two juxtaposed trends are important: first, a slow, but, steady loosening of the links between citizens and institutions which provokes the crisis of democratic legitimacy and accountability, and secondly, the rise of digital information and communication technologies (ICT) as a potential tool for amending some of the shortages in democracy (Coleman & Gotze, 2001, pp. 4-5).

Throughout political history it has been seen as being necessary to narrow the gap between the electorate and the elected politicians. As time went by, it started growing into the biggest obstacle for overcoming the democratic deficit. Almost twenty years ago the British economist Frances Cairncross (1997) wrote about the "the death of distance" where she forcefully elaborated the impact of telecommunications and the Internet on our lives and society. The United Nations identified a strong empirical correlation between a country's information and communication technology (ICT) diffusion index and its income and the human development level as measured by the United Nations Development Program (Prasad, 2013, p. 189). The Digital Revolution and its by-product the Information Society brought about changes in the way how people communicate with each other and with their political representatives (Rostiashvili, 2012, p. 11). Nowadays, the phenomenon described more than a decade ago as cyber or netpolitik is familiar virtually to everyone. It is certainly not true that netpolitik, unlike realpolitik, deals only with moral legitimacy and societal values, however, the assumption is that after the agricultural revolution that concerned the quantity of food, and the industrial revolution which was fueled by the quantity of capital, we are now witnessing the information revolution that is truly changing the world with regard to the quantity of information. (Bollier, 2003, pp. 2-3).

World Wide Web and Democratic Deficit

As with many other buzzwords in the social sciences e-democracy is a commonly used term, but, it comes with a very wide range of meanings. Definitions extend from a minimalist one in which citizens have electronic access to government information and interact with government officials and a more substantial one, where e-democracy implies a more active involvement of citizens and their ability, either directly or through their representatives, to govern themselves and their communities (Noris in Tuzzi et al., 2007, p. 33). Anyhow, a number of definitions uphold that e-democracy involves the use of ICT in support of the democratic decision-making processes. Obviously, the key component is how and to what level citizens are engaged. In this regard the OECD report identifies three approaches: firstly, information, as a one-way relationship in which government delivers information to the citizens; secondly, consultation, or a two-way correlation in which citizens provide feedback to the government and thirdly, active participation whereby citizens are engaged in defining the process and content of policy making. In spite of their proposed equal standing in setting the agenda, responsibility for the final decision should, nevertheless rest with the government (Macintosh, 2004, pp. 1-2).

Considering the effects of the nascent forms of direct democracy related to the World Wide Web, the most evident one is situated in the area of information exchange. Haider is right to highlight the power of the Internet as an "information enabler" (2009, p. 1). But, more information does not necessarily imply higher quality in the decision-making process since the conditions for transforming information into political action have to be in set place beforehand (Dijk, 2013, pp. 6-7). If the technology stays as the sole enabler in the field, it certainly is not going to provide the solution for the modern challenges of democracy. In order to have better access to information and, even more, to amplify the effects of using ICT through consultation and public participation, one report proposes the integration of the traditional offline with new online tools (OECD, 2003, p. 9).

The crucial challenge is to go beyond the traditional one-way model of service delivery from the government to the citizens and to use feedback from the people through digital media. As Coleman plainly put it: instead of citizens simply paying their taxes online, they would be better able to participate in a public debate about how their taxes are spent (Coleman & Gotze, 2001, p. 5). But, the problem is exactly this; participation is "highly problematic" whenever it comes to the concrete implementation of models, because participation

should not be an end in itself (Tuzzi et al., 2007, p. 34). The peoples' voices should not only be heard, but, more importantly, taken into account.

Supporters of digital democracy are sure that all the gaps of modern democracy can be filled by the use of ICT and in due course "facilitate a quantum leap" in democracy (Backer in Rostiashvili, 2012, p. 12). While recognizing the role of ICT in today's politics we are still at some distance from the point when the participation of citizens in decision-making processes will be substantial (Rostiahsvili, 2012, p. 13). Many scholars would agree that the major problem of democratic reform is how to sustain the mass deliberation of citizens and incorporate it into the political process (OECD, 2003, p. 28). One model for doing this is by combining the top-down perspective - citizens' access to information and their reaction to government-led initiatives and the bottom-up perspective, whereby the people "emerge as producers, rather than just as consumers of policy" (Macintosh in OECD, 2003, pp. 29-30).

The Internet: A Panacea or Just a Tool?

Perhaps like no other global medium in history the Internet triggered polarized views about its potential, influence and limits concerning the engagement of citizens and their connection with public policies. Arguments are divided about the "good" versus the "bad" effects of Internet usage. On one side of the rift there are those who believe that the Internet leads to more intensive and better social relations by adding another channel of communication, while others argue that Internet use can be socially isolating since the time spent on the web is often taken at the expense of other social activities, including political ones. This "displacement model" indicates the zero-sum effect with the time on Internet allegedly reducing the period available for face-to–face social activities (Nie & Hillygus, 2002, p. 2). Or to reformulate the thesis, using the words of Nie and Erbring: "the more time they spend using the Internet the more they lose contact with their social environment" (2002, p. 5).

The very notion of information being able to flow unrestricted over borders is splitting people into two categories: cyber-libertarians and cyber-utopians (Gaser et al., 2014, p. 123). In the first group, there are those who are convinced that the power of the Internet should soon mark the end of state sovereignty and the rise of a specific subtype of "information sovereignty". In their view, technology has given citizens a chance to leave political communities based on geography and join digital communities based on shared interests. On the other side, cyber-utopians are emphasizing the still unchallenged state

control over the physical telecommunication infrastructure and quote the recent study that over a third of all Internet users have experienced some form of filtering (Gaser et al., 2014, p. 128). Similar arguments, at times, followed by oversimplification are observable in discussions between the so-called digital enthusiasts and digital sceptics. Enthusiasts are confident that computer networks will contribute to more informed citizens and increase their political participation and impact by a simple click of the mouse. The extreme view among them is the belief that the Internet is changing the balance of power between citizens and the "power barons" and soon will make legislatures and other governmental bodies irrelevant, thereby allowing for a direct democracy (Levine in Hayduk & Mattson, 2002, p. 121). Grossman had even put forward the utopian idea about the "electronic republic" where government decision-making from the few in the power centers will be extended to the many like in the city-states of ancient Greece (Levine in Hayduk & Mattson, 2002, p. 122).

Some scholars demonstrate that the level of penetration of the Internet leads to higher levels of democracy; others warn that the web might have an adverse effect on democratization because the Internet empowers not only citizens, but also, governments to "monitor their people better and prevent free speech", as well (Best & Wade, 2009). In the past decade a public perception has been created that the Internet is a force for democratic change based on its perceived role in the popular uprisings in the world starting from the "color revolutions" in the Soviet successor states and ending with the Arab Spring. However, the loyal supporters of this thesis do not take into account the subsequent course of development in the same countries when authoritarian tendencies backfired in spite of unhindered access to the Internet (Faris & Etling, 2008, pp.65-66). What is beyond doubt is that the Internet does possess specific "generative possibilities" to bring people together for conversation, commerce, political engagement or action (Zittrain, 2008, p. 148).

In this context it is important to differentiate between the two dimensions of the effect of the Internet over political processes: horizontal within the government, and vertical when citizens interact with one another and with the government. Whilst the Internet offers new lines of communication between the citizenry and the authorities, it is not as good in improving processes among government institutions (Faris & Etling, pp. 65-66). The situation is worse in the case of authoritarian leaders who obstruct free speech and democratic movements with the same rigor - online as off line. Of course, democratic governments behave differently, so judging the impact of the Internet is always attached to the specific context in the democratic polity.

Basically, it is safe to say that in all instances the Internet should be considered as a politically neutral tool at the disposal of dictators and democrats alike (Faris & Etling, pp. 70-80).

In principle, social media do offer innovative opportunities for political actors, political institutions and for the public to interact with one another (Clarke, 2010, p. 1). Potential political benefits from the use of the social media are: the fostering of greater pluralism in political discourse; enabling citizens to become more effective political actors; building trust in public institutions and politicians; helping legislators to better represent citizens and governments to better serve public needs. In the group of potential risks the most prominent is the danger of constructing the so-called surveillance state which would allow the people in power to breach privacy rights *en masse* (Clarke, 2010, pp. 4-9). In the not so distant year of 1984 Barber alerted us to the fact that the use of technology could easily weaken the sense of face-to-face cooperation or confrontation and increase the danger of elite manipulation (1984).

E-voting: Capabilities and Legitimacy

A minimal definition of e-voting is the use of electronic means to mark a ballot paper, while Internet voting is electronic voting which involves casting a ballot via the Internet (Goldsmith, 2013). An umbrella definition would be that E-voting embraces casting a ballot via a broad range of electronic telecommunications technology, including the Internet, mobile phones, cable and satellite television and computers without internet connection (Gibson, 2001, p. 564). If Internet voting is a sub-genre of electronic voting, then, what is the demarcation line between the two? Electronic voting is performed by the computers installed in polling stations, not connected to any network, while Internet voting is executed in an unsupervised environment (Caporusso, 2010, p. 55). In most cases, e-voting in both forms is applied in the two crucial procedural phases: when casting and when counting the votes (Al-Khouri, 2012, p. 26).

Since 1982, voting by electronic machines on the European continent was used for legally binding elections, but, despite the increased interest it is still not widespread (McGaley & Gibson, 2006, p. 2). It was in use in Ireland and the Netherlands, but, in both states was revoked by the political parties concerned due to a low level of public confidence in the technology. Switzerland, the UK, Spain, Portugal and Italy have promoted limited trials without the legal effects; Belgium and France are in the process of deploying electronic machines (Caporusso, 2010, p. 55). Internet voting on a global level was applied for the first

Stevo Pendarovski, Veno Pachovski, Marko Andonov:
The Promise of E–Democracy and the Internet: Myths about Digital Agoras?

time in 2000 in the official political elections in the USA, as a pilot project in several states aimed at the overseas voters. Since then, dozens of other countries have been through the same experience. Estonia in 2005 became the first country in the world to organize nation–wide elections when voters were offered the alternative of casting their vote over the Internet (Breuer, 2006, p. 2). Estonia is still leading the field since the country had already in its portfolio several nation-wide elections conducted via the Internet in the past 10 years. In other parts of the world, the United Arab Emirates developed their advanced I-voting system with biometric smart cards (Al-Khouri, 2012, p. 25); Australia, Canada, France, Mexico and Switzerland use Internet voting in parts of their territories; India and Norway have attempted a few trials; Finland, the UK and the USA have exercised pilot projects, but, decided not to continue: the Netherlands and Spain have had a few successful years of e-voting, but, they have interrupted their practices (Goldsmith, 2013). In all the countries mentioned the Internet voting system is used as a supplementary channel to traditional ones for casting the vote.

In general, electronic voting is distributed more in Europe than in the USA but, the fact is that almost everywhere a certain level of skepticism about this voting mode continues to persist (McGaley & Gibson, 2006, p. 3). According to the Council of Europe Recommendations, the pre-requisites for integrity and public trust in e-voting are few, but rigid in their scope; namely: secure, reliable and efficient processes, which are technically robust, open to independent verification and easily accessible to voters (CoE, 2004). As the past experience of Estonia has testified, the I-voting system should not have had a high level of legitimacy if not trustworthiness on three critical levels: political/ legal legitimacy; voters' transparency; and system transparency (Maaten & Hall, 2008, p. 32). Another role-model to be followed was developed by Switzerland where all main factors were put in place: support at the highest level by the relevant political actors; a gradual approach and the involvement of multidisciplinary teams tackling personal data information, system security, sociological aspects and organizational questions (Chevallier et al., 2006, p. 55). In the same context, of especial importance are two lessons from the Netherlands: first, once trust in the voting system is lost it is difficult to win it back, secondly, if e-voting is well implemented in any particular country it does not mean that it is always suitable for others (Loeber, 2008, p. 29). Finally, inextricably linked with the trust complex is the so – called digital divide, particularly visible in the rural areas. About its sub-layer, digital literacy polling in Switzerland has rightly voiced concerns over the fact that only two thirds of the Swiss electorate are experienced Internet users (Gasser, 2010, p. 5).

Traditional vs. New Voting Practices: Pros and Cons

Some authors optimistically announced that electronic voting would have a "revolutionizing effect on democracy" by reducing costs and limiting errors made by voters and the administrations. But, more importantly, they argue that virtually unlimited access to online information will empower voters to construct a more informed opinion and eventually make a more qualified choice (Caporusso, 2010, p. 56). On the other side of the pool are the "old fashioned" experts who tend to see online voting as a kind of "betrayal" of traditional voting practices which, allegedly, serves only to increase the social isolation of citizens (Caporusso, 2010, p. 56). The truth is that if the system is well accepted by voters and candidates it can be cost effective, deliver faster and more reliable results and be a "greener" option to the casting of the ballot (Mellet, 2010, p. 3). Furthermore, the most valuable potential of information technology in democracy would be to strengthen the public sphere by multiplying "information resources, channels of communication and the networking capacity" for national and international policy groups and political parties (Norris, 2002, p. 2).

Studies show that Internet voting underperformed regarding the expectations that this technology would increase voter turnout. The empirical data is unambiguous: the existing literature on the subject either did not test this hypothesis, or indicated that I-voting is not contributing to the level of turnout (Oostveen & Besselaar, 2009, pp. 357-358). A similar conclusion is given in the report of the UK Cabinet Office which precisely states that electronic voting will not solve the problem of the voter turnout (in Oostveen & Besselaar, pp. 372). So far, the most comprehensive overview in this regard is offered by Pippa Norris who compared 70 national elections in the 1990s in 25 post-industrial societies with the established tradition of political rights and civil liberties. Her main conclusion is that dependent on the context, this type of voting could even be negatively associated with the turnout (Norris, 2002, p. 9). In other words, the electoral turnout is not related to the method of voting, but, much more to the viable policy alternatives and the quality of the candidates on the ballot (Norris, 2002, p. 7). Lastly, one European study suggested that the driving forces for Internet voting are not age, gender, income level, education or political affiliation, but, mainly the confidence of the people in the new technology and in one's own computing skills (Chevallier, 2006, p. 61). Some surveys present one further intriguing fact: those mostly in favor of electronic elections are the people who are already politically mobilized (Kenski, 2005).

Survey – Sample, Results and Discussion

A survey was carried out in 2014 in Skopje with 120 university students aged 20-22 years, 69 females and 51 males (see Table1)(Fig. 1) (Fig. 2). Most of them (94) reside in the capital Skopje or in cities with more than of 5,000 inhabitants, the remaining 25 came from communities with less than 5,000 people (Fig. 3). The predominant number (110) came from families with above the national income average per capita in the Republic of Macedonia, and only 10 students were below that threshold (Fig. 4). The large majority of students (101 students or 84% of those surveyed) were active on the Internet on average (at least one hour per day online) or more, only 19 were below that average or not connected at all. (Fig. 5)

Skepticism towards voting online is evident among those examined since 55.8% are against this voting mode to be applied in their country (see Table 2)(Fig. 6). Their most cited arguments were: weak technical support and infrastructure at the national level; little or no access to the Internet in rural areas; elements of the electorate who are ignorant of ICT; the danger of proxy voting, especially within families; and the possibilities of hacking the program and thus altering the election outcome.

Students in favor (44.2%) emphasize easy access to the network and the convenience of voting for the elderly, disabled and people in the diaspora; the avoidance of tense situations and violence in polling stations; the faster and cheaper counting of votes; the neutrality of the Internet as a tool, as opposed to many individuals involved in the election administration; increasing voter turnout among the young generations.

Responses within the four categories (gender; residence; income; and Internet activity) do not demonstrate any statistically significant deviation from the main framework of the survey's results (Fig. 7, 8, 9 & 10).

Conclusion

The Athenian agora in a modern guise should not be contemplated as the only point of departure because the original was neither democratic nor inclusive (Coleman in OECD, p. 148). If the goal is to enhance democracy by using ICT, then we should analyze the promise of the Internet through its two competing mechanisms: first, it definitely enables an infinitive range of ideas and perspectives, secondly, people almost naturally tend to "balkanize" creating numerous online communities which are not mutually connected (Levine in

Haydok & Mattson, 2002). One research study even indicates that the use of ICT in the public sector might strengthen existing power relations instead of "deinstitutionalization" or institutional renewal to get institutional adjustment (Homburg, 2005, p. 496). It is too optimistic to say that ICT nowadays is becoming increasingly relevant for political systems, but it does pose a challenge to the model of representative democracy and to a certain extent, is opening the space for the more intensive horizontal exchange of information and participation of individuals (Tuzzi, Padovani & Nesti, p. 32).

If it is not feasible to "merge the spirit of ancient Athens with the technology of the twenty–first century" when everyone will communicate with each other (Hilbert, 2007, p. 38), what is attainable? It is safe to say that direct democracy is out of reach since it is not sufficient to have only technical possibilities to connect the people. At the same time, direct control, influence or manipulation by the authorities cannot be ruled out (Hilbert, 78). What is evident in the world today is the rise of a new information class of individuals and organizations that are well equipped and trained to gathering, presenting and at times, if necessary, manipulating information (Schonberger, Lazer). The winning strategy would be to build on the emerging new, hybrid types of democracy which combine the virtual and real political engagement of the people (Zuniga et al. 2010, p. 45). It goes without saying that we are already witnessing the decentralization of power stimulated by plurality in electronic information networks (Hilbert, 49). A quick and radical shift from a representative to an Internet-based democracy is not likely in the foreseeable future, but, the mixed model of democracy with elements of both, is certainly in the making (Anttiroiko, 2003, p. 127).

Regarding e-voting with all the formidable challenges of a technical and political character in the future, it is not surprising that the number of countries experimenting with it is still marginal. Even world leaders like Estonia are taking an incremental rather than a revolutionary approach (Spucher, Haenni & Dubius, 2010, p. 270). The traditional voting systems are not going to disappear for years to come, but, the processes of advancing digital democracy and its component, e-voting are irreversible. The future of democracy would belong to the "smart mobs", consisting of people who do not know each other, but, are able to act together in shaping responses to the fundamental questions confronting our civilization (Rheingold, 2002, p. 191).

References

Al Khouri, A. (2012). E-Voting in UAE FNC Elections: A Case Study. *Information and Knowledge Management,* 2 (6), 25-85.

Anttiroiko, A-V. (2003). Building Strong E-Democracy – The Role of Technology in Developing Democracy for the Information Age.*Communication of the ACM*, 46(9), 121-128.

Barber, B. (1984). *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Best, M., Wade, K. (2009). The Internet and Democracy: Global Catalyst or Democratic Dud. *Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society*, 29(4), 255-271.

Bollier, D. (2003). *The Rise of Netpolitik: How the Internet is Changing International Politics and Diplomacy*. Washington D.C.: The Aspen Insitute.

Breuer, F. (2006). E-Voting: Lessons Learnt and Future Challenges, Conference Report, Tallinn, Estonia.

Caporusso, L. (2010). The role of Trust, Participation and Identity in the Propensity to E-Vote and I-Vote. 4th International Conference on electronic voting. Bregenz, Austria: EVOTE.

Cairncross, F. (1997). *The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Will Change Our Lives*. Harvard Business Press.

Chevallier, M. Warynski, M. Sandoz, A. (2006). Success factor of Geneva's e-voting system. *The Electronic Journal of E-Government*, 4(2): 55-62.

Council of Europe. (2004). *Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Legal, Operational and Technical Standards for E-Voting.* Retrieved from https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=778189

Clarke, A. (2010). *Social Media: Political Uses and Implications for Representative Democracy.* Library of Parliament.

Coleman, S. (2003). The Future of Internet and Democracy beyond Metaphors, Toward Policy in OECD. *Promise and Problems of E-Democracy: Challenges of Online and Citizen Engagement*.

Coleman, S. Gotze, J. (2001). *Bowling Together: Online Public Engagement in Policy Deliberation*. London: Hansard Society Publishing.

Crozier, M. Huntington, P. S. Watanuki, J. (1973). The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission. Retrieved from www.trilateral.org/.../doc/crisis_of_democracy.pdf

Dijk, J. (2013).Digital Democracy: Vision and Reality. In Snellen, I. Van de Donk, W. *Public Administration in the Information Age Revisited*. Amsterdam: IOS – Press.

Gasser, U. (2010).*Internet Voting: What Can Canada Learn?* Montreal: Carleton University, Transatlantic Dialogue.

Gasser, U. Zittrain, J. Faris, R. Jones, R.H. (2014). *Internet Monitor 2014: Reflections on the Digital World: Platforms, Policy, Privacy, and Public Discourse*. Harvard: Berkman Center Research Publication.

Gibson, R. (2001) Elections Online: Accessing Internet Voting in Light of Arizona Democratic Primary. *Political Sciences Quarterly* 116(4):561-583.

Goldsmith, B. (2013). *Internet Voting: Past, Present and Future*. Retrieved from http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Interviews/2013/Internet-Voting-Past-Present-and-Future.aspx

Faris, R. Etling, B. (2008). Madison and the Smart Mob: The Promise and Limitations of the Internet for Democracy. *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 32(2), 65-85.

Homburg, V. (2005). *The Myth of E-Government: Looking Beyond the Assumptions of a New and Better Government*. Rochester, Michigan: Idea Group Publishing.

Haider, A. (2009). Contribution of Internet to a Democratic Society. 17th European Conference on Information Systems. Retrieved from http://arrow.unisa.edu.au:8081/1959.8/114851

Hilbert, M. (2007). *Digital Processes and Democratic Theory: Dynamics, Risks and Opportunities that Arise When Democratic Institutions meet digital ICT.* Retrieved from www.martinhilbert.net/democracy.html

Macintosh, A. (2004). Characterizing E-participation in Policy- Making.Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on System Sciences.

Maaten, E. Hall, T. (2008). Improving the Transparency of Remote E-Voting: The Estonian Experience. In Krimmer, R. Grimm. (Eds.). Proceeding of 3rd International Conference on Electronic Voting, Austria.

McGaley, M., Gibson, P. (2006). A Critical Analyses of the Council of Europe Recommendation on E-Voting. Retrieved from *https://www.usenix.org/event/evt06/tech/.../mcgaley/mcgaley.pdf*

Mellet, C. (2010). *Internet Voting: What Can Canada Learn?* Montreal: Carleton University, Transatlantic Dialogue.

Levine, P. (2002). Can the Internet Rescue Democracy? Toward an On-line Commons. In Hayduk R., Mattson K. (ed.). *Democracy Moment: Reforming the American Political System for the 21st Century*.

145

Stevo Pendarovski, Veno Pachovski, Marko Andonov:
The Promise of E–Democracy and the Internet: Myths about Digital Agoras?

Loeber, L. (2008). E-Voting in the Netherlands: From General Acceptance to General Doubt in Two Years. In Krimmer R., Grimm R. (Eds.) 3rd International Conference on Electronic Voting, Austria.

Nie, H. N. Erbring, L. (2002). *Internet and Society: A Preliminary Report*. Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society.

Nie, N., Hillygus, S.S. (2002). The Impact of Internet Use on Sociability: Time-Diary Findings. *It & Society,* 1(1), 1-20.

Norris, P. (2002). *E-Voting as the Magic Ballot?: The Impact of the Internet on Electronic Participation and Civic Engagement*. Retrieved from http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/EUI%20E-Voting%20as%20the%20Magic%20Ballot.pdf

OECD. (2003). *Promise and Problems of E-Democracy: Challenges of Online and Citizen Engagement*. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/11/35176328.pdf

Oostveen, A.M., Besselaar, P. (2009). User's Experiences with E-Voting; A Comparative Case Study. *International Journal of Electronic Governance* 2(4), 357-377.

Prasad, K. (2012). E-Governance Policy for Modernizing Government through Digital Democracy in India. *Journal of Information Policy*. New York: Penn State University Press (2): 183 – 203.

Putnam, R.D. (1995). Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital. *Journal of Democracy*. 6 (1).

Rostiashvili, K. (2012). Information Society and Digital Democracy – Theoretical Discourse, *Scientific Journal in Humanities, 11-15.*

Rheingold, H. (2002). *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution*. New York: Basic Books.

Schonberger, M.V. Lazer, D. *E-Gov. and the Coming Revolution of Information Government*. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Press. Retrieved from.

Spengler, O. (1926). *Decline of the West: Form and Actuality*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/Decline-Of-The-West-Oswald-Spengler

Spucher, O., Haenni, R., Dubius, E. (2010).*Coercion –Resistant Hybrid Voting System*, 4th International Conference on Electronic Voting. Bregenz, Austria: EVOTE.

Tuzzi, A. Padovani, C. Nesti, G. (2007). Communication and (e) democracy: accessing European e-democracy discourses. In Cammmarts, B. Carpentier, N. (ed). (2007). *Reclaiming the Media: Communication Rights and Democratic Media Roles*. Chicago: European Communication Research and Education Association Series.

Zittrain, J. (2008). *The Future of Internet and How to Stop It*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Zuniga, H. De, Gil. Veenstra, A., Vraga, E., Shah, D. (2010). Digital Democracy: Remaining Pathways to Political Participation, *Journal of Information Technology and Politics*, 7: 36-51.

Tables

Table 1. Social Profile of Students

Social profile of students		Examinees	Percentage
Gender	Male	51	43%
	Female	69	57%
Total		120	100%
Residence	Urban areas	94	78%
	Rural areas	26	22%
Total		120	100%
Income level	Above national average	110	92%
	Below national average	10	8%
Total		120	100%
Internet activity	Average	101	84%
	Below average	19	16%
Total		120	100%

Stevo Pendarovski, Veno Pachovski, Marko Andonov:
The Promise of E–Democracy and the Internet: Myths about Digital Agoras?

Table 2. Question "Are you in favor of online voting in your country?"

Distribution of examinees		Yes		No	
		Number of examinees	Percentage	Number of examinees	Percentage
Gender	Male	28	23 %	23	19 %
	Female	36	30%	33	28 %
Total		64	53 %	56	47 %
Residence	Urban areas	54	45%	40	33%
	Rural areas	14	12%	12	10%
Total		68	57%	52	33%
Income level	Above national	63	53%	47	39%
	Below national	5	4%	5	4%
Total		68	57%	52	43%
Internet activity	Average	57	47 %	44	37. %
	Below average	11	9%	8	7 %
Total		68	56 %	52	44 %

Figures

Fig. 1 – Visual representation of Table 1 – social structure of the examinees

Fig. 2. Distribution by gender

Fig. 3. Distribution by residence

Fig. 4. Distribution by income level

Fig. 5. Distribution by internet activity

Fig. 6 – Visual representation of Table 2 – social structure of the examinees per answer


Fig. 7. Distribution of the examinees by gender

Fig. 8. Distribution of the examinees by residence

Fig. 9. Distribution of the examinees by income level

Fig. 10. Distribution of examinees by internet activity

153

Ganka Cvetanova, Veno Pachovski, Irena Bojadzievska:
The Engagement Initiative of EU Citizens and Digital Platforms for Open Policy Making

The Engagement Initiative of EU Citizens and Digital Platforms for Open Policy Making in Finland, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Macedonia

Ganka Cvetanova, Veno Pachovski, Irena Bojadzievska

Abstract

This chapter evaluates the digital platform for the engagement of citizens in the process of open policy making in the Republic of Macedonia, in comparison with digital platforms in Finland and the United Kingdom, based on the EU initiative for citizens' engagement. The methodological approach in this research relies on an analysis of government policies on the open policymaking process, as well as the digital platforms and digital tools used for this purpose. The open policy-making process was analyzed in all three counties from the following aspects: the legal basis, reforms in the public sector, and tools that enable the engagement of citizens and the reflections of civil society. For this purpose, we have analyzed the findings from the civil society organizations that monitor government performance in open policy-making. It should be emphasized that in this study the issue of open policy-making was analyzed from the perspective of the highest political level, that is a national level. As the findings of the study suggest, all of the three countries involved have a strong commitment to an open policy-making process and have established this process by certain legal instruments. The research revealed that in the UK and Macedonia the process of developing capacities to carry out consultations was attributed to reforms in the public sector. Unlike these two examples, in the case of Finland no major public sector reforms were implemented, consequently the leadership of open policy-making has remained in the hands of civil society. Also, the findings showed that in all three cases legitimacy has been given to civil society organizations and the feedback they provide has had a strong impact on open policy-making. Yet, in some of cases there are still persistent obstacles to be overcome in order to empower the impact of citizens on the final outcome of the process of open policy-making.

Keywords: open policy-making, citizens' engagement, digital platform, governments' politics, civil society organizations.

Introduction

The use of digital technology among citizens, civil society organizations and public institutions offer new possibilities within democratic processes. Engaging your "own" citizens or constituents through digital media includes enhancing active participation in law-making, policy-making, and the legislative process, all of which are influenced by a variety of forces - public opinion, debate, lobbyists, special interest groups, consultation with constituents, committee hearings, and expert testimony (Caldow, 2004). In other words, digital tools enable the citizens and civil organizations and provide new space and new ways of communication with public officials, thus increasing the access of citizens to information, strengthening their voice and participations in politics and governance, and promoting increased government accountability. This modern concept, called Open Policy Making, assumes that governments in the 21st Century should not have a monopoly in the process of policy making. In this sense, citizens and civil society should be equally involved in policy-making thereby establishing a partnership with stakeholders. So, open policy-making is about being open to new ideas. Yet, openness is not just a case of simply doing things more transparently, or releasing large numbers of government datasets. It also requires government to identify and involve organizations, individuals and citizens with expertise and knowledge, which government does not have in all areas of its work (Burall, Hughes and Stilgoe, 2013, p. 1).

While new information and communication technologies (ICTs) offer significant opportunities for greater citizen engagement in policy-making, they also raise a host of new questions for governments. For example, how are the rights of access of citizens to information to be ensured in the online era? What aspects of the current structures of government, their organization, resource allocations and available skills need to be changed to respond to new standards in their interactions with citizens? What is the status of online responses from civil servants to queries from citizens, or their submissions to an electronic discussion forum (OECD, 2003).

In this sense, one of the key elements in this process is Civil Service reform. Yet, as stated in NDI study on Citizen Participation and Technology (2013), despite the exuberance for technologies, there is little data available on the impact they have had on the political processes and the institutions they are intended to influence in emerging democracies. Additionally, the organizations

adopting them require new kinds of technical assistance, which has also been only partially studied.

Recognizing the importance of the use of digital technologies and the engagement of citizens in policy making, the European Union launched the so-called European citizens' initiative – Get involved in European policy making1. A European citizens' initiative is an invitation to the European Commission to propose legislation on matters where the EU has competence to legislate. A citizens' initiative has to be backed by at least one million EU citizens, coming from at least 7 out of the 28 member states. A minimum number of signatories is required in each of those 7 member states. The European citizens' initiative allows one million EU citizens to participate directly in the development of EU policies, by calling on the European Commission to make legislative proposals. The rules and procedures governing the citizens' initiative are set out in an EU Regulation adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in February 2011. A citizens' initiative is possible in any field where the Commission has the power to propose legislation, for example in the environment, agriculture, transport or public health.2

The paper evaluates the digital platform for citizens' engagement in the process of open policy- making in the Republic of Macedonia on the one hand and digital platforms in the United Kingdom and Finland as EU Member States on the other, based on the EU initiative for citizens' engagement. For the purposes of our research, the countries were selected based on their strong commitment to the open policy-making process.

The methodological approach in this research relies on an analysis of governmental policies on the open policy-making process, as well as the digital platforms and digital tools used for this purpose. In other words, the open policy-making process in this paper was analyzed from the following aspects: the legal basis, reforms in the public sector, tools that enable citizens' engagement and civil society reflections. Our research was based on data from analyzing the web portals for open policy-making. In the case of Macedonia some of the data was obtained from the Ministry of Information Society and Administration officials.

Open Policymaking in Finland

Finland declared its independence on 6 December 61917, after being a grand duchy in the Russian empire for 108 years, and before that a part of Sweden for a period of 600 years. The current form of government is that of a democratic,

parliamentary Republic. Finland currently has a parliament with 200 members in one chamber, elected every 4 years by direct vote. The Head of State is the President of the Republic, elected every 6 years, and serving up to a maximum of two terms. Finland has been a Member of European Union since 1995.

Finland has a population of 5.4 million. The key features of its society and economy are a high standard of education, social security and healthcare, which are all financed by the state. GDP per capita is $35,900 (2013 est.). Finland is the fifth-largest country in Western Europe. The capital is Helsinki (with a population of 1.25 million inhabitants in the metropolitan area).

At the national level, the Ministry of Justice is responsible for the process of open-policy making.

I. Legal Basis

For the purpose of enabling citizen's engagement and an open policy-making process, Finland amended its Constitution. According to the new provision in the Constitution, which entered into force at the beginning of March 2012, at least fifty thousand Finnish citizens are entitled to vote and have the right to submit an initiative for the enactment of an Act to the Parliament. The Act on citizens' initiative includes provisions on the procedures to be followed when organising a citizens' initiative.[3] These provisions allow citizens to pass complete bills directly to parliament, imposing an obligation on the Parliament to process any bill that collects more than 50,000 signatures from citizens of voting age. Alternatively, citizens can make a proposal for a bill, which will then be examined and potentially drafted by a ministry.

Parallel with the amendments to the Constitution, Finland introduced the European Citizens' Initiative. The Citizen's Initiative Act includes provisions from the previously elaborated EU Regulation. The functionality of this envisaged the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority to issue a certificate of the technical features of an online collection system to be used in Finland for collecting signatures. However this is not to be mistaken with the system for national online policy making. So, the online service maintained by the Ministry of Justice cannot be used in connection with the European citizens' initiative.

II. Tools Enabling Citizens' Engagement

The policy-making initiative in Finland refers to drafting a new law or amending an existing one. Either way, the threshold of 50,000 signatures from citizens who are entitled to vote must be met and statements of support have to be collected within six months. The procedure can be begun online with an

electronic signature and there is a procedure for the validation of the identities of voters.

To facilitate the process, a volunteer group in Helsinki has created the *Avoin ministeriö* (Open Ministry) website, an online tool for drafting bills and proposals and gathering signatures. (See Picture 1)

*"The Open Ministry is an idea that Joonas Pekkanen came up with last December. Pekkanen, who has been involved in launching Internet-based start-up companies, saw a newspaper article about the citizens' initiative. He began to recruit volunteer workers for the project from his circle of friends, and the group was formed quickly. The entire operation has started from the grass-roots level. No money from the government or any interest group is involved. Openness and involving everybody in the operation of the ministry has been the central principle behind the activity" (*Beadon, 2012)[4].

This association is politically and ideologically independent.

Most law making efforts start with the assumption that the quality of the laws and presumably the legitimacy of their eventual implementation would benefit from more diverse participation from a wider array of non-professionals. The e-tool on Open Ministry (http://openministry.info/) uses an open source platform representing the latest effort to incorporate wider participation in the law making processes through crowdsourcing – allowing the widest range of input, viewpoints and ideas. The platform provides for: 1) proposing topics for new laws; 2) writing drafts of a law; 3) commenting on drafts; 4) and expressing support or dislike of proposed laws.[5]

The Open Ministry tries to help the individual proposals meet the criteria of a sufficient number of people who need to be involved in: (1) the policy drafting process, (2) the campaigning process and (3) the parliamentary defence of their proposals.

Even though the mechanism was established in 2012, it took the Finnish Parliament until 2013 to decide how these initiatives would l be dealt with. Consequently, the first initiative reached Parliament in 2013. Up until the time of writing only seven initiatives achieved the required threshold. In all of them, the collected signatures were significantly over the threshold. For example in the case of the initiative for same sex marriages in Finland, it obtained more than 100,000 supporters within the first 24 hours, the Animal Welfare Act gained 70,000 signatures, and the Copy Right Act was signed up to by 51.976 names.

III. Civil Society Reflections

Parliament is obliged to take the citizens' initiative into consideration, but thereafter it is at the Parliament's discretion whether or not the initiative will be approved or if it will be amended in some way. If Parliament decides to reject the initiative, a new initiative on the same subject matter may be submitted.

"Each of the six citizen's initiatives that have proceeded through the proper channels to reach the parliamentary floor for discussion has failed. The Finnish Parliament says it doesn't have the time to hear them and they can't be moved to another date. Activists say technical shortcomings are poor justification for the slowness of the process".[6]

Of the 266 published initiatives, only six have reached the point where they have passed through the relevant committees and been submitted to Parliament. Civil society identifies the non-transparent manner in which these initiatives are being processed by parliament as one of the obstacles to the success of these initiatives. Only in one case, were the proposals invited into the parliamentary committee for hearing, whereas in the rest of the cases the parliamentary committees were held behind closed doors.[7]

Social sciences professor Jan Sundberg (2014) does not think the situation is quite so grim. He adds that: "They engender discourse on the matter. Not just among those who have supported the initiative, but also among the larger public. People remember the issue, and perhaps support it by the time the government proposes it for law."

IV. Political Commitment and Reforms in the Public Sector

Finland made its political commitment to open policy-making when it joined the Open Government Partnership[8], which was established on 9 March 2012[9,] and Finland subsequently joined the OGP in June 2012. The working group has active civil society representatives, and the Open Ministry is one of the most active examples of these. The leadership of Open policy-making in Finland lies in the hands of civil society, therefore no major public sector reforms were deemed necessary in Finland.

Open Policymaking in UK

The conventional name for Great Britain is The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Great Britain includes England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The population of the United Kingdom is 64,100,000 people (2013 est.).

The type of government is that of a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy. The UK legislature is defined by a bicameral parliament which consists of the House of Lords (618 seats; consisting of approximately 500 life peers, 92 hereditary peers, and 26 clergy) and the House of Commons (646 seats since the 2005 elections; where members are elected by popular vote to serve five-year term).

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United Kingdom was $39,348.82 /per capita (2013).

The United Kingdom has been a member of the European Union since 1973.

The Cabinet Office is responsible for the open policy-making.

I. The Legal Basis

In the United Kingdom, the notion of open policy making came along as part of The *Civil Service Reform Plan*[10] adopted in 2012. The reforming approach is in the setting up of open policy making to become the default. The justification of this is that government must not have a monopoly over policy-making so it has to be "robust, open, honest and constructive". Furthermore, the Civil Service can be highly innovative and effective in its work, the quality of policy advice is not always consistent or designed with implementation in mind. The key to success is the widening of a range of views and inputs. The ultimate goal is to design policies that reflect the real-world experiences of UK citizens and harness public engagement with the policy-making process. To enable this, the *Civil Service Reform Plan* suggests a variety of tools, such as a crowd-sourced wiki, wide public input by "crowd sourcing", and 'Policy Labs' which draw in expertise from a range of people and organisations.

II. Tools Enabling Citizens' Engagement

To understand the openness in policy-making we have researched the possibility for citizen's engagement, by analysing the section on consultations on the GOV.UK portal (see Picture 2). This shows that the UK had a tradition of open consultations even before 2012. However the commitments to open policy-making significantly improved the practice after 2012 (see Figure 1).

We have looked at the consultations opened in 2014. Our general conclusion is that depending on the complexity of the issue the consultations had a variety of length. However, it can be noted that the majority of them lasted for several months. For example, consultations closed in December 2014 had usually been opened in August or September 2014. The ones opened in

December 2014 were still open in March 2015. Even in the case of a shorter consultation period, the process lasted a minimum of 4 weeks.

The portal reveals whether or not the consultation is open, whether it is in the process of feed-back assessment, or if the consultation has been closed. On each consultation there is a summary of comments also reflecting how government answers to received feedback. The government departments take these responses into consideration before making decisions. In some cases there is even an impact assessment analysis of the concrete subject that was open to consultations. For the open consultations, there is an indication of when it closes.

The UK Government introduced a very modern tool – the open policy blog.[11] The Cabinet Office keeps information up to date so people know what they are doing by introducing a blog where it says: "Open Policy Making is broadening the range of people we engage with, using the latest analytical techniques and taking an agile, iterative approach to implementation." [12] This tool enables direct communications with citizens, direct engagement and first hand feedback on how citizens want their government to work. The blog functions transparently with minim requirements. Citizens can post comments. The Open Policy Making team acknowledges the comments usually within 48 hours. If a comment was deemed to be irrelevant and thus not published, the person who submitted it can ask for an explanation[13].

III. Civil Society Reflections

When a government initiative with a strong impact on citizens is introduced, it is very likely that a civil society organization will monitor its functioning. In the case of open policy-making in the UK, we came across a profound forum hosted by the Democratic Society (Demsoc). This UK-based membership organisation says about itself that they want to make democracy work for the 21st century, by trying to build a more participatory democracy, based on good information, transparent government, and open decision making[14].

With a thematic division on the portal, the Demsoc forum helps in two ways: (1) it reflects on government activities thereby enabling them to reach a wider community (citizenry) and (2) it improves government performance by providing feedback on concrete subject matter in the discussion on the forum[15].

Involve[16], on the other hand, is a charitable think tank specialising in public participation with a vision towards creating a stronger, more inclusive democracy through opening up decision-making among UK citizens. Their

reflections towards openness in policy-making were submitted in writing [17]. The report offers some recommendations where the government needs to be more attentive so as not to exclude other methodologies while going digital by default, and being aware of the level of expertise of the people in crowd sourcing.

IV. Political Commitment and Reforms in the Public Sector

Open policy in the UK is perceived as being a new operating model for government[18]. The Reform plan[19] acknowledged that to enable open policy-making, the change must start at the top. Successful reform will require firm political and corporate leadership across the Civil Service "The UK civil service needs to change to meet the long-term challenges that all economies are facing[20]." The Cabinet Office is supporting cross-government consultations and drives the reforming process[21].

The creation of the UK National Action Plan for open government partnership[22] was exemplary in open policy-making. The UK Open Government Civil Society Network[23] is made up of a group of organisations and individuals committed to making government work better for people through increased transparency, participation and accountability. They want all political parties in the UK to commit to open government.[24]

Open Policymaking in the Republic of Macedonia

The Republic of Macedonia is a relatively young democratic country gaining its independence in 1991, in the so-called 'third wave of democracy', following the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Republic of Macedonia is a small country located in the central Balkan Peninsula in Southeastern Europe, with a total population of around 2 million. It relies upon parliamentary democracy with an executive government elected by a unicameral parliament. The Assembly (parliament) is made up of 123 seats and the members are elected every four years. The role of the President of the Republic is mostly ceremonial and real/executive power rests in the hands of the Government which makes the prime minister the most politically powerful person in the country. The Republic of Macedonia is a candidate country for EU membership.

With a total population of around 2, 000, 000, most of its residents are concentrated in urban areas, in moderately sized cities with a population of 20,

000 or more. A quarter of the population (approximately 500,000) is located in the biggest city and capital, Skopje.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the Republic of Macedonia was 5,110 $/per capita (2013).[25]

In the Republic of Macedonia, the Ministry of Information Society and Administration is responsible for open policy-making.

I. The Legal Basis

In Macedonia, the entitled proposers of the laws are: the Government, a group of members of the Parliament and citizens with a threshold of 10,000 signatures. In 95% of cases laws are proposed by the Government. The Government Rulebook of procedure, according to its amendments of 2008[26], introduced the mechanism of regulatory impact assessment and the transparency of the law-making procedures by instituting an obligation on ministries to provide for the compulsory publication of draft proposals on its website and the Single National Electronic Registry on National Legislation (Bojadzievska, 2015: 133).

Also, as a feedback mechanism, the Government Rulebook of procedure, obliges ministries to draft reports for the obtained proposals,[27] where they have to indicate not only the accepted comments and/or proposals, but also elaborate the reasons for the comments and proposals that were not accepted. Such reports also have to be published on the respective ministry's website and the Single National Electronic Registry on National Legislation.

II. Tools Enabling Citizens' Engagement

By 2009, in the Republic of Macedonia public participation was provided only in the conventional offline manner, but despite the opportunities on offer, the government was not proactive enough in engaging Macedonian citizens, nor were the citizens and CSOs fully exploiting the system. In order to address the problem, the Government introduced the Single National Electronic Registry on National Legislation (ENER), in 2009 which aimed at achieving a higher level of citizens' and stakeholder engagement. (see Picture 3) It represents an electronic system where the drafting procedure of laws takes place. The system also represents an informative mechanism upon subscription, offering notifications to CSOs, chambers of commerce, business associations, and legal entities (Bojadzievska, 2015: 134-136).

The procedure is outlined in a Handbook on the manner of providing public consultations providing timely involvement of the stakeholders in the

law-making procedure[28]. The minimum consultation period is 10 days from the day of publication.

Today, on ENER, all comments received from stakeholders who took part in the consultation process are published right next to the web location of the posted legislative proposal. All citizens or stakeholders taking part in the consultation process can register on ENER and leave their comments. If the administrator from the ministry does not reply, the comment is automatically published after three days.

ENER is a modern tool providing any stakeholder with the opportunity of receiving notifications by e-mail whenever a new law is being created. If the user subscribed to follow a particular legislation, s/he will be notified each time amendments are posted for the respective legal act. The weakness of the system lies in its uneven implementation by the ministries. The practical use in terms of the full respect of the procedures varies even to this day.

The Ministry of Information Society and Administration in charge of ENER, released the new version of the system optimising the consultation procedure, on 25 December 2014. The system provides for simplified modules, as requested by the end users, with a very basic registration and manual for usage. The legislation is systemised according to the publications of the Official Journal of Republic of Macedonia, representing a user-friendly tool for search.

One of the biggest advantages of ENER is that it is now directly connected to the system of e-sessions (referring to e-government sessions). This means that a draft law cannot reach a government session unless the text had previously been published on ENER and open for consultations. (see Picture 4)

III. Civil Society Reflections

Despite the established possibility for online consultations, citizens' engagement remained a challenge. There was a lack of interest from civil servants in implementing the concept and creating better content on ENER and finally, there were no open results on the uniform application of ENER, which left space for the non-accountability of certain institutions. Being aware of the existing challenges, in 2011 the Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation (MCMS), is a CSO that developed the project "Government Mirror" (www.ogledalonavladata.mk). The aim of this intervention was to establish and implement a permanent system to track the openness of institutions and the involvement of citizens and CSOs in the decision making processes. "Government mirror" contributes towards increased the transparency and accountability of state institutions.

In the course of 2014, the practice of publishing weekly and monthly reports persisted, whereby 41 weekly and 8 monthly reports were published. The reports contained information on whether or not the requirement for a minimum of 10 days per consultation was being respected, and whether or not the necessary supporting documents that accompany the draft legislative proposal were also published. The final report for Government Mirror for 2014 was published in November by MCMS. The first part of the report is based on the results from a submitted questionnaire to 12 out of 15 ministries assessing the openness of institutions in the process of the preparation of 27 legislative acts. The second part of the Report shows the results of the monitoring as to whether the minimum requirements for consultations and the minimal length of the consultation period were met on ENER. As of June 2014 these reports were simultaneously published on the ENER portal (www.ener.gov.mk).

The publication of the results of a CSO organization on official government policymaking portal gives recognition to the CSO monitoring results that track the transparency and accountability of the state institutions.

IV. Political Commitment and Reforms in the Public Sector

Although Macedonian society is still regarded as a society in democratic transition, serious efforts have been made to develop and enhance the information society as a whole, striving to introduce a range of tools that can usefully be applied in democratic processes and institutions (Cvetanova, Pachovski, 2013, p. 135).

The process of opening legislation for consultations was part of the *Strategy for Reform of the Public Administration in Republic of Macedonia 2010-2015* (pp. 31-40)[29]. Similar to the UK case, the process of developing capacities to carry out the consultations was attributed to reforms in the public sector.

Open policy-making in Macedonia is a commitment under the *Open Government Partnership Action plan of 2012-2014*[30] *and 2014-2016*[31]. Macedonia declared its intention to join OGP in 2011.[32] As a result of the implementation of the first action plan to a commitment on participatory policy-making impacted upon the upgrading of the ENER system based on the feedback provided by the end users and civil society organisations. With the second Action plan a working group on each priority was set up, including the priority of open policy-making. Government institutions and CSOs were able to define their activities together.

Conclusion

This study has evaluated the digital platform for citizens' engagement in the process of open policy-making in the Republic of Macedonia as an EU candidate country on the one hand, and digital platforms in the United Kingdom and Finland as EU Member States on the other, whose platforms are based on the EU initiative for citizens' engagement. The open policy-making process was analyzed in all three counties from the following aspects: the legal basis, reforms in the public sector, tools that enable citizens' engagement and civil society reflections on the process. It should be emphasized that in this study the issue of open policy-making was analyzed from the perspective of the highest political level, in other words on a national level.

As the findings of the study suggest, all of the three countries concerned have a strong commitment to an open policy-making process and have established this process by certain legal instruments. In the UK it was the *Strategy for Civil Service Reform*, and in Finland it was amending the Constitutions and introducing a *Citizen's Act*. In the Republic of Macedonia the process of open policy-making was introduced with the *Strategy for Reform of the Public Administration in Republic of Macedonia 2010-2015* and resulted in amending the *Government Rules of Procedure*.

The research uncovered that in the UK and Macedonia the process of developing capacities to carry out consultations was attributed to reforms in the public sector. By contrast, in Finland no major public sector reforms were implemented, consequently the leadership of open policy-making in Finland remains in the hands of civil society.

According to our findings, all three countries embraced electronic tools to provide citizens' engagement in the policy-making process in a manner that would also facilitate that process. Also, the findings showed that in all three cases legitimacy is given to civil society organizations and the feedback they give has a strong impact on open policy-making.

The empirical findings of this study enhance our understanding of the importance of the open policy-making process as a precondition for the development of democratic processes and democratic institutions within society. Also, these findings provide a profound understanding of the relationship between digital platforms and citizens' engagement, as well as the Civil Service reform process, as the key elements in the open policy-making process.

However, despite the rapid rise in the use of digital technology among citizens and civil society organizations, there is little data available on the

impacts they have had on the political processes and institutions they are intended to influence in emerging democracies. Further research on this topic should be undertaken in order to investigate the use of digital technology among citizens and civil society organizations, as well as the impact they have had on the political processes and institutions in democratic societies.

Endnotes

1 http://europa.eu/eu-law/have-your-say/index_en.htm#toc_2

2 http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiave/public/welcome?lg=en

3 Ministry of Justice of Finland, http://oikeusministerio.fi/en/index/currentissues/tiedotteet/2012/01/kansalaisaloitekay ttoonmaaliskuunalusta.html

4 https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120302/09015117948/finnish-act-lets-public-send-bills-to-parliament-volunteer-group-makes-it-easy.shtml, Politics by Leigh Beadon, Mar 9th 2012

5 http://openministry.info/

6 http://yle.fi/uutiset/all_six_citizens_initiatives_have_failed__activists_accuse_ parliament_of_intentionally_slowing_the_process/7525779

7 http://openministry.info/

8 http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/finland

9 http://www.hare.vn.fi/upload/Asiakirjat/18747/ 218731811837451.PDF

10 http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Civil-Service-Reform-Plan-acc-final.pdf The Civil Service Reform Plan, Chapter 2 – Improving policy making capability (page 14-15)

11 https://openpolicy.blog.gov.uk/

12 https://openpolicy.blog.gov.uk/what-is-open-policy-making/

13 https://openpolicy.blog.gov.uk/moderation-policy/

14 http://www.demsoc.org/about/

15 http://www.demsoc.org/deme/open-policymaking/

16 http://www.involve.org.uk/about-involve/

17 http://www.involve.org.uk/blog/2013/06/03/citizen-engagement-as-an-act-of-leadership/

18 https://openpolicy.blog.gov.uk/2015/03/17/a-new-operating-model-for-government/

19 The Civil Service Reform Plan, (page 9)

20 https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/creating-an-exceptional-civil-service-less-bureaucratic-and-more-skilled-digital-and-unified

21 https://openpolicy.blog.gov.uk/tools-and-techniques/

22 http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/united-kingdom

23 http://www.opengovernment.org.uk/about/

24 http://www.opengovernment.org.uk/all-political-parties-must-commit-to-open-government-joint-letter/

25 http://kushnirs.org/macroeconomics/gdp/gdp_macedonia.html (last visited 30.03.2015)

26 Службен весник на РМ бр.36 од 17.03.2008 година

27 http://www.ener.gov.mk/UserManual/manual.pdf

28 https://ener.gov.mk/UserFiles/File/info/Priracnik_za_JA_mk.pdf

29 http://mioa.gov.mk/files/pdf/dokumenti/Strategija_zaRJA.pdf

30 http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/macedonia/action-plan

31 http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/macedonia/action-plan

32 http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/macedonia

References

Бојаџиевска, И. (2015). *До Демократско и транспарентно владеење преку е-влада.* Институт за економски стратегии и меѓународни односи: Охрид – Скопје.

Cvetanova, G. Pachovski, V. (2013). E-democracy Strategy in the Republic of Macedonia in the context of e-democracy strategies in EU Member States. In Dodovski, I., Pendarovski, S., Petrovska, I. and Hudson, R. *Out of the Crisis: EU Economic and Social Policies Reconsidered*. Skopje> University American College Skopje. Retrieved from http://www.uacs.edu.mk/Conference/userfiles/files/2013%20conference%20volume%20Out%20of%20the%20Crisis%20%20EU%20Economic%20and%20Social%20Policies%20Reconsidered.pdf.

Burall, S. Hughes, and T. Stilgoe, J. (2013). Experts, publics and open policy-making: Opening the windows and doors of Whitehall. *Sciencewise*. Retrieved from http://www.sciencewise-erc.org.uk/cms/assets/Uploads/Experts-publics-and-open-policyFINAL-VERSION.pdf.

All six citizen's initiatives have failed – activists accuse Parliament of intentionally slowing the process, (2014, October 13). UUTISET. Retrieved from http://yle.fi/uutiset/all_six_citizens_initiatives_have_failed__activists_accuse_parliament_of_intentionally_slowing_the_process/7525779 (last visited on April 1, 2015).

NDI. (2013). *Citizen, Participation and Technology.* Retrieved from https://www.ndi.org/files/Citizen-Participation-and-Technology-an-NDI-Study.pdf/.

OECD. (2003). Promise and problems of e-democracy: Challenges of online citizen engagement. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/11/35176328.pdf/.

Caldow, J. (2004). e-Democracy: Putting down global roots Institute for Electronic Government. IBM. Retrieved from http://www-01.ibm.com/industries/government/ieg/pdf/e-democracy%20putting%20down%20roots.pdf.

Action Plan on Open Government Partnership (First Action Plan, 2012-2013). Retrieved from http://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/legacy_files/country_action_plans/Macedonia_OGP_AP_1.pdf.

Action Plan on Open Government Partnership (Second Action Plan, 2014-2016). Retrieved from http://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/Macedonia%20OGP%20ACTION%20PLAN%202014-2016.pdf.

Кориснички Прирачник за ЕНЕР. Retrieved from http://www.ener.gov.mk/UserManual/manual.pdf

Стратегија за реформа на јавната администрација во Република Македонија (2010-2015 година). Retrieved from http://mioa.gov.mk/files/pdf/dokumenti/Strategija_zaRJA.pdf.

Figures

Picture 1: Open ministry association in Finland

Figure 1: Number of Open consultations in UK per year

Picture 2: Open consultations in UK – overview of all publications

Ganka Cvetanova, Veno Pachovski, Irena Bojadzievska:
The Engagement Initiative of EU Citizens and Digital Platforms for Open Policy Making

Picture 3: Open consultations in Republic of Macedonia (Home page of the ENER portal)

Source: https://ener.gov.mk/default.aspx?item=analysis (copied on April 1, 2015)
Picture 4: Results of citizen activities on ENER

173

Nikola Radunović: Wireless Montenegro: A Free Internet Service for Citizens
or Just a Government Project toward the European Union Accession Process?

Wireless Montenegro: A Free Internet Service for Citizens or Just a Government Project toward the European Union Accession Process?

Nikola Radunović

Abstract

As part of Montenegro's path towards accession to the European Union, the progress of the state administration is reflected through the negotiation process in 33 chapters. One of the most important chapters is on Information Society and Media, which among other things seeks to raise transparency, political participation and social inclusion. The authorities are working on the improvement and promotion of the information society in Montenegro, and are trying to enable citizens to use ICT in order to achieve certain rights similar to those of developed European countries. The recently launched project, Wireless Montenegro, aims to enable all citizens free wireless Internet and thereby access to various electronic services that have been imposed as part of the negotiation process. Is "Wireless Montenegro" just another project that needs to simulate the real commitment of the government to promote a democratic environment and reduce social exclusion, or is it an honest and well-envisaged project? To illustrate the situation in the Montenegrin towns, we used quantitative analysis. We have compared the situation with neighbouring Croatia which is now an EU member state, concerning the number of connections to free wireless networks, the number of access points and the dynamics of development, as well as plans for the expansion of the project. Together with the results of a survey of Montenegrin citizens and a qualitative analysis of the socio-economic environment and the complex political reality, it was concluded that Wireless Montenegro represents yet another project which failed in its function. Explaining the potential reasons why the state administration is not more committed to fostering an ICT environment, recommendations were offered to accelerate the achievement of European objectives and the development of e-democracy.

Keywords: Wireless Montenegro, negotiations, European Union, e-democracy, participation.

Introduction

Montenegro became a candidate country for membership of the European Union (EU) in December 2010. In mid-2012, negotiations began with the EU bodies with the aim Montenegro reaching the level of development, standards and practices of other EU member states at the moment of accession to this community. Negotiations are organized through 33 different chapters, but the main focus is on the rule of law, and fighting against organized crime and corruption. In this regard, in order to increase transparency, one of the most important chapters that was opened at a conference in Brussels in March 2014 is "Information society and media". Engaging citizens through digital media includes enhancing active participation in law-making, policy-making and legislative processes (Caldow, 2004). Although it was noticed that Montenegro has reached a good level of compliance with the EU acquis in the field of electronic communications, information society, and audio-visual policy, it still does not recognize sufficient transparency of state bodies and local governments (Radunović, 2015b), nor the involvement of citizens in decision-making. Throughout the *Comparative Project on Local e-democracy Initiatives in Europe and North America* (Peart & Diaz, 2007), we need e-democracy initiatives for a democratic process which should enhance transparency, participation and deliberation. However, the situation in Montenegro is now much better than in previous years, and a series of legislative acts that regulate the field of e-governance, the use of electronic documents, and electronic signatures, has already been adopted. The national team for incident management on the Internet (CIRT) has been formed, alongside the establishment of portal www.euprava.me, which offers electronic services to citizens and companies within the jurisdiction of public administration. At the same time, the Laws on Electronic Communications, Postal Services, Electronic Administration and other areas, were passed on the basis of the guidelines of European officials. However, Montenegro shows, as in other areas, that the main problem is not non-existent or poor legislation, but the non-implementation of legal provisions in practice. That is why the EU insists that the government finally has to demonstrate that the laws are respected, and that any breach of the law must carry the proper punishment. However, to date there are still no final verdicts on political assassinations, corruption and organized crime. The media is dealing with these problems on a daily basis, and they have also become a target, because we have frequent attacks on journalists and their property (Dan on-line, 2015). In order to enable citizens to participate in decision-making, to communicate with

administration and to achieve their rights more easily, it seems that the Montenegrin authorities are constantly working on improving the environment when Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) come into question. The question is whether or not there really is a genuine effort to provide the kind of services for citizens that are already available in developed democracies (Peart & Diaz, 2007), or, as in some other areas, it is just a performance for the officials of the European Union, and material which just formally serves to improve the tone of reports in the accession process? In the *Handbook on e-democracy*, Reinsalu (2010) points out that e-participation is a necessary component or even, more precisely, a prerequisite of democracy. One of the biggest steps forward so far for the development of the Information Society in Montenegro, which aims to offer free Internet to all citizens, and to create preconditions for easier communication with the public administration, is the project "Wireless Montenegro", which the citizens of Montenegro have perceived in different ways. How this project has been developed; what is comparative practice is like in Croatia; and, how this service is used and perceived by Montenegrin citizens, form some of the questions examined in this paper.

Free Internet for Citizens - the Intention or the Pressure of the EU?

Immediately after 2010 when Montenegro became a candidate country for membership of the EU, the Montenegrin government became aware of the obligations that had to do more with satisfying the public interest. One of the identified activities in this regard was an attempt to provide efficient communication services for the security and emergency services in Montenegro. To develop such a service, the Government made a public-private partnership with an Austrian investor EOSS Industries Holding, and formed a company "Wireless Montenegro". That new radio network developed for the security services and government bodies, started to operate in November 2012. In early 2013, after negotiations with the EU had started, the government changed its decision, and announced its intention to provide a free Internet service for all citizens through project "Wireless Montenegro" (Hadžalić, 2013). Although initially the project had been developed only for certain state institutions (Kalač, 2011).

An exquisitely formed action, especially for the socially vulnerable and those who can't afford the luxury of the Internet in the 21st century, was then announced by the Ministry for Information Society and

Telecommunications (MIDT). But how much has been carried out so far? The project was implemented only in 8 cities: Podgorica, Budva, Nikšić, Bar, Kotor, Bijelo Polje, Tivat and Pljevlja. In the official report of the Ministry for 2014, it was written that: "Wireless Internet connection is provided at 40 locations in 10 cities in Montenegro" (MIDT, 2015a), while on the official website of the MIDT, we have information that it is provided in only 8 cities - missing off Žabljak and Berane (MIDT, 2015b). At the same time, on the official website of the company. "Wireless Montenegro" which is implementing the project together with the Government, we have information that the signal covers 9 cities (Wireless Montenegro, 2015), where the centre of Berane is added to the above list, but there is no Žabljak municipality! Which of the following pieces of information is correct - 8, 9 or 10 cities? The largest number of access points (AP) is set in the capital city of Podgorica -with a total of 14 locations, while in the municipality of Tivat, signal covers only one location – the Airport. According to the available data, very small areas are covered by an Internet signal in Pljevlja, Bijelo Polje and Kotor.

However, it should be noted that some of the local government areas, which are not envisaged by the "Wireless Montenegro" project, have already been independently provided with free wireless Internet in some parts of their cities. Such services exist in Cetinje, Budva, Tivat, Berane, Pljevlja, Bijelo Polje and Podgorica, but it is still a different network with different characteristics and qualities of service.

The dynamics of the development and dissemination of the "Wireless Montenegro" project obviously have not been carried out satisfactory throughout Montenegro. This is obvious if one takes into account that since the project was first launched and up until February 2014, it was not possible to connect up to the network "Free Montenegro" except in Podgorica and Budva. By the end of 2014, the network had spread to 6 (or 7) other cities with insufficient access points, and this would appear to be so without any proper advertisement. Throughout this project, people can use only some of the basic and undemanding services, and if we know that there is not a large number of locations where the service can be used, the question arises to whom is the service being aimed at? The point becomes clearer when one looks at MIDT's Report for 2014 where it is clearly stated that the priorities and all activities are mainly carried out in order to meet the negotiating processes with the EU. Thus, it is explicitly stated that:

"The portal of electronic government, which represents the electronic counter for access administration at the state and local level, at the end of 2014

offers a total of 77 on-line services. In this context, as the most important activities of the Ministry in the past year, we emphasize the following:

       • The opening of negotiations for the chapter 10 "Information society and media";

       • The implementation of obligations on the agenda of the Government as a percentage of 92.9% ... (MIDT, 2015a: 4)

       This clearly indicates that the priority is on meeting the expectations of European Commission officials. Of course, this does not mean that there is no will to provide well-being for citizens, but it is obvious that it represents only a consequence, and not a cause of action.

       In a country where a large number of citizens do not have any decent economic and social status, it seems that for many of them this project makes little sense and is not really of any significance. This is because a prerequisite to use this service is to have the time and inclination to look for locations where the service is actually available, then to go there, and to be in possession of some of the portable devices that can gain access to the wireless Internet! According to Mahrer and Krimmer (2005) e-democracy is not just about technology but also impacts on every aspect of any organization that is involved in the process. Paradoxically, this project will obviously have a very small effect on socially disadvantaged and marginalized groups, that is, for those who might be in the most need of such service.

So Close and yet So Far

       In order to strengthen its capacity and to develop the necessary ICT services and infrastructure for raising transparency, and to be able to effectively deliver some services to their citizens, through the process of accession, the EU has enabled Montenegro to use pre-accession funds as well as the knowledge and practice of the developed EU countries (MIDT, 2013). The Montenegrin authorities were given the opportunity to collaborate, among others, with colleagues from Estonia, at the elections held in March 2015 when more than 176,000 people had voted electronically! Also, they have been cooperating with the Italians, whose government introduced a free WiFi with more than 3,000 AP across the country (Free Italia WiFi, 2014). However, when it comes to WiFi Internet, the United Kingdom is in front of others on this issue with over 5 million installed AP. Finland has declared the Internet to be a human right, and has set the minimum speed of Internet access, and so has Spain. Croatia joined them on

I January2015, and its "Universal Service Operator" must ensure that a minimum access speed to the Internet is at least 1 Mbps, for all users.

Since July 2013, neighbouring Croatia, has been a member of the EU. Anyone who follows developments in the Western Balkans, knows that Croatia together with Slovenia, is one of the countries of the former Yugoslavia, which has gone further than others when it comes to carrying out the practice and enforcing the standards of the developed democracies of Europe. In addition to guaranteed rights, Croatia has been working intensively on the development of a free Internet service for its citizens and visiting tourists. In that regard numerous electronic services have been developed in order to enable citizens to accomplish their rights quickly and efficiently, especially in terms of communication with local and state administrations.

Thus, for example, the city of Rijeka launched the free WiFi Internet for its citizens in June 2007. The signal was then released in a few locations in the city centre, but with 27 AP installed. The number of AP at the beginning of 2008 increased to 39, while the flow rate increased from 5 Mbps to 10 Mbps. During that period the number of daily connections increased from an initial 173/day on average, to 480/day, and the signal strength was around 50db (Petrak, 2009). Taking into account the signal strength with respect to the size of the coverage area, this WiFi zone seemed to be of the highest quality in Croatia (Lokal Patrioti Rijeka-Fiume, 2012). After the first year of using this service, the number of average connections was 748/day, and after two years that number rose to approximately 1,500 connections per day (Grad Rijeka, 2014). The city was further developing the service and covered almost all frequent locations, so that the total number of AP increased to 95, with the maximum number of 5,400 users who can simultaneously use free WiFi. At the same time, the flow of the wireless Internet access increased to 50 Mbps.

Following the practice of the city of Rijeka, Croatia soon realized the advantages of the free WiFi in every sense, and decided to introduce an expansion of that system. Through the project "Hotspot Croatia", in mid-2014, the Ministry of Tourism has installed 270 AP in various cities, and announced that by the end of that year the number of AP will exceed 500 (Kako na web, 2014).

Research Methodology

This study was conducted on a sample of 400 respondents. I have interviewed citizens in Podgorica, Budva and Nikšić as the cities with the largest

number of installed access points. Those cities represent all three regions in Montenegro, with a total population of 623,000 people according to 2011 census. In the capital city of Podgorica with 180,000 people, where the highest number of sites is covered by the free WiFi signal, the sample was 250 people. In Nikšić, municipality with about 56,000 citizens in the city itself, the sample was 100 people. In Budva with around 19,000 inhabitants, 50 people were interviewed. The survey was conducted in 2014 as follows: in Podgorica on November 23 and 24, in Nikšić on November 28, in Budva on November 30. There was a total of 237 men (59.25% of the total sample) and 163 women (40.75%), aged 15-70 years. The sample included 96 citizens of age 15-25 years (24%), 192 of age 25-45 years (48%), 76 of age 45-60 years (19%) and 36 of age 60-70 years (9%), (Figure 1). Among them, there were 140 high school or faculty students (35%), 212 employed persons (53%) and 48 unemployed (12%) including 20 pensioners (5%). In the total sample, 212 respondents have completed high school (53%), 144 have completed university education (36%), while 44 have completed primary school or are currently attending high school (11%). Respondents answered the following questions:

1. Do you have a smart phone, laptop or tablet you can use to access the Internet? (Offered answers: Yes, No);

2. Are you familiar with the project "Wireless Montenegro" and have you used the free web "Free Montenegro"? (Offered answers: I am familiar with it and I have used the service, I am familiar with it but I haven't used the service, I am not familiar with it but I have used the service (this particular answer was offered since there were a number of people who have been using this free wi-fi service, but they hadn't heard anything about the project "Wireless Montenegro"), I am not familiar with it and I have never used the service);

3. How many times have you used the free WiFi signal "Free Montenegro" and are you satisfied with the quality of service (acquired speed connections, flow and method of use of the service)? (Offered answers: I used it up to 10 times, I used it up to 50 times, I used it over 50 times; I am satisfied with the quality of service, I am not satisfied with the quality of service);

4. Have you used network "Free Montenegro" for communication with some state or local authority, and how many times? (Offered answers: Yes, I have - once, up to 10 times, more than 10 times; No, I have not);

5. Do you know on which sites free WiFi "Free Montenegro" can be used and are you willing to go to those locations only for using free Internet? (Offered answers: I know some sites, I don't know any of the sites; I would go to the site to use free Internet, I wouldn't go to the site to use free Internet);

6. Do you feel that the state is doing enough to facilitate access to free wireless Internet? (Offered answers: Yes, No, I am not sure);

7. Do you believe that the free WiFi provide by the government is connected with the process of accession to the European Union and, if so, in what way? (Offered answers: I believe that is associated with the accession to the EU–The state wants to please its citizens, the state wants to please the representatives of the EU, something else ...; I believe that is not related to the EU accession process; I am not sure);

8. Do you recommend your friends to use this service? (Offered answers: Yes, No, Occasionally);

Interviews were conducted on the streets, in direct communication with respondents, and with 200 of them, at locations where it the free wireless signal "Free Montenegro" was available, and with the rest of the 200 respondents at locations where there was no signal nor any AP. Part of the respondents who answered that they didn't use the network "Free Montenegro", were not responding to questions about the quality of the network and about the usage of the service for communications with some administrative authority (questions 3 and 4).

The results that were obtained were analysed together with the collected data on the number of sites and the number of access points in the cities, along with official documents from the Government of Montenegro in the context of accession negotiations. Also, I have used a comparative analysis with data gathered from Croatia.

Research Results

The largest number of APs and locations where it is possible to use the free wireless Internet "Free Montenegro", are located in Podgorica and Budva, where the project had been initiated. In Nikšić, the service became available at the end of February 2014. It is interesting to note that just ten days after Nikšić gained this service, the Ministry for Information Society and Telecommunications announced that the number of previously generated connections crossed the 1.1 million mark (Kodex, 2014). Only two months previously, at the end of 2013, the same Ministry stated that the number of connections was 300,000 (MINA business, 2014) with an almost identical number of available APs. It is interesting that, according to the data made available at that time, the largest number of connections, almost one fifth of the

total, was realized within the Clinical Center in Podgorica, and then followed by the faculty buildings and airports (MIDT, 2014). The yearly report of MIDT for 2014, states that the actual number of connections by the end of 2014 was 14,000,000. It is unclear why the same report, only a few pages further on, noted that 27,268,239 connections had been accomplished. (MIDT, 2015a: 19). But if we consider for instance, that in the city of Rijeka in Croatia, with 128,000 inhabitants, a total of 2,000 connections were achieved per day on an average basis, which is annually around 700,000 connections, it turns out that the percentage of Montenegrins who use free Internet is much more than that of the Croats. This data can be interpreted from different perspectives. First, we should bear in mind that mobile operators in Croatia from an earlier time have offered the Internet at very affordable prices with corresponding packages. Then, a large number of cafes and restaurants also offer a free Internet service in order to attract visitors. Additionally, the fact that Montenegrins are still at the top of the statistics in Europe when it comes to the use of mobile phones with 178 subscribers per 100 inhabitants, while Croats have 113 mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants, it becomes clearer that perhaps the need of Montenegrins to possess mobile phones affects a large number of connections (Bljesak, 2013). In addition, the financial situation in Montenegro is far worse than in Croatia, with the monthly average salary in Croatia amounted to being around € 730 in mid-2014, while in Montenegro was €473 (Vijesti online, 2014).

However, it is important for us to see the perception of citizens regarding the Government's intention of developing the project "Wireless Montenegro": Was it meant for citizens and to increase efficiency and transparency, or was its purpose just to please the EU officials? Out of the total of 400 citizens surveyed, 63 of them (15.7%) responded that they did not have a laptop, tablet or smart phone for WiFi access. Among the remaining 337 respondents, 212 (53%) responded that they were familiar with the project "Wireless Montenegro" and that they had been using that service (Figure 2). Although, the number of those who had never heard of the service was105 (26.5%), assuming that neither of those 63 people, who don't have a device for WiFi, have not heard of the service, the number of the uninformed would increase to 168, which represents 42% of the total sample. However, we have as well to factor in those who have declared that they are not familiar with the project, but that they have used the network "Free Montenegro" - their number is 13 (3.25% of the sample), and 7 respondents stated that they are familiar with it, but they have not used that service (1.75%).

Out of the 225 respondents who have used the service (Figure 3a), 113 were from Podgorica, 75 from Nikšić and 37 from Budva.

When asked how many times they used the service and whether or not they were satisfied with its quality, 47 respondents claimed to have used the service up to 10 times (11.75% of the total sample), the service was used up to 50 times by 118 respondents (29.5%), while the remaining 60 users accomplished connections more than 50 times (15%) (Figure 4). Interestingly, out of 225 who have used the service, 192 users were satisfied with the quality of the service, which is about 85% of all users (or 48% of the total sample), while the number of those who were dissatisfied was 33, which is almost 15% of users (8.25% of the total sample) (Figure 3b).

A very interesting fact for us is that only 13 respondents answered that they have used the network "Free Montenegro" to communicate with any state or local government authorities (3.25% of the total sample), and in each case they did it only once (Figure 5).

More than half of the respondents, 212, answered that they know where some sites with free Internet are (53%), but only 27 of them would be willing to go to some location in case they needed the Internet (6.75%).

It is interesting that only 42 respondents felt that the Government was doing enough to provide free Internet for the citizens of Montenegro (10.5%), while 149 of them were not sure (37.25%). The remaining 209 are not satisfied with the government's efforts in this field (52.25%) (Figure 6). Among the 42 who were satisfied, 34 respondents were not employed or were retired, which seems very strange, especially if one considers that among them, there are 25 participants who have not tried this service at all (Figure 7). Apparently, most of those who have been using the service and are familiar with the project "Wireless Montenegro", think the Government could do much more than at present- only 17 respondents which are service users, were satisfied with the efforts and activities of the state about the free WiFi (4.25% of the total sample)!

Out of 400, 288 respondents (72%) consider that the free Internet service totally caught up in the process of accession to the EU, while 100 respondents (25%) do not perceive this. Only 12 of the respondents (3%) were not sure (Figure 8). It is interesting that among those 288 who see a connection with the accession process, 144 respondents were those who have a higher or university education. Also, 173 respondents believe that the primary objective of this project is to satisfy EU officials (43.25%), while 112 respondents considered that service is because of the needs of the citizens (28%). The rest of the respondents, 115 (28.75%), had different attitudes (Figure 9).

A total of 325 respondents (81.25%) recommend this service to their friends and acquaintances, which is interesting if we know that some of them were not familiar with the project "Wireless Montenegro", or had not even got a device for accessing WiFi. Obviously, anyone who is familiar with the project also recommends this service, while it is understandable that some of the respondents who did not know about the project, could not recommend it (18.75% of the sample).

Conclusions

Research in Podgorica, Budva and Nikšić, was conducted on a sample of 400 respondents. The results show that over 81% of respondents support the government's efforts to develop the service, and they recommend this service to others. However, only 4.25% of total respondents who have used the service consider that the government is doing enough to develop this service, which indicates some dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. The results show that only about 56% of the respondents have used the service and that among them are some users who didn't know anything about the project. That fact alone supports the thesis that the government simply has not done enough regarding the promotion of the project. On the official website of the city of Bar, it is written that this project was initiated because the requirement is being put in front of Montenegro on its path to EU and NATO accession (Opština Bar, 2014). On the MIDT's website there is a section dedicated to this project, but other than a few appearances in the media, officials of the Ministry have simply not s promoted this project significantly enough. On the quality of this service, 85% of those who used it are satisfied. While the idea of the Montenegrin authorities with regard to this project is to allow free WiFi to all citizens, neighbouring Croatia has recognized the potential of free WiFi for developing its tourism. Croats placed around 500 APs for free Internet, whilst the Montenegrins placed only 40. If we compare Podgorica with its 186,000 inhabitants and only 15 APs, with Rijeka in Croatia where 123,000 people live and where 95 Aps have been set up (Figure 10), it becomes clear that the Montenegrin authorities have a lot more to do, in order to reach the level of the standards of their EU neighbours. However, in each of the plans, strategies and reports, the relevant Ministry stated that this project was designed with the aim of involving citizens in the information society, and for the improvement of electronic communication between citizens and administrations. Regardless of this, the results of this survey have demonstrated that only about 3% of

respondents have actually used the network "Free Montenegro" to communicate with the state or local government. Each of them did it only once, so it is clear that this service will not be used for intensive communication between citizens and the administrations in the near future. Whether the reason for this is the lack of adequate electronic services offered by the government or something else, a possible cause could be sought in the perception of citizens about what the goal of the Montenegrin government with "Wireless Montenegro" actually was. Citizens obviously do not believe that the government's intention regarding the project, was aimed at the benefit of the citizens, asover 70% of them declared that the project "Wireless Montenegro" only exists because of the EU accession process. We have the same percentage of those who believe that this project aims to satisfy the EU officials or some personal interests of certain politicians. Only 28% of respondents believe that the service is meant for the general population, which implies that citizens in general believe that the government is working under pressure from the EU. If it is known that the majority of citizens want to join the EU only because of the fact that they want a democratic society with the rule of law, a transparent and uncorrupted government, it is understandable why the certain percentage of citizens simultaneously support the government's intention to develop this service.

EU officials require the Montenegrin authorities to significantly reduce the number of employees in public administrations. The research that has been conducted indicates that the delay in this process, which is generated by social and political reasons, is one of the potential causes why the administration is not more committed to fostering an ICT environment (Radunović, 2015a). In order to have the project "Wireless Montenegro" functioning and to be recognized as a sincere intention of the authorities with the aim of involving citizens in the information society, and to give them the possibility of using electronic communication with the administration, the government obviously needs to change its approach. Thus, if the government succeeds in pleasing its citizens, then the EU requirement will be accomplished as well.

References

Bljesak. (2013, September 16). 9. u svijetu - Najviše mobitela u regiji imaju Crnogorci. Retrieved from http://www.bljesak.info/rubrika/sci-tech/clanak/najvise-mobitela-u-regiji-imaju-crnogorci/24 01/ispis

Caldow, J. (2004). *e-Democracy: Putting Down Global Roots*. Institute for Electronic Government, IBM.

Dan on-line. (2015, January 15). Mediji na udaru politike i kriminala. Retrieved from http://www.dan.co.me/?nivo=3&rubrika=Drustvo&datum=2015-01-23&clanak=472743

Free Italia WiFi. (2014). *Fundamental principles of Free ItaliaWiFi.* Retrieved from http://fiwen.provincia.roma.it/fundamental-principles

Grad Rijeka. (2014, July 9). Besplatni bežični pristup internetu. Retrieved from http://www.rijeka.hr/wireless

Hadžalić, V. (2013). Wireless Montenegro: Traži se model za besplatni internet za građane. *Pobjeda.* Retrieved from http://www.pobjeda.me/2013/02/17/trazi-se-model-za-besplatni-internet/#.UuQIiBA1hdg

Kako na web. (2014). e-Turizam: Bežični pristup internetu kao svakodnevna ponuda = zadovoljniji gosti. Retrieved from http://kakonaweb.tportal.hr/e-turizam-bezicni-pristup-internetu-zadovoljniji-gosti/

Kalač, D. (2011). Infofest: Osnovana kompanija Wireless Montenegro. *Vijesti online*. Retrieved from http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/infofest-osnovana-kompanija-wireless-montenegro-clanak-40710

Kodex. (2014, February 26). U Crnoj Gori registrovano preko milion konekcija besplatnog bežičnog interneta. Retrieved from http://kodex.me/clanak/45088/u-crnoj-gori-registrovano-preko-milion-konekcija-besplatnog-bezicnog-interneta

Lokal Patrioti Rijeka-Fiume. (2012, April 14). Besplatni bežični pristup internetu u Rijeci. Retrieved from: http://www.lokalpatrioti-rijeka.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=1896&f=26

Mahrer, H. and Krimmer, R. (2005). *Information Systems Journal,* 15, 27-42.

MIDT. (2013). *Izvještaj o radu za 2013. godinu.* Retrieved from http://www.mid.gov.me/ ResourceManager/FileDownload.aspx?rid=127159&rType=2&file=izvjestaj%20o%20radu %20za%202012%20godinu-konacna%20verzija.pdf

MIDT. (2014, February 26). *Registrovano preko milion konekcija besplatnog bežičnog interneta.* Retrieved from http://www.gov.me/pretraga/135902/Registrovano-preko-milion-konekcija-besplatnog-bezicnog-interneta.html

MIDT. (2015a). *Izvještaj o radu za 2014. godinu.* Retrieved from http://www.gov.me/Resource Manager/FileDownload.aspx?rId=191348&rType=2

MIDT. (2015b).*WiFi FREE MONTENEGRO.* Retrieved from http://www.mid.gov.me/rubrike /Free_WiFi/

MINA business. (2013, December 18).*WiFi signal za još nekoliko lokacija u Podgorici i Budvi.* Retrieved fromhttp://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/wifi-signal-za-jos-nekoliko-lokacija-u-podgorici-i-budvi-166916

Opština Bar. (2014, April 2). Besplatan bežični internet u Baru. Retrieved from http://www.bar.me/index.php?action=article&aid=1750&gid=71&id= 72

Peart, M. N. and Diaz, R. M. (2007). *Comparative Project on Local e-Democracy Initiatives in Europe and North America.* University of Geneve.

Petrak, A. (2009). Deveterostruko veći broj korisnika bežičnog interneta.Retrieved from http://www.rijeka.hr/fgs.axd?id=33328.

Radunović, N. (2015a). Political will as a potential obstacle for using electronic government in Montenegro. In *The Role of Media in Normalizing Relations in the Western Balkans* (pp. 67-80). Novi Sad: Filozofski fakultet.

Radunović, N. (2015b). Right to know - Media landscape, regulation and media practice of public administration in Montenegro on the way to the European Union*.* In *Kultura i etika u medijima*. Kikinda: UG Medijski istraživački tim.

Reinsalu, K. (2010). *Handbook on E-democracy*. EPACE Project.

Vijesti online (2014, September 23). Crnogorska prosječna plata iza slovenačke i hrvatske, ispred srpske i makedonske. Retrieved from http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/crnogorska-prosjecna-plata-iza-slovenacke-i-hrvatske-ispred-srpske-i-makedonske-797064

Wireless Montenegro. (2015). Broadband. Retrieved from http://www.wirelessmontenegro. com/index.php/me/broadband.html

Nikola Radunović: Wireless Montenegro: A Free Internet Service for Citizens
or Just a Government Project toward the European Union Accession Process?

Figures


Figure 1. The age and number of survey respondents.

Figure 2. The number of respondents: who have used and have known about the service; who do not know about the service; who do not have any device for using "Free Montenegro" service.

Figure 3.a) The number of respondents who have used the service; b) The number of users who were satisfied with the service.

Nikola Radunović: Wireless Montenegro: A Free Internet Service for Citizens
or Just a Government Project toward the European Union Accession Process?

Figure 4. How many times users have been connected to the WiFi network "Free Montenegro"

Figure 5. The number of respondents who have used the service for communications with some of public administration bodies.

Figure 6. The number of respondents who are satisfied with the Government's efforts in improving free WiFi services for citizens.

Figure 7. Those who are among the satisfied respondents with Government's effort on improving free WiFi service "Wireless Montenegro".

Nikola Radunović: Wireless Montenegro: A Free Internet Service for Citizens
or Just a Government Project toward the European Union Accession Process?

Figure 8. The number of respondents who see/do not see any connection between project "Wireless Montenegro" and the EU accession process.

Figure 9. What respondents consider the project is about: for citizens; for satisfying EU officials; something else

Figure 10. A comparative overview of the number of citizens and the number of access points for free WiFi: The cities of Rijeka and Podgorica, and the countries of Croatia and Montenegro.

Legal Europe and Beyond: From Transition to Integration through Legislation and Practice

195

Krum Efremov, Jasmina Majstoroska, Ilijana Petrovska:
The South East Europe 2020 Strategy – Integration through Trade and Investment

The South East Europe 2020 Strategy – Integration through Trade and Investment

Krum Efremov, Jasmina Majstoroska, Ilijana Petrovska

Abstract

The topic of this research is a deeper analysis and comparison of one of the pillars of the South East Europe (SEE) 2020 Strategy - SEE 2020 Strategy: Jobs and Prosperity in a European Perspective. The SEE 2020 as a regional strategy is inspired and based on EU 2020 principles, reflecting the commitment and determination of all governments in South Eastern Europe for achieving a higher level of socioeconomic growth and facilitates integration within the EU. The SEE 2020 Strategy, especially the Integrated growth pillar focuses on increased regional trade and investment flows, by strengthening cooperation and creating transparent national policies. In order to reach these targets, as well as the creation of new jobs and prosperity, key importance is placed on increased regional trade and investments that actually increase the competitiveness and integration of the region on a European and global level. The main research question of this chapter is the level and the dimension of the implementation of trade and investment integration targets in South East European countries, with the aim of increasing intra-regional trade in goods by more than 140% and increasing the overall FDI annual inflow to the region by at least 160%. The research methodology for this chapter is a comparative analysis of quantitative data and a review of the official reports and scientific articles published last year. The authors will provide an updated overview of the situation in South East European countries with a critical analysis of different respective actions and projects needed if the SEE 2020 targets are to be achieved for the Integrated Growth Pillar. This work will add value to research in the area of trade and investments and will provide important recommendations for the further activities of policy makers.

Keywords: South East Europe 2020 Strategy, trade, investment, economic growth, competitiveness, integrated growth.

Introduction - SEE 2020 Joint Vision of the Region

Seven South East European countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia) under the auspices of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) developed and adopted the South East Europe 2020 Strategy ('SEE 2020' or 'Strategy'), in November 2013. This ten year strategy is a document of commitment and interest for political and economic cooperation in the region in order to enable the economic growth of the countries concerned, as well confirming and emphasizing the importance that these countries attach to the European perspective. All countries are strongly linked with the European Union (EU) economy, not only geographically, but also economically they and they see their future within EU. (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-current-status/index_en. htm)

The Strategy was inspired by the EU's Europe 2020 Strategy, both in terms of the issues addressed and the concept of advancing progress through better cooperation of the region in areas that are of common interest. SEE 2020 is based on the same pillars as the Europe 2020 strategy: 1) Smart growth, 2) Sustainable growth 3) and Inclusive growth, with the inclusion of two more pillars: 4) Integrated growth and 5) Governance for growth due to South East European priorities (*EUROPE 2020 a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, EC, 2010). The SEE Strategy 2020 outlines a new approach and sets out a vision for a new development pathway that seeks to give fresh impetus to economic growth and development in the region as well as contributing to greater prosperity, the creation of more jobs and stronger ties with the EU, based on closer integrative links and common European values. The economies of South East Europe endorsed their own 2020 vision by adopting 11 regional and 77 national headline targets and charting out a comprehensive cooperation agenda.

According to Kersan-Skabic et al. (2009) regional cooperation is of major importance to the stability and development of this region, as well as becoming more competitive worldwide alongside the developed EU countries. The implementation of the SEE 2020 vision is headed by existing regional structures, such as CEFTA (the Central European Foreign Trade Agreement), SEEIC (the South East European Investment Committee), as well as on a national level with National Action Plans. After 2016 these will be integrated into the National Economic Reform Program (NERP). The NERP focuses on national structural reforms for long term growth and competitiveness, as well as keeping macroeconomic stability, fiscal sustainability and prosperity, aligned with national and regional strategic documents.

SEE 2020 Pillars and the Integrated Growth Pillar – Pillar 1

The adoption of the SEE 2020 Strategy is a significant step forward in a process aimed at the political and economic cooperation of the region. It pursues a holistic pattern of development for the region and seeks to stimulate the key long-term drivers of growth such as innovation, skills, FDI and the integration of trade. The projected activities should be achieved along the five following pillars (SEE 2020 Strategy, RCC 2010):

• Integrated growth: through the promotion of regional trade and investment linkages and policies that are non-discriminatory, transparent and predictable.

• Smart growth: by committing to innovating and competing on value-added rather than labor costs.

• Sustainable growth: by raising the level of competitiveness in the private sector, the development of infrastructure and encouraging greener and more energy-efficient growth.

• Inclusive growth: by placing greater emphasis on developing skills, creating employment, inclusive participation in the labor market and health and wellbeing.

• Governance for growth: by enhancing the capacity of public administration to strengthen the rule of law and reduce corruption, the creation of a business-friendly environment and the delivery of public services necessary for economic development.

The efficiency of the Strategy is closely related to a growth in trade, so four of the targets (as part of overall targets and within different pillars) demonstrate an increase in trade in different aspects as an indicator for the competitiveness, growth and prosperity of the region: Total trade in goods and services in millions of euros; Trade balance as a percentage of GDP; Intra regional trade in goods in millions of euros; Exports of goods and services per capita. The progress in all five pillars is required for SEE economies to reach the overall developmental goals presented in the strategy.

According to Strategy 2020, the capacity of the South East European economies to attain these ambitious headline targets is strongly influenced by the macro-economic context in which implementation takes place. One of the key pillars related to regional economic integration and economic growth is based on the expectations for increased trade in the region and the larger inflow of FDI. Within this pillar actions are promoted aimed at further development under the three following dimensions: a free trade area, a competitive economic

environment - increasing the competitiveness of the region as a destination of FDI, and integrating the region more fully into the European and global economy. The pillar has very ambitious headline targets, so by 2020 the region should achieve the following:

Increase South East European intraregional trade in goods by more than 140% (from 12459 mil. EUR, to 30500 mil. EUR)

Increase annual FDI to the region by at least 160% (from €3,396 million to €8,800 million)

Being among the SEE 2020 priorities and prerequisites for growth, the South East European region must establish a free and open investment regime by removing intra-regional investment barriers, facilitating the free flow of factors of production (goods, services, and human capital), pursue policies that support the attraction and inflow of FDI, as well as intra-regional investments, and promote the further integration of the regional markets. The removal of barriers to regional trade and investment offers the opportunity for economies of scale, geographically diversified businesses, and overall a more efficient allocation of resources within the regional markets.

On a concrete level, this means the potential for investor subsidiary networks, as firms seek efficiency gains through a fragmentation of their production processes by allocating individual segments of value addition in places of comparative economic advantage. The progressive liberalization of cross-border transactions reduces time and costs to trade and investment within a region. It fosters the development of regional value chains and leads to increased diversification and the sustainability of economic growth. The SEE Strategy 2020, is a prerequisite for better intraregional trade and higher attractiveness for investment in the Region.

CEFTA 2006 Importance towards SEE 2020 Implementation

The main goals of CEFTA 2006 are to increase the intra-regional trade and competitiveness of the region as a whole. CEFTA 2006 provides a comprehensive framework for the development of mutual relations and economic cooperation among the SEE countries and builds their competitiveness (Petreski, 2013). As the author has demonstrated, the effects from CEFTA 2006 are much larger and better than the effect of the previous Stabilization and Association Agreement. This conclusion is based on the fact that it encompasses a much larger number of issues than the individual bilateral agreements that had been regulating this area until recently, as well as the

original CEFTA agreement. The new opportunities for cooperation pertain to the following areas: trade in goods and services, investments, public procurement and the protection of intellectual procurement.

CEFTA 2006 opens up opportunities for the development of cooperation among its members, so as to achieve progressive liberalization and the mutual opening of their markets for preferential access. It also provides opportunities for initiating concrete negotiations for the liberalization of trade in services among members. CEFTA 2006 mandates that its members should encourage mutual investment initiatives through the promotion of the right kind of conditions and that they should facilitate administrative procedures in investment in order to create a transparent regional environment for investors. In this context, members are obliged to provide equitable treatment, as well as full protection and security for investments coming from other members,

The CEFTA Joint Committee has formally aligned the CEFTA agenda with that of the SEE 2020 Strategy. A number of other actions, particularly those relating to attracting investment are at a more preliminary stage of research and analysis, but they are very important for developing an increased level of intra-regional and global trade.

Results for Total and Intraregional Trade in Goods

The statistical data in Table 1 presents the total trade of South East European countries up to 2012/2013, showing a slower than expected convergence towards the 2020 targets. For example, the increase of total trade annually in the period 2010/2013 is performed by 7%; 1.5% and 2% annually, while the gap between the projections for 2020 in relation to 2013 is very large at 100%. The difference in the trend in the first three years of the implementation of Strategy SEE 2020 is difficult to realize.

Table 1: Total trade of goods of SEE countries

Eur.

million

Country	2010 baseline	2011	2012	2013	2020 target
Albania	7,695	8,154	7,596	7,498	1,7500
Bosnia and Herzegovina	12,138	11,418	11,323	11,609	24,500
Croatia	35,400	37,092	37,752	36,701	80,000
Kosovo	3,321	3,681	3,576	3,573	6,000
Macedonia	7,834	9,670	9,683	9,747	15,500
Montenegro	3,118	3,489	3,555	3,530	6,000
Serbia	24,907	27,557	29,093	32,004	60,000
Total	94,413	101,061	102,578	104,662	209,500
% of increase of total trade annually		+7	+1,5	+2	

Source: CEFTA intra-regional trade, http://www.cefta.int/statistics

This especially relates to trade indicators, given that around 14% of the total trade volume of South East European countries goes to intra-regional trade. In Table 2, intra-regional trade presents an increase in 2011, but then a slight decrease in 2012 and 2013, making the gap between the 2013 value and the 2020 target very large at 120%. Country-by-country comparison indicates that the 2020 targets are between 102% (Republic of Macedonia) and 170% (Serbia), higher than the 2012 values in all the other economies, with the exception of Montenegro, which has a modest 15% gap between 2012 and 2020 target.

Krum Efremov, Jasmina Majstoroska, Ilijana Petrovska:
The South East Europe 2020 Strategy – Integration through Trade and Investment

Table 2: Intra-regional trade of goods of SEE countries

Eur. million

Country	2010 baseline	2011	2012	2013	2020 target
Albania	425	509	533	497	1,150
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3,100	3,450	3,231	3,297	7,100
Croatia	2,474	2,809	3,004	2,860	6,200
Kosovo	872	955	946	853	2,000
Macedonia	1,243	1,452	1,336	1,239	2,700
Montenegro	800	1,003	1,040	984	1,200
Serbia	3,544	3,818	3,755	3,837	10,150
Total	12,458	13,996	13,845	13,567	30,500
% of increase/decrease of total trade annually		+12	-1	-2	

Source: CEFTA intra-regional trade, http://www.cefta.int/statistics

The main objectives for development are to enact specific steps to deepen the free trade area, to promote greater trade facilitation and to identify measures and actions that will improve the intra-regional trade and attractiveness of the region as a destination for foreign investment and therefore enhance its competitiveness. Mutual trade cooperation in the South East European countries can be further enhanced by the greater activity of business associations and chambers of commerce of the countries in order to improve the opportunities for bigger economic cooperation and increased intra-regional trade.

FDI as a Driver for Economic Growth

Attracting FDI is one of the key strategies and pillars for enabling economic growth. They contribute to the expansion of productive capacity, job creation, income growth, knowledge and technology diffusion, the inflow of new skills, enterprise development, and the diversification of exports. All countries, whatever their level of development and historical background, have to host inward-FDI to stay competitive. The countries from the South East European region identified attracting FDI as one of the key pillars in their development strategies. In general the level of FDI inflow into a country is an indicator that shows the attractiveness of its market, the favorability of its business environment, reforms that have been realized, political stability and the predictability of the economy, as well as the potential of the market for growth and access to other markets, the availability of attractive investment potentials and incentives that are offered, and the efficiency of the promotional activities in order to attract attention and convince investors to come and invest in the country.

Global competition for foreign investment is fierce, in addition to the competition between South East European countries. There are various motives for companies to engage in FDI, such as: seeking markets, seeking resources, seeking strategic assets, and seeking greater efficiency. . Foreign investments are coming into the region through the process of privatization especially in Bosnia and Serbia, where this process has still not been completed, as well as in the development of infrastructure projects, economic zones, and brown-field and green-field investments. Attracting FDI has been one of the key objectives of those governments which have transitional economies throughout the course of the transition. They therefore put in place regulatory frameworks (namely, removing legal barriers and regulatory obstacles to foreign capital inflows) and institutional settings (such as, the use of public agencies to attract FDI) with the agenda of promoting a favorable environment for foreign investors. In addition to classical measures including a wide range of fiscal privileges (such as tax concessions and tax exemptions), the creation of special economic/industrial zones, and investment in physical infrastructure. Governments have not been reluctant to offer special arrangements and negotiate terms individually, based on the mode, function, and objective of the entrance of multinational enterprises (Mehic, Silajdzic, Babic-Hodovic, 2013). FDI policies in the region are focused on improving the environment for investment; active promotion, image

building, and the creation and promotion of economic zones, such as industrial estates, business zones and free zones.

Creating a business environment that is conducive to all forms of investment is an important policy challenge for emerging and transitional economies. One of the most relevant is the attractiveness of the business environment that can be followed by different ways, but the most commonly used ones are the rankings by the international organizations like World Bank - Doing Business Report as well as the World Economic Forum (WEF) - Global Competitiveness Index.

According to the latest report of the World Bank "Doing Business 2015'' comparing the results of 189 economies, South East European countries are ranked between the 30th and 107th place. The Republic of Macedonia is ranked in the high 30th position among 189 countries in the world and is a leader in the region in creating the right kind of conditions for doing business. It is followed by Montenegro at 36th, Croatia at 65th, Albania at 68th, Kosovo at 75th, Serbia at 90th and Bosnia and Herzegovina at 107th. The rankings are distributed in 10 pillars, so the countries vary in the rankings, due to internal legislation and procedures defined for starting and leading businesses.

From the point of view of competitiveness, the World Economic Forum develops the Global Competitiveness Index as a set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country followed in 12 pillars. The level of productivity, in turn, sets the level of prosperity that can be reached by an economy. The productivity level also determines the rates of return obtained by investments in an economy, which in turn are the fundamental drivers of its growth rates. In other words, a more competitive economy is one that is likely to grow faster over time. The concept of competitiveness thus involves static and dynamic components. According to data from the latest GCI 2014-2015 of the World Economic Forum, the Republic of Macedonia is ranked in the 63rd position; Montenegro is ranked at 67th, Croatia at 77th, Serbia at 94th and Albania at 97th. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are not included in the rankings. The most problematic factors for doing business identified in the WEF for each country are as follows: for Croatia - inefficient government bureaucracy, the instability of policies, and corruption: for Macedonia - access to finances, poor working ethics in the national labor force, and an inadequately educated work force; for Serbia - inefficient government bureaucracy, access to finances, and corruption; for Montenegro - access to financing, corruption, poor working ethics in the national labor force; and, for Albania - corruption, access to finances, and inefficient government

bureaucracy. These areas with identified weaknesses should be addressed by the South East European countries in order to improve their competitiveness and attractiveness for doing business, increasing the trade and FDI.

Results for Foreign Direct Investments in South Eastern Europe

The Investment Policy and Promotion Dimension are contained within the Integrated Growth Pillar of the South-East Europe 2020 Strategy. This pillar aims at fostering integrated growth through the promotion of regional trade and investment linkages and policies which are non-discriminatory, transparent and predictable.

Due to the fact that one of the defined targets that should be reached in order to enable economic growth in these countries and the region is the increase of FDI in the region by 160%, the countries have individually made different projections based on their strategies, so it lies in the range of between 22% to 360%. In the following section we will analyze the sustainability of the projected FDI targets and the ability for the fulfillment, country by country and as a region. The targets that are given in the SEE 2020 Strategy are for the year 2020, and the baseline data is for 2010. It is a fact that FDI data are very volatile, due to the strong influence of internal and external factors in each of the countries concerned. This fact creates difficulties in defining the required average growth rate in order to reach the target.

Above all, the most important fact is that all countries define and target FDI as a pillar for economic growth, projecting higher FDI inflow in 2020 compared to 2010. FDI can be followed in different ways as absolute values of FDI per country, FDI per capita or FDI as a percentage of GDP. These figures provide different aspects of this very important topic. In Strategy SEE 2020, the targets are given in absolute values as volume of FDI (Table 3). Also, in order to analyze the effects of FDI on the domestic economy it should be linked to further analysis of created new working places, created links with the domestic companies, sectors of the economy that have attracted FDI, and the inflow of new technology.

Table 3 - FDI by countries in mil. EUR - SEE 2020 and Baseline data

Country	2010 Baseline data	2011	2012	2013	2020 Target	% of growth 2020/2010
Albania	793	717	727	741	2200	177
Bosnia and Herzegovina	174	342	273	320	500	187
Croatia	326	1,087	1,066	437	1,500	360
Kosovo	366	379	213	286	800	119
Macedonia	160	337	72	252	600	275
Montenegro	574	495	634	479	700	22
Serbia	1,003	1,827	242	756	2,500	149
Total	3,396	5,184	3,227	3,271	8,800	160

Source: Authors calculations based on the SEE 2020 Baseline Report, Towards Regional Growth, 2014, Publisher, Regional Cooperation Council, p. 89

The South East European countries have identified different targets for FDI inflow in 2020 presented in the table 3. The expected average growth of FDI in the region is 160%, the lowest projections have Montenegro at 22% growth, and highest expectations were projected by Croatia 360% and Macedonia of 275% growth. These projections are provided according to governmental calculations based on their strategic documents and programs. The indicator for overall FDI inflow is subject to one-off annual data and therefore it is difficult to extrapolate a clear trend. Actual data for FDI up to 2012/2013 shows slower than expected convergence towards the 2020 targets. However, given the 2010-2013 annual values, the 2020 targets also seem very ambitious, with the regional 2020 target inflow being 169% higher than the 2013 inflow. This is due to many internal and external factors.

In general, in comparing the targets it seems that Montenegro will attract much more FDI than the figures that have been projected as well as Macedonia which has projected far too ambitious a figure. The key characteristics of FDI in the region followed by countries can be summarized as follows:

• Albania has a projected growth of 177% that will be based mainly on inflows in energy infrastructure. Bosnia has a projection of 187% growth, based on expected FDI in energy infrastructure, and the privatization of existing facilities and plants. Kosovo bases its expectations of 119% growth in FDI inflow on investments in infrastructure. The Macedonian figure of 275% projected growth focuses on attracting FDI in Free Economic Zones as well as new green field and brown field investments in different sectors. Montenegro projected a modest growth of 22% and Serbia expects 149% FDI growth coming from the energy sector, manufacturing, and privatization.

• The most attractive sectors for FDI in the region are energy and transport infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture and tourism as well renewable energy sectors.

• The volatility of FDI annual inflows is due to both internal and external factors.

• The EU and a few strategic partners provide the key source of FDI,

• FDI attraction is positioned high in the economic policies, with a commitment to do "investment friendly" structural reforms and the creation of a favorable business climate attractive for FDI,

• Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro have created specialized institutions for FDI promotion and in some cases have created a network of promoters abroad.

• The key sector that attracts FDI in the region will be energy, infrastructure, and privatization in some cases, as well the Free Economic Zones.

The risks to achieving the projected amounts of FDI are possible EU and World recessions, EU internal problems, political instability in South East European region, and a a deterioration in image of the region.

Conclusions

Regional cooperation is one of the most important elements in creating new relations in South Eastern Europe, which will bring political stability and economic development, which are important preconditions for the countries in this region in their EU accession processes. Analyzing the data for trade and FDI inflow in the region after the adoption of the SEE 2020, and comparing the baseline data with the targets we can conclude that:

• The SEE Strategy 2020 target was to increase SEE intraregional trade in goods by more than 140%, from the €12.46 billion in 2010 to €30.5 billion by 2020, for some countries it may imply that the 2020 targets are too ambitious.

• The legally binding regional free trade agreement, CEFTA acts as the main driver for actions in this pillar. Many of the actions to be carried out in this period relate to the implementation of specific trade liberalization and facilitation measures already agreed on as part of the Agreement and/or subsequent ministerial decisions and further technical work and negotiations to prepare the next set of trade measures required by CEFTA and/or SEE 2020.

• The SEE Strategy 2020 target was to increase the FDI levels from 3.4 billion in 2010 to 8.8 billion by 2020, for some countries it may imply that the 2020 targets are too ambitious.

• Due to the global economic crisis, the weak Euro zone economy and some internal factors, the region has so far performed well blow projected expectations. The actual data show heterogeneous country experiences with relatively small progress or mixed/reverse trends in 2010–2012/2013. In order to reverse the negative trend, countries will need to implement aggressive measures and to work together.

• The South East European countries are relatively small economies that continue to undergo transition and have strong aspirations towards increasing integration into the EU. They compete for investors primarily based on cost efficiency, in which they progressively offer more generous investment incentives with limited clarity on the opportunity cost.

• Regional integration on investment matters offers opportunities through a higher degree of market integration.

• The removal of barriers for regional trade and investment increases the market size and offers an opportunity for economies of scale, geographically diversified businesses, and overall a more efficient allocation of resources within regional markets.

• The efforts at regional integration lead to increased FDI and intra-regional investments by creating a bigger market and attracting market-seeking investments; contributing to the development of stronger and more wide-spread regional value chains which are attractive for efficiency-seeking investments; increasing connectivity among businesses, thereby reducing risks of conflict; and, creating commitment mechanisms that positively influence domestic policy reforms.

• The main objective of the SEE Strategy 2020 of increasing overall FDI inflows by at least 160% can only be achieved through the removal of the remaining intra-regional trade barriers, a lasting commitment to pursue policies that support the upturn of inward FDI and further trade-facilitation measures, coupled with the free movement of a skilled regional workforce.

• On a national level a favorable investment environment and the successful implementation of reforms are vital and key prerequisites for attracting more FDI. So the countries should continue to improve the conditions on a national level and take an active role in regional projects and actions for promoting and attracting FDI.

• Due to continuous competition in giving incentives for attracting FDI, key to this should be to conduct further cost/benefit analysis of FDI and calculating the price of every new work place.

In order to raise regional competitiveness and future growth prospects and achieve the targets defined in the SEE Strategy it is necessary to increase integration and collaboration in the region, by exploiting all potentials. Key areas should be focused on increasing the facilitation of trade, liberalization and integration as well as acknowledging the fact that all the countries in the region are individually competing for FDIs places potential obstacles against closer cooperation in this area. There are also challenges to mobilizing resources in order to attract more FDI in the region. By creating and promoting bigger markets it will result in attracting market-seeking investments that will also contribute to the development of stronger and wide-spread regional value chains which are also attractive to efficiency-seeking investments. This will have an influence on re-branding the image of South Eastern Europe and will build the perception of an attractive business location. The success of SEE strategy depends on the further commitment of countries in the implementation and development of the process, and a readiness to collaborate and provide finances for the implementation of the measures and incentives.

References

Albanian Investment Development Agency (2015). Retrieved March 10, 2015 from http://aida.gov.al/?page_id=307.

European Commission (2015). Retrieved March 10, 2015 from http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-current-status/index_en.htm.

Foreign Investment Promotion Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015) "Investment Opportunities in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Why Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, subheading No 3". Retrieved March 10, 2015 from http://www.fipa.gov.ba/publikacije_materijali/brosure/io_27.01.2014.pdf.

Foreign Investors Council in Macedonia - White Book 2014-2015, (2015). Retrieved March 10, 2015 from http://www.fic.mk/content/pdf/WhiteBook%20ENG.pdf.

Holzner M. (2014). Investment to the Rescue.*Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies* - Forecast Report No. Spring 2014, March 2014, 89-90. Retrieved March 10, 2015 from http://wiiw.ac.at/albania-instat-replay-p-3136.html.

Invest in Serbia (2015). Retrieved March 10, 2015 from http://www.investinserbia.biz/_file/publications/Invest_In_Serbia.pdf.

Kersan-Škabić I.; Tijanić L. (2009). The Challenges of Competitiveness in Southeast European Countries. *South East European Journal of Economics & Business* (1840118X), 4(2), 23-37.

Mehic, E., Silajdzic, S., Babic-Hodovic, V. (2013). The Impact of FDI on Economic Growth: Some Evidence from Southeast Europe. *Emerging Markets, Finance & Trade,* January. Supplement, 49, 5-20. Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency. (2015). Montenegro Country Report 2014 Edition (online). Retrieved March 10, 2015 from http://www.mipa.co.me/dcs/country_report_2014.pdf.

National Bank of Serbia - Macroeconomic Development in Serbia 2015 (2015). Retrieved March 10, 2015 from http://www.nbs.rs/export/sites/default/internet/english/18/18_3/presentation_invest.pdf

Petreski M. (2013). Southeastern European Trade Analysis: A Role for Endogenous CEFTA-2006? *Emerging Markets, Finance & Trade.* 49(5), 26-44.

RCC Websites (2015). Retrieved March 10, 2015 from http://www.rcc.int/pages/62/south-east-europe-2020-strategy.

Regional Cooperation Council (2015). South East Europe 2020 Baseline Report towards Regional Growth. RCC, June 2014.

SEE Strategy 2020. Jobs and Prosperity in a European perspective. *Regional Cooperation Council*.

World Bank SEE Regular Economic Report June 5, 2012 (2015). Retrieved March 10, 2015 from http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/SEERER_3_Report_FINAL_eng.pdf.

211

Kimo Cavdar, Jasmina Dimitrieva, Zoran Sapurik: European Standards and Principles in the Law on Mediation in the Republic of Macedonia…

European Standards and Principles in the Law on Mediation in the Republic of Macedonia in View of the European Directive 2008/52/EC on Cross Border Mediation

Kimo Cavdar, Jasmina Dimitrieva, Zoran Sapurik

Abstract

Mediation, as an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) method, represents the fastest, the most accessible, and the most cost-effective way of resolving disputes. In the Republic of Macedonia, mediation is regulated by the Law on Mediation. It has been introduced in the Macedonian legal system as a counter-measure to problems identified in the judiciary, such as the unreasonable length of proceedings and ineffectiveness. The authors of this chapter provide an analysis of the applicable European standards and principles, which have an impact on mediation regulation in the Macedonian legal system. Mediation legislation from Italy, France, Germany and the UK is analyzed in order to learn from their experience in the transposition of the EU cross-border mediation directive. The scope and effectiveness of the Macedonian Law on Mediation is further analyzed, as well as the transposition of the EU cross-border mediation directive in the Macedonian legislation. The results of this research show that mediation is not just needed in Macedonia for the sake of ticking a box in the area of legal approximation with the EU; on the contrary, it has great potential in enabling effective, just and less expensive long-term solutions in legal traffic when certain conditions, such as mediation quality, legal certainty, public confidence and understanding of the process are met. Recommendations are provided regarding the enhancement of the legal infrastructure as well as the manner for the effective implementation of mediation. The need to raise the awareness of citizens and their understanding of mediation as the first stage of the dispute resolution procedure, should prevent the judicial settlement of disputes, thereby helping to save time and money. The methods used encompass legal analysis, comparative analysis and desk research. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with experts from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), from the European Policy Institute (EPI), from the Macedonian Center for Mediation and from the Judicial Strengthening Project. Information has been collected and collated from the Chamber of Mediators, MoJ, EPI and the EU website.

Keywords: mediation, peaceful dispute resolution, extra-judicial settlement of disputes, civil procedure, Directive 2008/52/E3.

Introduction

Judicial adjudication is the primary, but not the only method used for dispute resolution in contemporary societies. In parallel, other extra-judicial methods for peaceful dispute resolution exist that are known in legal theory as alternative dispute resolution (ADR) (Funken, 2002). Mediation, which belongs to the ADR group, according to Petrović Tomić (2010) is a structured process facilitated by a third neutral party called the mediator, who provides a mutually satisfactory solution to its objective (pp. 475-494). This article focuses on mediation as the most cost-effective and flexible type of ADR, in the light of the EU cross border directive on mediation. The aim of this chapter is to explore the use of mediation as defined by the EU cross border directive on mediation in selected EU countries, and to examine the transferability of EU mediation law and practice in Macedonia, in view of the on-going EU integration process. The article explores the following questions:

1.   What are the positive and negative sides of mediation?
2.   What is the EU law and best practice regarding mediation?
3.   What are the lessons that may be learned from the transposition of the EU cross-border directive in selected EU countries?
4.   What can Macedonia learn from the experience of the EU and EU countries in the mediation arena?

The methods used encompass legal analysis and desk research. In addition, semi-structured interviews with mediation experts from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the European Policy Institute (EPI), the Judicial Strengthening Project and the Macedonian Center for Mediation helped collect and collate empirical and statistical data about the current state of mediation in the Republic of Macedonia. A comparative review of selected EU countries contributes to the body knowledge on the transposition of the EU "cross border" directive in national legislations. The EU countries have been selected based on the longevity of the tradition in mediation and legal culture.

Mediation: Benefits, Drawbacks and Risks

From a historical perspective, there was a mention of the use of mediation originating from 500 B.C, with conflicts being settled in a peaceful manner by the chiefs of tribes and village judges for centuries (Gavric et al., 2012). The tradition to settle disputes peacefully continues nowadays, as

213

Kimo Cavdar, Jasmina Dimitrieva, Zoran Sapurik: European Standards and Principles
in the Law on Mediation in the Republic of Macedonia…

demonstrated by the legal systems of the Western European countries such as Germany, France, and Italy.

Whereas the mediator does not need to be an expert in the area where the dispute has arisen, the mediation paradigm requires him or her to be neutral and impartial, in the function of stirring the negotiation process of the parties willing to reach a dispute settlement. The mediator can also be a judge, but he or she must never be involved in any judicial proceedings or arbitration ensuing from or connected with the dispute. There can be one or more mediators in a dispute, depending on the complexity of the issue and the preferences of the parties. As a rule, mediation is a voluntary act, but the law may also foresee compulsory mediation for certain disputes, such as insurance, employment, and financial matters on balance with the right to access to court. The results of mediation are not automatically enforceable. In short, mediation is not a formal process, in which the legal value of the arguments is assessed by a mediator as a prevailing criteria in order to discern who is right and who is wrong. On the contrary, it should be used as a process in an innovative way, as an escape for the parties from their own box of convictions and stereotypes, in order to avoid a "Pyrrhic victory". Therefore, mediation is not only used in order to relieve the courts of their backlog, but also as a tool for the resolution of social and other conflicts in a peaceful manner, as it creates conditions for the parties to a dispute to resolve their issues in a constructive and friendly manner, and to come up, as says Liebmann (1995) with a win-win solution (p. 10).

Mediation, as a tool for dispute resolution, finds its practical value in all areas of human life. As a process, it can help resolve problems and undo wrongdoings in criminal matters, and juvenile justice, in addition to its recognized value in civil and commercial law disputes. It relies on the human dimension and uses emotional intelligence in solving problems. States that foresee mediation in their laws positively influence the assessment of the level of legal protection, and thus, mediation contributes to the attractiveness of a country for foreign investments.

From a plethora of reasons going in favor of mediation, we would like to emphasize the following:

First, with mediation the parties to a dispute have a second chance to re-examine their problem and find a good solution for it, with lower legal costs, which makes it a more accessible dispute resolution procedure in comparison to judicial procedure. It improves access to justice guaranteed by major European human rights instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Second, mediation relieves the courts from their backlog. Consequently, the courts are able to use their capacities in a more efficient and effective way, and thus live up to the guarantee for a trial within a reasonable time stipulated in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Third, the unwritten mediation procedural rules prone to adjustments create a positive atmosphere for the parties concerned and the persuasion that they can reach an agreement with the aim of avoiding going to court (Šimac, 2006).

Fourth, the principle of confidentiality applies in the mediation procedure. This is precisely the biggest comparative advantage of mediation vis-à-vis judicial and arbitration procedures, and provides the most valued mediation attribute in the business world, as it minimizes the possibilities for negative publicity. It is the rule on discretion that creates the expectations of the parties that information given during mediation will not be shared to their detriment in the case of a judicial adjudication of their dispute.

At the end of the day, ending a dispute by the use of mediation means ending all future court disputes between the parties. In short, mediation saves time and money.

On the negative side, the following obstacles must be overcome in mediation:

First, the parties to a dispute may not perceive mediation as being a successful tool for a dispute resolution, which brings us to the two dimensional issue of confidence, in other words that of confidence in the form of mediation as such, and confidence between the parties who are already hostile to each other.

Second, certain disputes, especially cross-border disputes, need specialized knowledge and skills from the side of the mediator, which might not be available in small countries like Macedonia.

Third, parties in the mediation process may agree to terms that may not be subjected to mediation, without even knowing that there are legal obstacles to mediation.

Fourth, mediation agreements are not automatically enforceable, and may not even be allowed to be enforced in the country where they have been concluded. It follows that unless the parties fulfill the obligations from the mediation agreement *bona fid*e, frustration of the mediation agreement may occur. *Finally*, mediation can be abused by a dishonest party to lure the other party to a dispute into a mediation agreement by coercion and duress.

The EU Rules on Mediation

The EU, as a hybrid between an international and supranational organization, uses a specific lawmaking system based on primary and secondary sources of law. Directives belong to the latter, which require the EU member states to attain a specific objective, by freely choosing their measures. This legal instrument has been precisely chosen by the EU to manifest its interest in the development of alternative methods for cross-border dispute resolution. The possible motive for choosing a directive over any other legal instrument may be found in its flexibility, which allows each EU member state to fulfill the EU requirements on balance with its own policies and existing legislation. Since mediation creates a legal framework for a wide range of disputes from commercial and civil areas across the EU, a more rigid legislation might have produced counter effects to the wishes expressed in EU policies, thereby discouraging potential parties from using cross-border mediation.

The EU adopted Directive 2008/52/EU on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters on 21 May 2008, based on a wide range of consultations with experts and practitioners in its member states and public debates in line with the principles of inclusion, transparency and legislative legitimacy, as well as the protection of human rights. EU policy makes it clear that mediation is a desirable way of settling cross-border disputes in the interest of a single market and the community building of European citizens based on the principles of four freedoms, security and justice. Its main aim is to encourage an increased use of mediation for parties to a cross-border dispute in order to create space for greater access to justice in wide areas such as, consumer rights, contractual disputes, family law, investments, and insurance. While the Directive underscores that its provisions are applicable to cross-border disputes, it makes clear that its provisions can be used to structure domestic mediations.

The Directive is based on the following tenets:

1) free will, 2) neutrality, 3) the equality of the parties, 4) the quality of mediation, 5) confidentiality, 6) legal certainty and 7) public information. Regarding the *first* tenet, it emphasizes mediation as a voluntary act. The parties are the ones initiating mediation, selecting the mediator, and determining the subject and process of mediation. For example, contractual parties can foresee, out of their own free will, a provision for mediation in their contract. Furthermore, the parties may terminate mediation proceedings at free will as long as a mediation agreement is not signed. In short, the Directive makes it clear that in mediation the parties are granted much more autonomy in

comparison with formal judicial proceedings. The Directive foresees the mediator as signing up to neutrality and impartiality, to treat the parties equally and to be able to maintain a balance between the wishes and expectations of the parties concerned, and thus as states Phillips (2011) win their confidence. It follows that the *second* and the *third* tenets are interlinked, as there is no neutrality in a procedure without treating the parties as equals. Yet another (*fourth*) tenet has been specified in the function of building confidence in mediation as a process, namely that of quality. That is even more the case, when disputes with cross-border elements are at stake. According to the Directive, the *fifth* tenet - confidentiality is a *sine qua non* for the greater use of mediation. The mediation process is not public, the parties remain discreet regarding the subject-matter of mediation and other data surrounding it. A mediator cannot be summoned in court proceedings, and information from the process cannot be used following unsuccessful mediation. The *sixth* tenet, on legal certainty contributes towards building a secure space, which enables the conflicting parties to freely and sincerely provide their arguments and discuss facts, without the fear that somebody will (ab)use them, and thus makes mediation more accessible to all EU citizens. For that reason, the time-limits in judicial proceedings are stopped while the mediation process is on-going, so the parties do not feel that mediation will preclude them from bringing their case to court. *Last but not least*, public information about mediation serves to inform the citizens, business, legal and natural persons alike about the availability and power of mediation.

Subject-matters linked to *acta iure imperii,* to public interest (such as national defense) or recognition as a person fall outside the ambit of mediation procedure.

The EU cross-border Directive foresees *ex-post* evaluation about its effects and developments in mediation in the EU member states with the possibility of being revised in 2016, and ties-up with the European Parliament's Resolution 2011/2026 (INI), which *inter alia*, provides *ex-post* monitoring of the transposition of the EU Directive in national legislation. The Resolution also calls upon national authorities to conduct awareness-raising activities on the benefits of mediation.

As a bottom-line, the 2008 EU cross-border Directive builds upon European values and commitments, such as the peaceful resolution of disputes, the protection of human rights and freedoms and the rule of law, and counts on the support of EU member states. It offers a simple solution to complex issues that can range from doing business across the EU to settling a divorce.

Regardless of its practical sides, mediation cannot be imposed upon its beneficiaries, as a construct of the policies created in Brussels. Indeed, according to the 2014 Survey on Rebooting Mediation Directive commissioned by the European Parliament, mediation achieved modest results in the EU. Revision of the Directive may be expected, based on the recommendations of the Survey, which was used as a tool for *ex post* monitoring of implementation and effects of the mediation legislation.

European Standards and Principles: A Comparative Overview

In view of the importance of mediation and the requirement for the transposition of the EU cross-border directive, a comparative overview of mediation legislation and the practice of some of the EU member states is presented herein. Whether or not the proceedings are voluntary or mandatory, who provides mediation, the enforceability of the mediation outcome and incentives to use mediation have been used as indicators for comparison.

In the **French** legal system there is a long-standing tradition of mediation. Starting from the mid-19th century, certain arbitrators made decisions based on the principle, *ex equo et bono,* before the referral to the courts. Articles 95-125 of the 1906 French Civil Code encouraged peaceful settlements of disputes by a third party. Mediation, as a rule, is practiced on a voluntary basis, except for certain family disputes. Mediation is used also for small value disputes, not exceeding €10,000. Once the parties reach an agreement, it becomes binding and enforceable when approved by the court. The 2011 Decree transposed the Directive into the French legal system and provides a legal framework for the friendly settlement of disputes which can be mediated by judges (judicial mediators) or outside judicial proceedings (conventional mediators). The regulation of mediation rests firmly entrenched in the various associations for mediation.

In compliance with the Directive, a new mediation law in **Italy** made mediation mandatory for certain types of disputes, such as in the fields of the settlement of defamation cases, contracts, insurance, banking and finances. The mediation procedure must commence before the judicial proceedings are initiated. Mediation is provided by certain organizations and institutions registered in a special register to which the mediation case gets allocated. Mediation procedure is based on the principle of self-regulation by mediation associations. Upon the resolution of a dispute, the mediation agreement is approved by the court and becomes directly enforceable. A voluntary paradigm

still exists and applies to civil and commercial disputes. Smaller value disputes of up to €50,000 are considered especially amenable to mediation. According to the statistics, out of the total number of mediations, 76 % of the disputes were resolved under the compulsory mediation procedure, whereas 24% of the disputes were resolved on a voluntary basis. All documents, acts and measures in the mediation procedure are exempt from administrative tax or other charges, as an incentive to use mediation (EU Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2014).

In **Germany,** in 2012 a separate mediation law was passed in order to transpose the Cross border Directive. There is a basic training program that each mediator must complete, and additional training in order to become a certified mediator. Parties to a dispute are encouraged first to actively seek mediation, otherwise they must explain to the court why they did not consider this in the first place (EU Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2014).

However, no compulsory mediation has been introduced at the federal level. Reconciliation is mandatory in divorce proceedings, but it is conducted by a judge who has territorial jurisdiction to hear the divorce cases, while the divorce proceedings are on-going (EU Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2014). The mediation outcome can be enforced through a notary or through the courts.

In addition to the positive practice that mediation depicts in the **UK,** its value for the settlement of disputes has been re-confirmed in the light of the above EU Directive, which, *inter alia*, re-enforces the confidentiality of the process. Mediation is regularly used in civil and commercial areas, in particular, in family, labor and social disputes. Although there is no separate law in the UK regulating mediation in civil and commercial matters, the courts may refer the parties to mediation. There is court-annexed mediation in small claim cases. In civil cases, the parties can face high court expenses, if they had not previously attempted to reach a settlement through mediation. Mediation providers are accredited by the Civil Mediation Council. A settlement reached through mediation needs a court order in order to be enforced.

From the above it transpires that all examined countries transposed the cross border directive in their national laws, while retaining the most important features of their legal systems. All countries foresee by law some type of training for mediators who must remain impartial. Italy and the UK foresee mandatory mediation for certain types of commercial cases. Most of the countries from the sample foresee mandatory mediation for family disputes. While all countries foresee some incentive or "sanction" to encourage the use of mediation, they

differ from country to country. As a rule, the enforcement of the mediation outcome passes through the courts, with Germany allocating an important role also to the notaries.

Law on Mediation in the Republic of Macedonia

Mediation was officially introduced in 2006, when the old Law on Mediation was adopted by the Macedonian Parliament. The main aim was to reduce the backlog in the courts, as well as modernizing the Macedonian legal system. While the Law proscribed for substantial self-regulation in the mediation area by the Chamber of Mediators, the analysis of the MoJ and the EPI showed that mediation had failed to execute its goal, due to the low quality of proceedings and insignificant number of mediation cases. In addition, in 2008 the EU cross – border Directive came to light.

The new Law on Mediation no. 188/2013 (the Law) was adopted in December 2013, with the expectation that it would improve the quality of the mediation procedure, increase public confidence in mediation as well as approximate mediation in commercial and civil matters with the EU's applicable directive, in view of the prospective EU membership. It almost fully transposes the above Directive (the MoJ Table of Correspondence) in compliance with its afore-mentioned tenets. Mediation is a voluntary act, and remains as such, despite some efforts to introduce compulsory mediation in disputes worth less than 1,000 000 MKD. Equality of the parties is guaranteed with mediation carried out by a neutral mediator. Mediation is confidential and held *in camera.* As a rule, access to information in other types of proceedings is prohibited. Confidentiality was quoted as one of the reasons for not allowing judicial mediation, although it functions well in certain countries belonging to EU. Enforcement of the mediation agreement is achieved when it is certified by a notary, in order to safeguard legal certainty and foresight. When the mediation settlement is reached during court proceedings, it represents the basis for a judicial settlement. As an incentive, certain mediation costs may be covered by the state when legal conditions are met (articles 6-14, 28).

When looking at the other side of the coin of the Directive's tenets, which have not been fully translated into Law, the corresponding Table shows the remaining gaps with regard to public information about mediation. Indeed, although through the Dutch sponsored project MATRA, the EPI has organized information events and funded the Chamber of Mediator's website, no follow-up to this project has been envisaged. Furthermore, the above-mentioned

website is no longer available. In this regard, the counterparts also mentioned a lack of interest in pushing for a greater use of mediation by the Chamber of Commerce, the judges or even the mediators themselves who are for the most part practicing lawyers. All in all there have been only 45 registered mediation cases since 2006, and none of them concerned a cross-border dispute, which makes mediators totally inexperienced in the Directive's subject-matter.

Furthermore, the Law appears to be over-detailed, which might in some way help the legal certainty of the Law, but the question arises, why secondary legislation has not been used as a tool to achieve the same effects in line with the rest of European good practice? From all discussions with counterparts, it appears that the quality of mediation is the biggest controversy when the mediation paradigm in Macedonia is tackled, and that was the prevailing reason to include greater detail in the Law. The Law attempts to increase the quality of the mediators by detailing out groups of examinations and foreseen licensing arrangements. However, although the Law entered into force in September 2014, still no exam for the licensing of new mediators has as yet taken place. The Law foresees that the Mediation Chamber will cease to exist and that the current mediators must be licensed to continue their practice. While the new licensing system, which aims to increase the quality of mediation and increase public confidence represents a positive step taken by the MoJ, further delays in its implementation, leave the mediation mechanism in a state of limbo, which was most certainly not the intention of the drafters of the Directive.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In conclusion, mediation has the power to reduce the costs, time and resources which otherwise would be deployed for the judicial resolution of disputes. It also represents the values of the EU, especially in the areas of tolerance, the peaceful settlement of disputes and access to justice, which should be reflected in Macedonian society, if any hopes remain that Macedonia will become a full member of the EU club one bright day.

While the Government recognizes the values of mediation, the delays in the implementation of the Law, adversely affect the whole mediation mechanism, which has been built since 2006 in terms of training, knowledge, experience and public information.

When there will be some practice developed out of the Law, the Government will have to repeat its good practice regarding the *ex post* evaluation of the 2006 law, which represented one of the pillars of the

221

Kimo Cavdar, Jasmina Dimitrieva, Zoran Sapurik: European Standards and Principles
in the Law on Mediation in the Republic of Macedonia…

mediation reforms, in order to achieve its strategic goal, namely, an increased number of mediation cases . By the same token, the Government may wish to implement a program aimed at raising awareness of mediation, which will target specific groups, such as businessmen, members of the Chamber of Commerce and Centers for Social Works, in order to get them on board for the further popularization of mediation.

The Macedonian government should conduct an awareness raising campaign, not only about its use in domestic matters, but also regarding cross-border matters in view of the EU Directive, mentioned above. Overall, mediation may come cheaper for the state budget, which funds the court system and its functioning, by reducing the backlog in the courts and the length of proceedings.

The transposition of the EU Cross Border Directive in Macedonian legislation is commendable not only because of the prospect of EU integration, but due to the fact that Macedonia is surrounded by EU member countries and countries with the prospect of European integration, as well as the fact that many commercial and civil disputes have arisen and have the potential to arise between EU countries. It follows that by creating conditions susceptible to cross-border mediation, Macedonia could feel the positive effects in trade, consumer protection, and small claims disputes. However, the Macedonian government must examine, in particular, how to ensure the quality of mediators, as cross border mediation may require specialization, as there is also the language issue, and the possibility of using IT equipment.

The Macedonian government should look closer into the possibilities of using mediation in various types of cases, and encourage its use in small claims cases and defamation cases, in balance with the freedom of expression guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as in labor law disputes and in electoral disputes.

References

Abramson, H. (2011). *Mediation Representation.* (2nd ed.) International Mediation Institute.

Alexander, N. (2009). *International Comparative Mediation: Legal Perspectives* New York: Kluwer Law International.

Alexander, N. (2006). *Global Trends in Mediation.*(2nd ed.) New York: Kluwer Law International.

American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC.

Berger, K. (2009). *Private Dispute Resolution in International Business – Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration* (2nd ed.). New York: Kluwer Law International.

Besarović, V. (1997). *Arbitražno rešavanje sporova iz oblasti intelektualne svojine*. Zbornik referata Međunarodna privredna arbitraža. stanje i perspektive. Beograd.

Carroll, E. and Mackie, K. (2006). *International Mediation – The Art of Business Diplomacy* (2nd ed.). New York: Kluwer Law International.

De Palo, G. and Trevor, M. (2007).*Arbitration and Mediation in the Southern Mediterranean Countries*. New York: Kluwer Law International.

EU Directorate General for Internal Policies. (2014). *Rebooting the Mediation Directive.*

European Policy Institute. (2013). *Resete go sporot, da za medijacija*.

Funken, K. (2002).Comparative dispute management: Court-connected mediation in Japan and Germany. *German Law Journal*, No. 2/ 2002.

Goldberg, S., Sander, F., Rogers, N. and Cole, S. (2007). *Dispute Resolution* (5th ed.). Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Goldsmith, J., Ingen-Housz, J. and Pointon, G. (2006). *ADR in Business.* New York: Kluwer Law International.

Hodson, D. (2008). The EU Mediation Directive: The European encouragement to family law. ADR *Family Law*.

Hopt, K. and Steffek, F. (2012).*Mediation – Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective.*

New York: Kluwer Law International.

Ingen-Housz, A. (2011). *ADR in Business – Practice and Issues across Countries and Cultures* Volume II. New York: Kluwer Law International.

Kirchhoff, L. (2008). *Constructive Interventions: Paradigms, Process and Practice of International Mediation.* New York: Kluwer Law International.

McCrory, J. P. (1999). Mandated mediation of civil cases in state courts: A litigant's perspective on program model choices. *Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution*, 14(3).

McIlwrath, L., Michaeand, S. J. (2010). *International Arbitration and Mediation – A Practical Guide.* New York: Kluwer Law International.

Nelson, N., Stipanowich, T. J. (2002). *Commercial Mediation in Europe, Better Solutions for Business.* CPR Institute.

Neuvians, N. (2011). *Mediation in Familienunternehmen.* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien.

Petrušić, N. (1999). *Mediation - The Method of Collective Labour Disputes Resolution in the Yugoslav Law*. Facta Universitatis, Vol. 1.

Petrović Tomić, H. (2010). *Medijacija u osiguranju.* Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta. Rijeka.

Poon, P. G. (2010). *The Corporate Counsel's Guide to Mediation.* Chicago: ABA Publishing.

Stitt, A. J. (2004). *Mediation: A Practical Guide.* Portland: Cavendish Publishing.

Šimac, S. (2006). Mirenje – alternativni način rješavanja sporova*. Rijeka, *ZPFR*, 27(1).

Vucev et al. (2013). *Priracnik za obuka na medijatorite.*

Other sources

Law on Mediation, promulgated in Official Gazette no. 188/2013

MoJ, Table of Correspondence, Tarifnik za medijacija

Programa za medijacija (2014)

Lista na medijatori (2013)

Internet sources

<http://www.mediate.com/eu/>

<http://www.mediationworld.net/european-union/publications/full/82.html>

< http://conflictresolution.weebly.com/mediation-in-italy-updated.html>

<http//www.ecthr.coe.in>

<http://e-justice.europa.eu/home.do?plang=en&action=home>

<http://epi.org.mk>

<http://www.pravda.gov.mk>

<http://unito.academia.edu/ElenaDAlessandro/Papers/1122122/ enforcing agreements>

<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-conc/ml-conc-e.pdf.

<http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4284.pdf 43>

Cross-border Cooperation in Europe: Experience, Tools and Practice

Daniele Del Bianco and Marina Andeva

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of the current analytical approaches and tools used in decoding and fostering cross-border co-operation (CBC) processes in Europe. Cross-border cooperation is understood either as a process for overcoming socio-political fractures between states, or as tool in which integrated regional continuity is generated. Within this perspective, CBC is also perceived as a process hindering the Westphalian principle of state sovereignty. Ultimately, CBC establishes a dynamic system of social, economic, legal and political actions that reduce the negative effects of administrative borders in the wake of the enlargement of the so-called Schengen area (ISIG, 2011). Cooperating across borders generates positive spillovers on the territories in which CBC operates, implying that promoting cross-border continuity develops the social and economic opportunities of people inhabiting border areas, thereby contributing to the European integration process. Yet, CBC remains a highly complex subject whose context and time-specific nature limits its comprehensive understanding. Taking stock of the research-led experience on CBC issues developed by ISIG – the Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia, this chapter considers the multifaceted nature and goals of CBC and the tools aiming at its promotion with a specific focus on those developed under the auspices of the Council of Europe.

Keywords: cross-border cooperation; European Integration; Council of Europe.

Introduction

Cross-border cooperation (CBC) is one of the key phenomena that both characterizes and influences the current process of European integration. CBC is a cooperative process carried out, across borders, by actors who belong to different states but work together, developing joint solutions to common problems. In a global context in which economic, cultural and social factors impact on geographic areas without distinction to national borders, the traditional role, function and legitimacy of nation-states is increasingly being questioned.

CBC represents an opportunity for local actors to address and overcome cooperatively the obstacles set by a border on the development of an integrated cross-border system (Del Bianco & Jackson, 2011). Cooperating across borders, communities actively engage in the resolution of problems designing and deploying solutions, which are shared by local actors and relying on the democratic participation of all stakeholders. Within this perspective, CBC represents the operational tool and the reference framework for local actors to collaborate together to control the negative effects of a border and capitalise on shared cross-border resources. This process involves a variety of legal, economic and socio-cultural factors, which contribute to the success or failure of a cooperative activity (ISIG, 2014a). Impacting on the nature and scope of such cooperative process, these factors determine the high level of diversity of CBC processes across Europe. Stemming from initiatives taken by both Local Authorities and civil society actors, CBC is applied to different sectors and different contexts: each border area is, in this sense, unique, mobilising different actors and the interpolation of several administrative and cultural variables. The chapter offers a snapshot overview of some of the available tools and resources useful to decode and improve the phenomenon.

Cross-Border Cooperation: Aims and Governance Arrangements

Cross-border cooperation (CBC) is a concerted process of building neighbourly relationships between local stakeholders and authorities on both sides of national land and sea borders; its aim is to foster the harmonious development of border communities. This paragraphs draws on the contents elaborate in the following CoE Toolkits: Cross-Border Cooperation Toolkit (2012); and Manual on removing obstacles to cross-border cooperation (2013).

CBC is not about conveying additional powers to border communities or authorities. Rather, it is a more efficient way of exercising their powers to:

1. Promote the socio-economic development of the border area.
2. Develop economies of scale to provide better services, and
3. Widen cultural perspectives.

Despite the wide variety of CBC activities, arrangements and participating authorities, the rationale of CBC is to overcome the peripheral positioning of border areas, by overcoming the sense of isolation and applying joint solutions to issues of common concern with adjacent local communities and authorities.

CBC starts as an exchange of information and develops into consultation and policy co-ordination. As CBC activities progress, extending to a growing number of issues and demonstrating CBC potential in the development of the cross-border area, local authorities often seek to formalise further existing CBC arrangements. This implies establishing joint CBC governance bodies. In this sense, involvement of not only local authorities, but also of civil society organisations and stakeholder representatives guarantees the incorporation of a wider set of instances into the cross-border decision making and thus a more sustainable policies' implementation process.

The choice of the legal form of CBC, including different degrees of participation, is a strategic decision. It expresses not only the political compromise that allowed the development of the CBC process, but also the lines of development of CBC itself.

A CBC governance structure should be set so as to operate directly for the achievement of its objectives whilst its members supervise its work and (partially) fund its activities. The more complex the tasks - compared to those carried out directly by its members - the more complex the legal basis of the CBC body and the level of clearance from competent regional and central authorities.

The different types of CBC governance arrangements mostly fall into one of the following four clusters:

1. Informal CBC relations
   • They do not entail any binding legal decision and therefore they do not need a precise legal basis. They rely on political commitment and partnership working.

2. CBC agreement
   - They represent the simplest and less formalized instrument for CBC. They may be drawn up under national law or international inter-State agreements.
3. CBC bodies governed by private law
   - They are often not-for-profit structures governed by the (private) law of the country where their headquarters are located:
   - Associations (or foundations) acting as "operators" or "project managers";
   - Co-operation bodies for political consultation.
   - They maintain a legal independence from their members but cannot act as deputies for member institutions.
4. CBC bodies governed by public law
   - They are established when bi- or multi-lateral agreements between the States they belong to allow for it. Such bodies may perform all tasks of interest to their members including cross-border governance, the cross-border provision of public services, or the cross-border management of public facilities.

The development of such governance arrangements strongly depends on the available legal (national and international) frameworks. Local communities and authorities engage in CBC activities within the powers available to them internally and within the limitations that this poses to their action. Both domestic law (constitutional and secondary) and international law, as currently in force are incorporated into these principles.

The main institutional actors contributing to the definition of the international legal framework for CBC are the following:

1. The Council of Europe
   - The European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (1980).
   - The Additional Protocol to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (1995).
   - Protocol No. 2 to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities concerning interterritorial co-operation (1998).
   - Protocol No. 3 to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities concerning Euroregional Co-operation Groupings (ECGs) (2009).

2. The European Union
   - Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on a European grouping of territorial cooperation (EGTC) (2006).
   - Revised EGTC Regulation (EU) No 1302/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 on a European grouping of territorial cooperation (EGTC) with regard to the clarification, simplification and improvement of the establishment and functioning of such groupings. The Revised EGTC Regulation applies from 22 June 2014

The sustainability of the CBC process strongly relies on the participation of citizens and their involvement (Del Bianco, Bianchizza, 2015) so as to see their instances mirrored in local CBC strategies and actions. To this end, whatever their legal form might be, CBC governance mechanisms must ensure:
- The care of citizens' interests;
- Efficiency and effectiveness;
- The minimilization of public costs;
- Respect for the ethics of public administration; and,
- Local accountability.

Focusing on the most institutionalised types of CBC governance structures, three main types of arrangements can be identified with reference to the participation of citizens:
1. The Euroregions
   - The participation of citizens in projects and decision-making is listed among the working methods in the Practical Guide to CBC drafted by The Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) and adopted by the European Commission.
2. EGTC
   - Even though the EGTC Regulation does not explicitly provide participative instruments or tools within the decision-making process, it states that the statute of the EGTC shall specify "decision-making procedures" (Article 9.2) and "may provide for additional organs with clearly defined powers" (Article 10.2), besides the assembly and the director (Article 10.1). Thus, it allows for civic engagement bodies to be established and ingrained in the decision-making procedures.

3. ECGs
    -   The Third Protocol of the Madrid Outline Convention (9/11/2009) introduces an instrument for cross-border cooperation open to any establishment with a legal personality to be set up specifically to meet needs of general interests, including civil society participants in the decision-making.

CBC arrangements lack the direct political accountability of public institutions. They group together whilst being subject to a wider spread of accountability as in the cases of:

-   Citizens and beneficiaries who want to know how the CBC entity is performing; but they must first understand CBC and its operations.
-   They are expected to be efficient and effective. Poor performance will undermine the value of the CBC; people will begin to see it as a waste of time and money.
-   Partner municipalities and their citizens want to be sure that one partner is not benefitting at the expense of the others; this requires good communications and a culture of trust and cooperation.
-   Decision-making processes have to be transparent so that people have confidence in the integrity of the CBC entity.
-   The delegated CBC members represent the interests of their own municipality at the same time as they represent the interests of the citizens of all the partner municipalities.

Assessing Cross-Border Cooperation across Europe

Between 2003 and 2011, under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the analysis of the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) of cross-border cooperation in 55 border regions in the Balkan-Danube area, Central Europe, Western Russia and the Baltic Sea region was carried out (ISIG, 2010). The main function of SWOT analysis is to assess the cross-border development prospects of regions in cross-border terms. Setting it between its operational present, or current scenario and a future predominantly marked by local development fostered by cross-border cooperation and known as the latent scenario (ISIG, 2010), the SWOT method involved an analysis of what occurs, and above all, how development could occur, between time t_0 and time t_1.

The SWOT method develops an assessment framework for local practitioners and policy makers, identifying (internal and external) variables (53) grouped in the following ten dimensions:

1. A propensity towards cross-border cooperation
2. The level of training and coordination
3. Cross-border relations in each activity sector
4. Institutional obstacles for cross-border cooperation
5. Economic obstacles for cross-border cooperation
6. Socio-cultural obstacles for cross-border cooperation
7. Institutional factors for effective cross-border cooperation
8. Administrative factors for effective cross-border cooperation
9. Economic factors for effective cross-border cooperation; and,
10. Linguistic, cultural and historical factors for effective cross-border cooperation.

Assessing CBC in specific border regions by means of SWOT analysis proved, among other things, that whereas (i) building regional continuity in border areas emphasizes the opportunities for socio-economic development based on pluralism at the local level, (ii) states play a key role in allowing or hindering international cooperation at the local (border) level. The following two paragraphs address these issues in turn.

Addressing CBC Complexity to Enhance the Re-centralization of Border Areas

The need to implement collaborative processes across borders comes from the joint recognition of the border areas of a common and interdependent state of overall remoteness as compared to the respective national centers (Galtung, 1969; Johansson 1982; Martinez, 1994; Ferrara, 2000; Gasparini, 2003; Del Bianco, 2008; Gasparini & Del Bianco 2008). Coupling the fundamental variables of general systems theory and those of social interaction in space (Gasparini, 2000b), CBC is interpreted as the process aiming to *re-center* a cross-border area (Del Bianco, 2009).

The re-centralization of a border area is understood as the process that enhances the re-positioning of a border area from a peripheral to a central role in any given system, whether from an economic, cultural, or social perspective. Cross-border cooperation is held to be the engine of such a process since the cooperative actions undertaken jointly by two contiguous border areas are supposed to overcome their respective peripheral position by creating a truly cross-border area playing a new central role in any given system. Cross-border cooperation – understood here as both the strategy and the actions jointly pursued by actors operating in peripheral areas – offers the opportunity to re-

center an area, when ensuring an equilibrium of economic and cultural activities pursued through balanced direct and indirect relationships (Del Bianco, 2009).

A border area is thus analysed with reference to both (i) the relations between cooperative activities undertaken in the cultural and economic sectors on the one hand, and (ii) between the direct or indirect interactions that characterise them on the other. CBC in the cultural sector traditionally pertains to cooperative activities promoting fairs and cultural events, bi-/multilingualism, as well as local cultural promotion and facilitation on tourism, student exchanges, the elaboration of textbooks, and university cooperation. Moreover, it covers issues such as environmental and historical heritage protection/promotion.

Cooperating across borders in the economic sector often refers to activities of in the following areas: agriculture and farming, manufacturing, services, technology and R & D, transport infrastructure, tourism, spatial planning, labour markets, health and social security.

Concerning the relations between actors engaged in of cross-border cooperation, it is possible to distinguish two basic types: (i) relations involving direct interaction and those involving indirect interaction, or networks. The former involves socio-cultural, institutional and economic relations undertaken directly through face-to-face contacts among border counterparts. This type of relations unfolds in the exchange of information and consultation at a cross-border level, with a direct involvement in joint cross-border activities, and through the participation in working groups, consultation groups, and coordinating committees or local cross-border governance structures.

Indirect relations refer to those functional contacts, which CBC actors activate within larger multipurpose networks in order to achieve specific goals for which technical or the financial support of national networks, central governments or European institutions is needed.

As depicted in *Figure 1: Sectors of cross-border cooperation re-centralization*, assessing the prevalence of activities carried out in the cultural or economic sectors and of relations (direct/indirect) cross-border actors activate, it is possible to place a given cross-border area within four specific re-centering situations (Del Bianco, 2009):

1. An autochthonous culture,
2. Institutional organization,
3. Economic organization; and,
4. Economic autochthony.

The area of centrality, finally, indicates the effective, or potential, refocusing of the cross-border area through the process of balanced cooperation in operational, structural and relational terms.

The scope of CBC is to originate a new centrality for a border area. It is key, therefore, to supporting local practitioners and local authorities in elaborating original solutions to overcome the obstacles to CBC, which ultimately determine the peripheral positioning of a border area.

Eden: A Database for Practitioners to Overcome Obstacles to Cross-Border Cooperation

At the CoE level, legal instruments have been supplemented by a number of recommendations adopted by the Committee of Ministers, in particular Recommendation Rec(2005)2 on good practices in and reducing obstacles to transfrontier and interterritorial cooperation between territorial communities or authorities (Council of Europe (COE), 2005). Rec(2005)2 highlights that *the generalisation of good practices and the removal of obstacles could facilitate ratification of the Madrid Convention and its protocols by states that have not yet done so and enable existing parties to give full effect to their provisions* (Council of Europe (COE), 2005, p. 1).

The benefits to be mutually gained by cooperating across borders and the common added values of CBC are increasingly recognized by relevant actors throughout Europe. However, notwithstanding the progress made so far, obstacles to CBC continue to hinder the potential of cooperation in border areas across Europe.

The EDEN (E-Database Empowering Networks) – supplemented by the Manual on Removing Obstacles to CBC – is based on the data collected through the questionnaires prepared and distributed by the COE *Committee of experts on local and regional government institutions and cooperation* in preparation of the *Conference on removing obstacles and promoting good practices on cross-border cooperation* (Council of Europe (COE), 2011). It aims to systematize the data collected and to provide a thorough account of CBC instances across Europe. In this respect, it should be used as a gateway to the information provided by respondents. All recorded CBC instances are thoroughly referenced and can be traced back to the original source. Moreover, the database is continuously updated with new instances collected online.

EDEN collects the experiences of cooperation made by European actors belonging to member countries of the Council of Europe, and organizes them into a tripartite system based on:

- Issues and initiatives that cross-border cooperation implements;
- Obstacles that were encountered during the process of implementing these activities; and,
- Solutions that have been found to any of the obstacles encountered in the process.
- The online platform that hosts the database is based on maximum user-friendliness, presenting search engines that offer the ability to search within the three groups of elements, with the option of restricting one's a search to specific areas of cross-border cooperation or specific states. The areas in which the database is organized are:

- Mobility and Transport (117 entries in the database);
- Health systems (87 entries in the database);
- Education and training (122 entries in the database);
- Labour markets (109 entries in the database);
- Crisis and Disaster / Emergency Management (55 entries in the database);
- Crime Prevention (50 entries in the database);
- Environment (105 entries in the database); and
- Other issues (144 entries in the database).

As of 12 May 2015, EDEN contains: 541 Issues, 162 Obstacles, and 50 Solutions. The online platform also offers an opportunity for providing experience of cross-border cooperation activities, contributing to the database, and of restricting a search to contributions coming from a specific actor. The database has two main functions:

To facilitate the implementation of cooperation activities by providing a collection of best practices from which policy makers can draw ideas and inspiration; and

Encouraging the creation of networks between actors involved in cooperation processes, and providing contacts to those who provided the information of each example of best practice in the database.

EDEN and the Manual are intended to be a companion for CBC actors interested in promoting further cooperation activities across national borders. The approach originates in the consideration that neither the problems suffered by a cross-border area nor their solutions respect national borders but that cross-border areas across Europe share similar functional characteristics and challenges.

Conclusion

Cross-border areas expand beyond national borders and find their rationale for cohesion in the functional characteristics and challenges local communities share. The problems faced are directly related to the presence of a border. Overcoming them is about developing joint cross-border strategies. Although, cooperation often stalls over a lack of reciprocal confidence and ideological competition, CBC actions can lead to the real improvement of living conditions on both sides of the border. This is what CBC does. Its success is built on clear concrete objectives and the willingness to cooperate.

Although there is a widespread and (still) growing awareness of the benefit of cross-border cooperation, unsuccessful experiences, unexpected impacts or enduring obstacles may endanger the development of CBC, causing setbacks, citizens' scepticism and resentment.

Analytical tools (such as the SWOT analysis) and capacity building instruments (such as the EDEN platform and the presented Toolkits and Manuals) are essential in shaping robust and sustainable cooperative processes across borders, which will ultimately improve the daily life of border area inhabitants.

References

Ancarani F., Caldani E. (2001). *Strategie di marketing del territorio. Generare valore per le imprese e i territori nell'economia della conoscenza*. Milano: Egea.

Ardigò, A. (1977). Introduzione all'analisi sociologica del "Welfare State" e delle sue trasformazioni, in La Rosa, M., Minardi, E., Montanari A., (ed.) *I servizi sociali tra programmazione e partecipazione*. Milano: Angeli

Atkinson, A. B. (1989). *Poverty and social security*. London: Harvest Wheatsheaf.

Bagnasco, A. (1999). *Tracce di comunità*. Bologna: Bologna.

Becattini G. (2000). *Dal distretto industriale allo sviluppo locale*. Torino: Bollati e Boringhieri.

Bramanti, A., Maggioni, M.A. (1997). Struttura e dinamica dei sistemi produttivi territoriali: un'agenda di ricerca per l'economia regionale, in Bramanti, A., Maggioni, M.A. (ed.), *La dinamica dei sistemi produttivi territoriali: teorie, tecniche, politiche*. Milano: Angeli.

Bravo, G. (2001). Dai pascoli a internet. La teoria delle risorse comuni, in *Stato e Mercato*. n.63. (pp. 487-512). Milano: Angeli.

Cersosimo, D.(2002). *Le agenzie locali di sviluppo: modelli organizzativi, progetti, esperienze*. Roma: Donzelli.

Council of Europe (COE). (2005, January). *Recommendation Rec(2005)2 of the Committee of Council of Europe (COE). (2005, January 19). Recommendation Rec(2005)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on good practices in and reducing obstacles to transfrontier and interterritorial cooperation between territorial communities or authorities.* Retrieved from https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=812155&Site=COE

Council of Europe (COE). (2011, November). Preparation of the conference on removing obstacles and promoting good practices on crossborder cooperation - Replies to the questionnaire. Retrieved from https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=LR-IC(2011)6%20Addendum&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864

Del Bianco, D. (2008). Euroregioni in Europa. Conference Proceedings "*La Sfida dell'Euroregione*". Gorizia: Accademia Europeista del Friuli Venezia Giulia.

Del Bianco, D. (2009). Prospettive euroregionali per il futuro delle governance dei territori italiani transfrontalieri. *Vita e Pensiero*, n3/2009.

Del Bianco, D. & Jackson, John. (2011). *Cross-border Cooperation Toolkit*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Del Bianco, D. & Bianchizza, C. (2015). *European Experience of Citizens' Participation in Cross-border Cooperation*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Ferrara, W. (2000). *Come funzionano le Euroregioni. Esplorazione in sette casi*. Gorizia: ISIG.

Galtung J. (1969). Violence, peace and peace research, *Journal of Peace research* 6, 3, pp. 167-191.

Gasparini, A. (2003). Processi di istituzionalizzazione: Vademecum per una buona Euroregione in *ISIG – Trimestrale di Sociologia Internazionale* n.3/4. Gorizia: ISIG.

Gasparini, A. (2008a). Governance della cooperazione transfrontaliera, in Pizio Ammassari, G., *Élites e processi decisionali tra politica ed economia. Analisi di casi* (pp. 167 – 214). Catanzaro: Rubbettino.

Gasparini, A. (2008b). *Cross-border co-operation in Central Europe. An analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats*. Gorizia: Council of Europe/ISIG.

Gasparini A, & Del Bianco, D. (2008). L'Europa centrale dei confini. Governance della cooperazione transfrontaliera, *Quaderni di Futuribili* 14. Gorizia: ISIG.

Gasparini, A., Del Bianco, D. (2005), *Eurego. Progetto di una euroregione transfrontaliera*. Gorizia: ISIG.

Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The problem of Embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology*, 91, pp. 481-93.

ISIG. (2010). *Analysis and Planning for Cross-border Co-operation in Central European Countries*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

ISIG & Council of Europe. (2014a). *Manual on Removing Obstacles to Cross-border Cooperation*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

ISIG & Council of Europe. (2014b). *EDEN: e-database empowering networks*. Retrieved from http://cbc.isig.it/.

Johansson, R. (1982). Boundary conflict in a comparative perspective a theoretical framework. In Strassoldo, R. & Delli Zotti, R. (ed.). *Cooperation and conflict in border areas*. Milano: Angeli.

Luhman, N. (1990). *Sistemi sociali: Fondamenti di una teoria generale*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Martinez, O.J. (1994). The dynamics of border interaction. New approaches to border analysis. in Schofield, C.H. (ed.). *Global Boundaries, World Boundaries*. Vol. 1. London: Routledge.

Mayhew, L. (1971). *Society: Institutions and Activity*. Glenview: Scotts-Foresman.

Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, E. (1999). Institutional rational choice: An assessment of the institutional analysis and development framework, in Sabatier P. A (ed.). *Theories of the Policy Process* (pp. 35 - 71). Boulder: Westview Press.

Paasi, A. (1986). The institutionalisation of regions: a theoretical framework for understanding the emergence of regions and the constitution of regional identity in Fennia. *International Journal of Geography,* 164.

Ricq, C. (2006). *Handbook of Transfrontier Cooperation.* Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Robiglio, C. (2005). *Verona Est. Le attività economiche e il territorio*. Università degli Studi di Verona, Università degli Studi di Trieste. Verona: CCIAA di Verona.

Sassen, S. (2000). Territory and territoriality in the global economy. *International Sociology*, 15, 2/June, pp.372-393.

Strassoldo, R. (1979). Temi di sociologia delle relazioni internazionali. La teoria dei confini in *Quaderni dell'ISIG* n. 5, ISIG Gorizia.

Strassoldo, R. e Gubert, R. (1973). The Boundary. An overview of its current theoretical status. In AA.VV., *Confini e regioni*. Trieste: LINT.

Struever, A. (2002). Significant Insignificance. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, 17-1.

Figure 1: Sectors of cross-border cooperation re-centralization
Source: (Del Bianco, 2009)

Areas of cross-border cooperation re-centralization

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Biljana Stojcevska has been working as an assistant professor at the School of Computer Science and Information Technology at the University American College Skopje since 2011. She received her PhD degree in Computer Science at the Institute of Informatics, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Sts. Cyril and Methodius, Skopje in the field of TCP congestion control. Her teaching involvement is currently concentrated in the areas of computer networks, operating systems and programming languages. Her research interests are focused on computer networks and network protocols.

Daniele Del Bianco, BSc (LSE-UK), MA, PhD (UniTS-IT) has been the Director of ISIG since 2012 and a researcher since 2004. He is a lecturer in the Sociology of Development at the University of Trieste. His main fields of research and study are in: European policy making (and participatory processes), local sustainable development, border studies and security studies. He has published scientific articles in Italian and international journals and volumes on these topics and is frequently invited as a speaker to various conferences in these fields.

Dushko Stojanovski holds a PhD degree in Criminal Law from the Faculty of Security at the Sts. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia. As of 2010, Dr. Stojanovski has been Professor at the University American College Skopje, teaching Criminal Law, Criminal Justice Law, International Criminal Law, Criminal Law – cases, Criminology, Criminalistics, War Crimes & Human Rights Protection, Terrorism & Human Rights, and Conflict Management. His main research interests are related to the investigation of crime, Homicide investigations on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, criminal justice law and international humanitarian law.

Ganka Cvetanova was born in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia in 1968. She graduated from the Faculty of Music Art in 1989, completed her MA at the same institution in 1994, and gained her PhD in Sociology at the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research (ISPPI) at the University of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje in 2006. From 2008 until 2010 she was a visiting professor at the University American College – Skopje. She participated in many domestic and international conferences as a lecturer and moderator. Currently, as an Associate Professor, she is the head of the postgraduate cultural studies department at ISPPI and teaches Culture and Identity; Ethnic Identity; Cultural Politics and Cultural Institutions; Digital Culture; and New Media and Democracy.

Ilijana Petrovska, PhD is an Associate professor lecturing several courses in the field of Marketing at University American College Skopje. In October 2013 she was promoted as Vice Dean for Education and continues to lead the Marketing Department. Her research area is mainly in Integrated marketing communications, Marketing in Banking, Measuring Marketing, Social media and Quality education. Her previous professional experience as a Marketing Manager in the biggest bank in Macedonia supports all her research and academic activities. She is also a professional consultant providing Executive education in Marketing. Since summer 2014 she has been supervising a research project in Measuring marketing at the Rome Business School.

Irena Bojadzievska holds a Doctorate in political science (PhD on e-Government), from the Institute for Sociological, Political and Judicial Research at the Sts. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje. She also specialized in European Contemporary studies, at the Institute for European Studies, University of Birmingham, in the UK (in 2008) and holds a Masters in International and European Comparative Law, and an LLM, from the Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussels, Belgium. Since 2012, she has been working at the Ministry of Information Society and Administration, the Department for telecoms and media, and as a Counselor for audiovisual media policy, a national coordinator for open data, focal point for OGP.

Ivan Dodovski is Associate Professor in Critical Theory. Currently he is Dean of the School of Political Science at University American College Skopje. He studied general and comparative literature with American studies, and obtained an MA degree in Macedonian literature and narratology at Sts. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. He holds a PhD from the University of Nottingham, UK. His recent research in the field of cultural studies is focused on politics and identity representation in contemporary Balkan drama. Dr. Dodovski has edited the volume *Multiculturalism in Macedonia: An Emerging Model* (2005), and five recent volumes dealing with European integration, politics, economy and culture. He has also published academic papers, three poetry books and a collection of short stories.

Ivana Stojanovska has a master's degree in computer science in the field of Software and Application Development. Currently she is a PhD student at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technologies in Skopje. She has more than eight years of working experience as a research and teaching

assistant at several computer-oriented modules, and currently she is an assistant at the School of Computer Science and Information Technology at UACS. She has development and research experience in several fields and is motivated and inspired to leverage advanced software technologies. She has a deep understanding of algorithms and also a very good knowledge on programming.

Jasmina Dimitrieva, PhD graduated as a lawyer with a doctoral degree in international public law, with focus on international and European election standards, and EU law. She has more than 20 years of work experience in international public law. She had worked as lawyer for the EU integration unit in the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, for the European Court of Human Rights, for the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and for the OSCE missions in Macedonia and Kosovo. Currently, she works as Legal and Human Rights Consultant in projects managed by OSCE, by the Council of Europe and by the Macedonian NGO sector in Macedonia and Armenia that focus on protection of the rights of prisoners, of minorities and legal education.

Jasmina Majstoroska, PhD is an Advisor in the Industrial Policy Unit within the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Macedonia. Her work experience and specialization is related to investment, trade promotion, the EU accession process, and economic development and competitiveness enhancement programs. She has followed many seminars abroad and in the country. During her work engagement in the Agency for Privatization and the Ministry of Economy she was involved and actively participated as a Macedonian counterpart in many projects realized with UNIDO, OECD, PHARE, USAID, GIZ, WB and other organizations. She has prepared as author and co-author many articles published in different journals and publications. She was a guest lecturer at the American College, The Institute of Economics and Faculty of Economics in Skopje.

Jeremy Cripps is Professor of Management and Accounting. He started into the profession in England as an apprentice with Coopers and Lybrand and became a Chartered Accountant. Winning a scholarship he then attended Case Western Reserve University, graduating and earning an MA in political science. After graduating he rejoined Coopers & Lybrand in Cleveland, became a CPA then transferred to New York working in Federal and then International Tax. Joining an American multinational as European Controller he gained international

experience in managerial accounting, computerized information systems, strategic planning, and compliance with national commercial legislation. Having a young family he transitioned into academia and earned Fulbright Scholarships in Zimbabwe (1994) and Bulgaria (2002). His academic activity includes many short-term consultancies with US Aid contractors most recently in Jordan, Iraq, and Tunis. From 2004 to 2011 he set up the ACBSP accredited undergraduate business program at the American University in Kuwait. He returned to the United States and is full-time on the faculty at the University of Findlay, Ohio.

Kimo Cavdar was born in Skopje in 1967. In June 1992 he graduated as a Bachelor of Law, in the Faculty of Law, at Sts. Cyril and Methodius University – Skopje; In November, 2001 he became a Master of Law, in the Faculty of Law, at Sts. Cyril and Methodius University - Skopje; In February, 2009, he gained his PhD (Thesis entitled: Political and Legal Aspects of Forced Denationalization Property in Macedonia), at the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research in Skopje, University of Sts. Cyril and Methodius - Skopje. In 2010 he published *Business Law* and a second book, *Obligation Law* was published for the students at UACS.

Krum Efremov, PhD is a Special Adviser to the Minister for Economic Diplomacy within the Ministry of foreign affairs of Republic of Macedonia. From 2010, he has been an Assistant professor at UACS. He was involved in the process of accession of the Republic of Macedonia to the World Trade Organization. He was a Chief Negotiator of the Republic of Macedonia for Agreement on the amendment of and accession to the Central European Free Trade Agreement – CEFTA 2006 and a President of the Council for Consumer Protection of the Republic of Macedonia (2004-2009). In 2003, he was participant on the "23rd Trade Policy Course" in Geneva, organized by WTO Training Institute.

Ljupcho Stevkovski holds a PhD degree from the Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus" in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia. In 2011 Stevkovski was elected Assistant Professor at the University American College Skopje, teaching Conflict management, Political Culture and Conflict Resolution and Mediation. Additionally, he has a considerable track record in working for the Macedonian National Security Bodies. His main research interests are related to regional security in the Western Balkans, security sector reforms, conflicts, foreign policy, right wing extremism, terrorism, radical religious groups, and energy policy.

Marina Andeva is an Assistant Professor at the UACS School of Political Science. Her other working engagements include the position of Research Fellow at the Institute of International Sociology in Gorizia (ISIG) since 2009. She finished her PhD in Transborder Policies for Daily life and MA in Methods in European Policy Making at the University of Trieste, Italy and her BA in Law at the Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus", Sts. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia.

Marjana Vaneva is an Assistant Professor and Dean of the School of Foreign Languages at the University American College Skopje. As a graduate teacher of English with an MA and PhD in Linguistics from the Sts. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, she mainly teaches English grammar subjects to English language students at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Her research interests are in the domain of applied linguistics, cognitive linguistics, semantics, contrastive analysis, language testing, and English language teaching. She has published on zero derivation, negative prefixes, homonymy and polysemy, cognition in teaching vocabulary, and also on teaching second/foreign language grammar.

Marko Andonov holds a PhD in the field of Business Law from the Sts. Cyril and Methodius University Skopje. Currently, he is a Dean of the School of Law within the University American College Skopje. At the same time, as Assistant Professor, he teaches courses in Company Law, Financial Law and Labor Law. His teaching and research areas are also related to Securities Law as well as the legal aspects of the investments funds. His work experience includes a supervisory position in the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Republic of Macedonia. As an expert, Dr. Marko Andonov has participated in the preparation of several bylaws that derive from the Securities Law. Also, he was a member of the working group that prepared the Law on Investment Funds for the Republic of Macedonia. Among other activities, he has been elected as educator in the Academy for Judges and Public Prosecutors of the Republic of Macedonia in the fields of Company Law and Labor Law.

Minas Bakalchev is an architect and professor at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Faculty of Architecture, Skopje. He graduated in Architectural Engineering in the Faculty of Architecture, Skopje, an MSc from the Faculty of Architecture, University of Belgrade, and a PhD. in Technical Sciences from the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje. He was co-curator of the Macedonian National Pavilion at the Venice Biennale 2006 and got a mention

for the project "City of Possible Worlds". Under the acronym MBMHP, he worked together with Prof. Dr. Mitko Hadzi Pulja on architectural projects, workshops and exhibitions. For their works, they got many city and national awards. He believes that architecture can change the world in the way the world changes us.

Mitko Hadzi Pulja is an architect and professor at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Faculty of Architecture, Skopje, grad. eng. arch. from the Faculty of Architecture, Skopje, M. Sc. from the Faculty of Architecture, University of Belgrade, Ph. D. in Technical Sciences from the Sts. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje. He was co-curator of the Macedonian National Pavilion at the Venice Biennale 2006 and gained a mention for the project "City of Possible Worlds". Under the acronym MBMHP, he worked together with Prof. Dr. Minas Bakalchev on architectural projects, workshops and exhibitions. For their works, they got many city and national awards. He believes that architecture can change the world in the way the world changes us.

Nikola Radunović is a PhD student at the Faculty of Political Science in Podgorica, Montenegro. The field of his research is media and communication, and in particular he is interested in communication issues concerning citizens and government in general. He is currently working on his dissertation which aims to explain all the factors and their influence to the process of implementing e-governance. He has a master's degree in Electrical Engineering as well as in Economics. He has twenty years of experience with the media, but also his professional activities are related to the implementation of telecommunications and ICT equipment and services.

Robert Hudson is Professor in European History and Cultural Politics at the University of Derby, and Director of the Identity, Conflict, and Representation Research Centre. A graduate of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, he held a Yugoslav government scholarship as a Postgraduate Fellow at the University of Sarajevo. In the 1980s, he lectured at Exeter College of Art and Design and the University of Rennes (France). Hudson was a faculty member of the EU Marie-Curie funded European Doctoral Enhancement Programme (EDEN) in Peace and Conflict Studies (1997 – 2010). He has revisited Yugoslavia and its successor states frequently since 1995 and during the 1990s participated on six missions with the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) as an election supervisor. He co-edited

Politics of Identity: Migrants and Minorities in Multicultural States (2000), *Different Approaches to Peace and Conflict Research* (2008), *Peace, Conflict and Identity: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Research* (2009), *After Yugoslavia* (2012) *Land and Identity* (2013) and *Affective Landscapes* (2014).

Stevo Pendarovski is Associate Professor in International Security and Foreign Affairs at the School of Political Sciences at the University American College Skopje. In the 1990s he was an Assistant-Minister for Public Relations and Head of the Analytical and Research Department in the Macedonian Ministry of Interior Affairs. In the last decade he has served as National Security and Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to two Presidents of the Republic of Macedonia. In 2004/5 he was a Head of the State Election Commission. His teaching and research areas include geopolitics, globalization, national security, US foreign policy, EU foreign and security policy, and small states in international affairs.

Veno Pachovski was born in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia in 1965. He graduated from Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Sts. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia in 1989, completed MSc in Mathematics and Computer Science in 2000 and gained his PhD in Computer Science at the same University in 2007. Since 2007, he has been teaching a variety of courses at the University American College – Skopje, mainly within the School of Computer Sciences and Information technology (SCSIT). His fields of expertise include Databases, Information systems and Natural language processing. Lately, his research activities have been aimed towards social networks and social media in general.

Violeta Bakalchev obtained her MSc degree in the field of Architecture and Design from the University American College, Skopje, School of Architecture and Design, Skopje, Macedonia. She currently holds the position of Assistant Professor at the University American College Skopje where she teaches subjects connected with architectural design. She has worked on a number of projects and investigations in Macedonia and in the neighboring countries. Her research interest is focused on the different aspects of modern residential projects and their role as a reference level for the research of the permanence and variability of the spatial, program basis of the modernity.

Zlat R. Milovanovic has been Professor of International Relations and Diplomacy and Business Ethics, since 2007. He concurrently served as Vice Rector of UACS. He was named Professor Honoris Causa at the UACS in August 2012. Milovanovic has a PhD in International relations from Temple University, a Doctorate in Public Law from the University of Nancy (Lorraine) and an MA in European Studies. He previously taught at Boston University Graduate Programs, Temple University, Glassboro University and SEEU (Tetovo). He has lectured in a range of universities, from South Africa and Rwanda to Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje, and has participated in many international meetings in the US, Africa, Europe and at the UN. He has various publications and is a member of the American Society for International Law, APSA, ISA, Macedonian Chamber of Mediators et al.

Zoran Sapurik holds a doctoral degree from the Sts. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. He is a tenured professor at University American College Skopje. His main areas of interest are the European Union and the environment. He has published several books and more than twenty papers in international journals. He was Minister of the Environment and Physical Planning in the Government of Macedonia.

University American College Skopje

Treta makedonska brigada 60, Skopje, Macedonia
www.uacs.edu.mk

Does the continued use of twenty-four working languages in the European Union maintain transparency or hinder communication? Would a shared, mono-lingual Union be the best way forward if we are to achieve more effective European integration? If so, which language might be chosen? And, how can we develop E-democracy in Europe at the same time as overcoming the marginalization and exclusion of the elderly through E-inclusion? What are the potential security outcomes of the current migration crisis in Europe and how might these be overcome through improved European Cooperation? Europe might well be at the 'End of the End of the Cold War', but rather than actually returning to the Cold War, does a multi-polar world based on mutual interdependence between states offer greater hope for the future? And, how can we further regional and cross-border cooperation across South Eastern Europe to enable the EU accession process of all Balkan countries? These are just some of the questions addressed in this volume which takes an in-depth look into the state of affairs affecting the vital layers of the architecture of the European Union. The authors explore new and alternative prospects of European integration from a critical and forward-looking perspective, whilst seeking solutions to the controversies and debates over future European enlargement.